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THE CYBERNETICS OF_LANGUAGE. - 
I 
Asa complement to the philosophy 
, 
of language, '. the. , cybernetics of language-is to synthesise a picture--of 
language as a whole; and runs into-(descriptive) 
difficulties where (at any one time) we can only speak 
about bounded portions of the world (Wittgenstein). 
This same difficulty permeates the short history of 
cybernetics in the concern for wholistic respresentation, 
and thus the concern of the cybernetics of language leads 
to (or arises in) the concern for the language of 
cybernetics. It_ beFomes,, resolvable in the context., of,. second 
order cybernetics (i. 'e. the 'cybernetics, of' descr. iliing as 
well as described systems (von Foerster)). 
The difficulty and the possibility of its resolution are 
introduced in terms of differences between Russell and 
Wittgenstein; in terms of the second order cybernetic 
discussions of the black box (seen as capturing 
Wittgenstein's silence and, in general, interpretation) and 
distinctions (G. S. Brown); and in terms of the distiction 
between natural and artificial languages and the problem of 
describing description (self-reference). Here the 
cybernetics of language concerns the nature of inquiry into 
our descriptive abilities and activities, and determines 
what we can and what we cannot (objectively) speak about. 
The notions of 'the function of language' and 'the 
existence of language' (presupposedtin a first order 
description) are shown to be mutually interdependent, 
giving rise to a paradox of means (and giving rise to the 
question of the 'origin of language'). This paradox is 
resolved where a language is seen as constructed (for a 
particular purpose), and thus the circularity is unfolded, 
considering that 
(i) in terms of a constructive function of language, 
there is no language (something is in the process of being 
constructed); 
(ii) in terms of a communicative function of language, 
such a construction is in the process of being accepted 
(something is being negotiated); 
(iii) in terms of an argumentative-function of- 
language, a language (accepted, eg. having, been`"" 
negotiated) is used to pegotiate things distinct from-this 
language. 
Language is seen as comprising the interaction between 
these activities. , The cybernetics-Of language 
is developed in terms of the 
requirements for an observer to construct, communicate and 
argue: a language is constructed for, -the 
description of 
these processes in terms of the; complementarity between 
description and interpretation__-tunderlying_the process of 
construction) and the complementarity between saying and 
doing (enabling an observer to explore, eg. question, test 
and explain his construction and distinguish another 
observer; and enableling two or more observers to negotiate 
and accept relations and argue by distinguishing both a 
language and the things this is used to describe). 
The text comprises three mahl parts, 
which can, but need not, be read in the 
order in which they occur. Of similar 
significance, consider "The "I" of 
Language", the first, seco»id or third part; 
"About and Beyond", the first or second 
part; and "What we can speak 'about" (a 
second or third part of "About and Beyond", 
or) the second or third part. 
Note: Only even page numbers appear. Odd page numbers 
refer to the top half of page. 
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Parts, 'Chapters' and 'Sections' are 
separated by "f", which vary in number 
showing a relation between the parts they 
separate. (One interpretation of these 
may be as the " "'s in the well known 
numbering of sections eq. 
1. $f 
ti, etc. ) 
Notes to the text are marked by the 
underlined first letter of a keyword in the 
text, and appear in alphabethical order of 
their keywords at the and of the texts. 
Reference to the context in which this 
could be written is made in the notes to 
the text. 
Numbers in the texts (oil. (12), (ii), 
etc. ) refer to the ideograms in the 
particular text in which they occur. 
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ABOUT and BEYOND 
"What we cannot speak about, 
we must pass over in silence. " 
There appear to be no bounds to the things 
we can speak about. We can speak about the 
weather, a tree, and. a cloud, in much the 
same way as we can speak about unicorns, 
the law of gravity, and quarks. We can 
speak about what we cannot speak about" in 
much the same way as we can make 
observations about the unobservable, 
concieve of the inconce*vable, 'and know 
that we do not know. 
The world of things we can speak about 
is bounded by what we cannot speak about, 
just as the world of things we can observe 
is bounded by what we cannot' observe, that 
of what we can conceive of by what we 
cannot conceive of, and that of what we can 
know by what we cannot know. But in that 
we can speak about this boundary, it 
appears within the world it bounds, and in 
so doing, it becomes subject to our 
curiosity. We can in turn speak about our" 
curiosity, and wonder about the object of 
our curiosity. Naturally, we begin to speak 
about this object, and in so doing, bring 
it inside the world of things we can speak 
about. 
The world of things we can speak about, 
appears to be an ever-growing world, which 
immediately finds a way of including 
within, anything which appears outside it. 
We are all too familiar with the 
unsatisfiability of our curiosity and the 
ever-changing nature of the things we 
wonder about. -Life would be of little 
interest if it was not for the "BEYOND" 
which we seak to bring within. 
Nevertheless, there is a difficulty in 
grasping the notion of an ever-growing 
world and the notion of a, boundary which is 
transcended as soon as it is perceived. 
(This difficulty is reflected in the 
tendency not to perceive Wittgenstein as 
speaking about "what we cannot speak 
about". In the tendency, not to think of 
knowing that we do not know as knowing 
something about the unknown. ) 
There is an incongruity between 
experiencing an ever-growing world In 
pursuing a curiosity and the difficulty in 
speaking about or conceiving of such a 
world (or boundary). It is a difficulty in 
rendering explicit what is intuitively 
obvious. As such it arises in the nature of 
speaking about a thing. The issue is not 
one of limits to the things which can be 
spoken about, but rather a question of how 
something is changed (or transformed) in 
being spoken about. 
The nature of this change can be 
compared to that involved in becoming aware 
of one's happinesai before I notice that I 
as happy, I as simply happy; having noticed 
my happvness, I may wonder about it, and 
may try to explain its cause or try to do 
something with it leg. visit a friend). 
Whatever I do, -I cannot recover the 
unreflocting happiness I had. Similarly, in 
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speaking about an thing we change its 
nature and our relation to IT. The change 
is reflected the circumstance that we have 
to speak about an IT. 
As a result of this change'(or 
transformation) we speak ABOUT a thingi we 
deliniate an object of attention and, in so 
doing, reify what we speak about. We create 
an IT. In speaking about a thing we 
distinguish it from ourselves as 
describers, conceivers, or knowers, of it. 
We distinguish it from the means by which 
we speak about it (and as a result we use 
one thing to speak about another). 
Prior to this change, what we do not- 
speak about (or the input to this 
transformation) lies BEYOND speaking. It 
lies beyond doubt and beyond description. - 
Where Wittgenstein's observation 
concerns this change, we need to remain' 
silent to grasp the qualities which are 
lost in speaking. We need to remain silent 
to grasp (the qualities which lie beyond 
description and beyond doubt). Rather than" 
suggesting a limit to the things we can 
speak about, Wittgenstein can be seen as 
acknowledging an activity complementary to 
speaking. 
My curiosity lies in the nature of the 
change involved in speaking{ in how what 
lies beyond is transformed in being'spoken 
about. To pursue this curiosity, I need to " 
consider both what is beyond being spoken 
about and what is spoken about. I need to 
speak about both. With anything I need to 
say about what lies beyond being spoken 
about, I need to break the silence. 
-It is this difficulty which underlies 
the difficulty in speaking about 
ever-growing worlds. It is'not that the 
notion, of such growth in itself lies beyond 
what we can speak about. It is rather that 
the dynamics of the ever-growing world of 
things we can speak about arises in the 
complementarity between what is spoken 
about and what, in so doing, must be passed 
over in silence. 
The notion of an ever-growing universe 
needs to be considered in a process of 
pursuing a curiosity between these two 
complementary activities. Any attempt to 
only contemplate speaking is bound to run 
into problems. C 
ýn 
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LORD RUSSELL AND MR. WIT1t3ENSTEIN 
The curiosity in the change involved in 
speaking about a thing leads to a 
predicament similar to that which left 
Russell with "a certain sense of 
intellectual discomfort" with 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus: ".. what causes 
hesitation is the fact that afterall Mr. 
Wittgenstein manages to say a good deale 
about what cannot be said... ". Russell's- 
discomfort arises with what he assumes to 
be Wittgenstein's explanation of this 
predicament, i. e. that what cannot be said 
can be shown. 
I might similarly do no more than draw 
attention to what is beyond being spoken 
about, and accept to give rise to -a similar 
hesitation. But, what allows Wittgenstein 
to say a good deal about what cannot be 
said, is what renders the world of things 
we can speak about ever-growing. What 
Russell objects to Is Just what gives rise 
to our curiosity. 
Where Russell continues, "... thus 
suggesting to the skeptical reader that 
possibly there may be some loophole through 
a hierachy of languages, or by some other 
exit. ", the suggestion arises that the 
pursuit of our curiosities provides just 
such a "loophole"; suggesting that it is in 
pursuing our curiosities that we give rise 
to a hierachy of languages. 
Russell's notion: of a "loophole" arises 
in too narrow an interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's silence. Where hierachies of 
languages can only arise in the pursuit of 
some curiosity or other, it is possible to 
speak about how, what lies beyond, is 
changed. in being spoken about, in a process 
of pursuing this particular curiosity 
(rather than speaking about curiosity per 
se). - 
sss 
RUS8ELL'8 "LOOPHOLE" 
AND WITTGENSTEIN'S BOUNDARY 
"Y 
Russell's discomfort with Wittgenstein's 
suggestion that, what cannot be said can 
nevertheless be shown, arises with 
Wittgenstein's notion of a boundary. 
Russell describes Wittgenstein's boundary 
as a ".. limitation of logic to the things 
within the world as opposed to the world as 
a whole". This is a generalisation from 
what he earlier describes as the 
".. fundamental instance of Wittgenstein's' 
thesis", i. e. "that it is impossible to say 
anything about the world as a whole, and 
that whatever can be said has to be said 
about bounded portions of the world. " 
These two formulations differ 
substantially in conception. The latter 
(Russell's initial) formulation suggests no 
particular boundary. It is compatible with 
the notion of the ever-growing world of 
things we can speak about. The former 
(Russell's later generalisation) is not. It 
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suggests that'there are given limitations 
of logic. The notion of given limitations 
appears to underly Russell's talk of a 
"loophole" (through which an "exit" might 
be found). His discomfort-arises in taking 
Wittgenstein to assert, and nevertheless 
transcend, such limitations. 
In terms of the earlier formulation 
(which I take to be closer to 
Wittgenstein's view), it is more difficult, 
if not impossible, to conceive of a 
"loophole". In this conception, cause for 
hesitation would arise if Wittgenstein were 
speaking about an un-bounded portion of the 
world. Russell makes no attempt to show 
such &difficulty. Instead, the phrase "a 
good deal", suggests that Russell has in 
mind particular, and hence bounded, things 
Wittgenstein manages to say. 
The notion of a (two-sided) boundary, 
reflected in Russell's notion of an "exit", 
is in direct contrast with Russell's awn 
rendering of Wittgenstein's 'boundary's 
"Our world may be bounded for some 
superiour being who can survey it from 
above, but for us, however finite it may 
be, it cannot have a boundary, since it has 
nothing outside it... and in like manner 
our logical world has no logical boundary 
because our logic knows of nothing outside 
it. " It is difficult to see how in the 
absence of a boundary (in the ordinary 
sense) there can be a "loophole", or an 
"exit", through it! 
In contrast to Russell's two sided 
boundary, Wittgenstein appears to speak 
about a one-sided boundary. This suggestion 
arises in his observation, that to'conceive 
of the limitations of thought, we would 
have to be able to conceive of what we 
cannot conceive of, i. e. conceive of what 
would be beyond such limitations. This he 
persists we cannot do. 
In terms of this difference in the 
conception of a boundary, it can be shown, 
that what Russell perceives as a 
contradiction, is in fact a 
complementarity. 
sss 
RUSSELL'S SELF IMPOSED "LIMITATIONS" 
AND HIERACHIES OF LANGUAGES 
The fact that Wittgenstein manages to say a 
good deal about what cannot be spoken 
about, can only be established by 
considering both Wittgenstein and the act 
in which he speaks. Russell, however, deems 
the act of speaking, and the person 
performing this act, irrelevant to logic as 
"facts on their own account". 
The boundedness of what we can speak 
about can be relativised and transcended in 
the activity of speaking. In the act of 
-speaking, and speaking about one thing at a 
time, the complementarity between what we 
spear about and what we pass over in 
silence is generative (rather than 
exclusive). Thus, it is in pre-empting what 
_may 
or may not be relevant to the language 
Wittgenstein has in mind, that Russell, 
himself, imposes the limitations he takes 
a 
Wittgonstain as asserting! 
Russell devotes a good deal of his 
introduction to the discussion of what is 
and is not relevant to logic. Propositional 
attitudes of the sort 'A believes that P', 
he suggests can be abstracted as "fictions" 
relevant only to a "psychological relation 
of intention or association or what not. " 
No doubt they can be thus excluded. But it 
is in then turning his attention to what he 
has deemed irrelevant to logic (to one 
language), that he finds it necessary to 
introduce another language. It is in 
pursuing and changing his curiosity that he 
actually begins to generate another 
language. It is in skeptically considering 
what he previously deemed irrelevant, that 
he perceives the possibility of-a hierachy 
of such languages. It is in transcending 
the limitations he imposes on himself, that 
he perceives the possibility of a 
"loophole". 
: sa 
AN ENDLESS HIERACHY OF LANGUAGES 
The notion of "limitations" arises in 
Russell's generalisation of the notion that 
whatever can be said, has to be said about 
(particular) bounded portions of the world. 
Russell's notion of a hierachy of languages 
arises in connection with his discussion of 
"... the totality of things in the world and 
thus involves the attempt to conceive of 
the world as a whole. " The problem arises 
in that Russell's generalisation excludes 
the agent who is assumed to conceive of the 
world as a whole. The notion of the 
totality of possible propositions relies on 
overlooking the speaker who actually 
proposes these. Russell proceedes. "These 
difficulties suggest to my mind some such 
possibility as this( that every language 
has, as Mr. Wittgenstein says, a structure 
concerning which, IN THE LANC3UAOE, nothing 
can be said, but that there may be another 
language. dealing with the structure of the_ 
first language and having itself a new 
structure, and that to this hierachy of 
languages there may be no limit. " The 
notion of an unlimited hierachy of 
languages can only arise in considering the 
possibility of going on and an pursuing a 
curiosity. It cannot arise in the actuality 
of our pursuits. In terms of such a 
hierachy, what we do speak about, we speak 
about on a particular level. 
It is in contemplating generalisations 
and possibilities that the reification 
involved in speaking leads to pitfalls. 
Only with regard to the possible, can 
Russell speak of "every language". Only 
with regard to the possible, can he suggest 
"that there may BE another language.. '. 
Only in such generalisation, can he 
consider the existence of such a thing as a 
language. In the actual pursuit of a_ 
curiosity, there say, at any one time, be a 
language. In actually pursuing a curiosity 
the language is continuously changing. 
There is a world of difference between an. 
Ever-changing language and a hierachy of 
(languages. 
Only in assuming the existence of a 
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language, can Russell speak of its 
"structure". To speak of a "structure" as 
Russell does, is to presuppose some such 
thing as a system of rules, for speaking 
that language (eg. a syntax and a 
semantics). It is to presuppose that such 
things can in turn be spoken about. It is 
to presuppose a hierachy of languages in 
the first place. 
In contrast, Wittgenstein's notion of 
"structure" concerns what is beyond being 
spoken about. It concerns the act of 
speaking and the impossibility of 
overcoming the structure of speaking. The 
structure in which we can only speak about 
bounded portions of the world. The 
structure in which Russell is caught in 
speaking about a language. The structure 
(or form, as I shall call it) in which we 
are bound to assert the existence of a 
language in speaking about it. The 
structure in which we are bound to assert 
the boundedness of a language, imposing 
limitations on it, so as to be able to 
speak about it. In the process, the 
'language' we speak about becomes a static 
and bounded portion of language. The 
possibility of speaking about the 
structure" of a language arises only with 
regard to such a bounded portion of 
language. 
There is a world of difference between 
speaking of the structure of language (or 
the form of speaking as Wittgenstein does) 
and speaking of the structure of a language 
(as Russell does). 
In speaking about a language. its 
existence is presupposed. But the fact that 
we can use a language to to speak about 
itself, does not touch upon the structure 
Wittgenstein is concerned with. There is a 
world of difference between the syntactic 
and semantic structure of a language, and 
the structure of speaking; the structure by 
which we are bound to speak of bounded 
portions of the world, rather than being 
able to speak of the world as a whole. This 
difference in the notion of "structure", 
leaves Wittgenstein's thesis unaffected by 
Russells suggested "totality". 
Russell continues i "Mr Wittgenstein 
would of course reply that his whole theory 
is applicable unchanged to the totality of 
such languages. " Wittgenstein's structure 
cannot be captured in Russell's hierachy of 
languages. The hierachy is generated by 
speaking about languages. To speak about 
languages, is to use the structure of 
speaking. 
tt! 
WITTIENSTEIN"S LANGUAGE 
Wittgenstein's suggested reply that what he 
says about language also applies to a 
limitless hierachy of languages, suggests 
that, concerning the things he speaks 
about, there is no distinction between the 
language and a hierachy of languages. This 
corresponds to the observation that natural 
language is its own meta-language, and 
suggests that Wittgenstein is speaking 
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about natural language; that his 
observations concern natural language and 
apply to any narrower sense of a language, 
because they concern natural language. 
Wittgenstein's discussion of logic 
overshadows this suggsetion. But a logic is 
constructed by someone using his natural 
language abilities. A logic is a 
construction within natural language. Where 
Wittgenstein is concerned with the 
construction of logical systems, he is 
thus, concerned with the natural (language) 
ability (to construct artificial 
languages). 
In terms of this suggestion, the fact 
that Wittgenstein manages to say a good 
deal about what cannot be said, reflects 
the difference between natural and 
artificial languages. Limitations are 
introduced in constructing an artificial 
language; they distinguish artificial 
languages from natural language. We 
introduce limitations in the act of 
speaking about a thing. We overcome 
limitations in pursuing and changing our 
curiosities. 
s, . 
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THE LANGUAGE OF CYBERNETICS 
AND 
THE CYBERNETICS OF LANGUAGE 
To speak about a thing, is to distinguish 
it. In speaking we are bound to limit what 
we speak about. While such limitations 
allow for the construction of artificial 
languages, they appear to render a 
description of natural language impossible. 
In enabeling us to pursue our curiosities 
natural language cannot be bounded. Where 
we can speak only of bounded portions of 
the world, natural language cannot be 
spoken about. 
'hat is beyond being spoken about, not 
lending itself to being bounded, can only 
be captured as a whole. The difficulties in 
speaking about what is beyond being spoken 
about, lead to the concern with the whole. 
It is this concern, based on the 
observation that the whole is greater than 
the sum of the parts, which underlies 
cybernetic pursuits over the last half 
century (just the period since the 
differences between Russell and 
Wittgenstein). The difference between a 
philosophic and a cybernetic approach to 
language, concerns these difficultiest 
notionally, language is analysed and spoken 
about in the Philosophy of Language, while 
the Cybernetics of Language is to 
synthesise a picture of language as a 
whole. 
The appeal of such a simple distinction 
is superficial and the difficult] es of 
either approach are reflected in the other. 
But, as a rough characterisation, it 
captures a substantial difference in 
intention in contemplating language. In 
the complementary aspects of the difficulty 
in speaking about language, the caricature 
"philosopher" is limited to speak only 
about bounded portions of language and the 
caricature "cybernetician" is silence bound 
from the outset! 
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SILENCE BOUND FROH THE OUTSET 
'Silence bound from the outset', is not 
unfair a characterisation of cybernetics. 
Taking Wittgenstein seriously (as most 
cyberneticians would) this predicament 
arises with the very concern with the 
whole. Cybernetics, and General Systems 
Theory, have from the outset been concerned 
with wholistic forms of representation, 
without which, the concern for the whole 
must be doomed to failure or silence. 
Where the difficulties of developing 
wholistic forms of representation were 
by-passed, in an attempt to show results in 
this initially very promising new concern, 
such a failure was indeed registered. When 
it became apparent that anything could be, 
_, called a system and that little or nothing 
need be achieved in doing so, disillusion 
took the place of promise. Disrepute may 
have been (and in some cases still is) 
deserved. What may not have been so 
apparent, to either the systems consultant 
or his client, was that the wholeness of 
the system remained in the eye of the 
beholder. That the wholeness of the system, 
as system (rather than in the organisation 
of its component parts), had to be passed 
over in silence. Seeing a system as'a 
whole, a systems consultant may have been 
able to make suggestions concerning its 
improvement, and these may have proved 
successfull. But, without a means to speak 
about his insight, he was bound to appear 
as a visionary magician, transparently 
disguised as pseudo-scientist, or as a 
craftsman, in the best sense of the word. 
Craft or art is compatible with 
Wittgenstein's silence. It is perhaps the 
only, perhaps the most common, expression 
of this silence. Why then did the concern 
with the whole not settle as a craft, an 
art, acknowledging the limitations of 
science, bound to representations and hence 
to bounded portions of the world? 
Paradoxes have an unsettling and 
unresting influence. They cannot simply be 
dismissed. While giving the appearance of 
craftsmen, cyberneticians (or at least 
those who did not leave the development of 
wholistic representations to others) have 
remained pre-occupied with their 
paradoxical predicament, being silence 
bound from the outset. A coffee-table 
definition of cybernetics in the mid 
seventies reflects this preoccupations 
"Cybernetics"is philosophy with your feet 
on the ground! ", acknowledging the craft of 
this art, while nevertheless claiming an 
intersubjectivity so clearly beyond, if not 
bound to defeat, such craft. It shows the 
cybernetician torn between sharpening his 
tools as a artisan (doer) or pursuing his 
faith that his insights could be expressed 
the faith in the possibility of a language 
of cybernetics which could transcend the 
limitations of science and logic, 
transcending the' limitations of speaking, 
as, for instance. Russell had perceived 
them. ' 
However, 'such perplexity can only have 
been an apparent one. Silence bound, the 
ie 
cybernetician may have been a coffee-table 
looser; or confuser if pressed to break his 
silence. His pains must have been those of 
seeing the beauty of silence contrasting 
with the coffee-table embarrasment over,, 
silences. Silence bound, he may have been 
unable to resolve one in the other. But, 
with in. the recent advent of a "language of 
cybernetics" (or something I suggest 
deserves this description) many a 
cybernetician's apparent silence reveals an 
expression of his wholistic concern. So 
many in fact that the advent of. this 
language might not be considered so recent 
after alle the silence appears to have been 
deceptive. 
Only a decade ago there appeared to be 
no such thing as a language of cybernetics. 
Often, what was (and in many cases still 
is) paraded as "cybernetics", had all the 
appearances of a craftsman's "bag of tools" 
or a magician's "bag of tricks". For a 
people concerned with the whole, it seemed 
odd to make do with a bag of parts. Some 
carried their bags, shamefully, closed very 
tight. Others sought the protection of more 
reputable disciplines. 
But, others protested that familiar 
forms taken lightly should be taken rather, 
more seriously. They turned their concern 
with the whole to their bag of parts and 
considered the, "Cybernetics of 
Cybernetics". Whether they applied their 
silence to their silence or in silence 
could see the point of their silence, what 
sprang from it, sprang from it so obviously 
that it could only have been there, 
silently, all along. What sprang from 
applying cybernetics to cybernetics (an 
undertaking, perhaps paradoxically called 
"second order cybernetics") was the form of 
applying a thing to itself 
(self-reference). What sprang from applying 
silence to silence was the unpartiallity 
and wholenesss, of silence (closure). 
Silence bound from the outset, they had 
arrived, before they had begun, the form of 
wholistic representation, lay in the form of 
their silence. 
They had arrived before they had begun, 
by being silence bound, for the form of 
silence can hold a whole. This is just what 
Wittgenstein observed. Knowing the form of 
the silence, this form, rather than the 
silence itself, can be used to represent 
wholes. Suprisingly, or perhaps not 
suprisingly at all, such forms of 
representation have allways been used. 
They had arrived before they had begun 
since the form which can hold a whole lay 
in their silence. For something to be 
partial (made up of parts), we must be able 
to distinguish it, as well as its parts. 
While we may distinguish silence from 
speaking, we cannot distinguish parts of a 
silence (without thereby breaking the 
silence). We cannot distinguish one silence 
from another silence (except on grounds 
external to the silence). If, for example, 
I try to apply being silent to being 
silent, I remain silent. But what, while 
being obvious, deserves discovery, is that 
while I may initially think that I apply 
one silence to another, I cannot keep the 
two appart. If I try, I start speaking, at 
least to myself! The form of the silence is 
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that-. of; what, applied to itself, is itself. 
This form can hold .a whole, precisely 
because it sakes no sense to say this is 
one and this is another silence. 
They had arrived before they began, as 
the form for the representation of wholes, 
lay, silently, in the form of their paradox 
(silence bound from the outset). The form 
is well known, but had been recognised only 
in examples which leadýto problems, i. e. 
Paradoxes. Where there is only one, where 
two are truely one, they cannot be 
distinguished. Where the two remain in the 
one,. instead, we (can be lead to) was the 
one and the two warring within it. - 
Where two things are one, we tend to 
perceive an ambiguity. We perceive it in 
asking which ofthe two it is now. But, 
ambiguity is not of the silence. Ambiguity 
comes about in beginning hers or there,. 
where there can be no beginning or end. ` 
Where two things are one, qiw whole, there 
is only one, there is no ambiguity. It is 
in speaking, -that ambiguity arises. -- 
The concern with (and"the problems of) 
the representation of wholes; leads 
naturally to the cybernetics of language. 
It does so in terms of the cyberneticians 
predicament of being silence bound from the 
outset. Rather, than applying one thing to 
another (eg. cybernetic thinking to 
language), the cybernetics of language 
coincides with the concern to develops a 
language of cybernetics. The problems 
resolved in the 'discovery" of a language 
of cybernetics, could only be resolved in a 
quest concerning the cybernetics of 
language. 
, 
However, the cybernatics'of'language 
cannot be an analysis (! )'of language using 
an outmoded cybernetic "bag of tools", such 
as information theory, -feed-back systems, 
flow charts, production systems, transition 
networks and the like. It has nothing to do 
with such first order attempts to apply (! ) 
cybernetics to language, as pervade 
computational and mathematical linguistics 
or the notion of an information theoretical 
study of natural language, the notion of 
machine translation or the 
cybernetic/systemic inspiration underlying 
Chomsky's work. In such first order terms, 
the very notion of a 'cybernetics of 
natural language' is contradictory. Any 
attempt to analyse language in terms of, or 
to 'apply' such cybernetic notions to 
natural language is doomed to contradictory 
entanglements. Such attempts are 
constrained to limited portions of 
language, i. e. 'to artificial languages. 
Instead, the cybernetics of language ' 
arrises in the concern with wholistic farms 
of representation, recognising and 
exploring the necessary partiality of 
speaking. Cyberneticians must have been 
exploring the cybernetics of language (not 
for the sake of exploring language, but) 
simply in the attempt to overcome being 
silence bound. In the process of 
transcending limitations of expression (in 
Russell's sense), they must have explored 
the cybernetics of language, exploring 
Wittgenstein's silence (even ifs or perhaps 
precisely because, they did not write great 
volumes on the cybernetics of language). 
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What, if not a silent exploration of 
Wittgenstein's silence, is the cybernetics 
of language? How, but by breaking the 
silence, can 'second order' cybernetics 
give it expression? Applying cybernetics to 
cybernetics, applying silence to silence, 
the cybernetics of language finds its 
expression in the application of language 
to language. 
This is not unfamiliar. Logicians have 
long observed that natural language is its 
own meta-language,, and hence the 
cybernetics of language amounts to the 
exploration of what logicians call natural 
language. But, any linguist would take the 
application of language to language as a 
home truth= as his inevitable predicament. 
Where, he may wonder, lies the novelty in 
exploring this predicament? 
In this simple characterisation, the 
logician and the linguist coincide in their 
recognition of the inevitability of 
applying natural language to itself. They 
differ, however, in how they view the 
consequences of this observation. The 
logician concludes that he is silence-bound 
concerning natural language (his way of 
saying so, is to say that natural language 
has no describable semantics). The 
linguist, instead, proceeds to describe 
natural language, its syntax, its semantics 
and its pragmatics. Where both are quite 
respectable, the contrast is somewhat 
puzzeling, and it may be in the resolution 
of this puzzle, that the value of the 
cybernetics of language lies. 
Concerned with artificial languages, the 
logician recognises that he uses one 
language to describe another. Confounded 
with the a situation of using one language 
to describe itself, he recognises the 
limitation of his approach (assuming that, 
to a logician 'describing' a language leans 
describing it in a language other than the 
language he is describing). The linguist 
never has the option of distinguishing the 
describing language from the described 
language. He has no doubts about what his 
language can and cannot describe. Evidently 
he uses it to describe everything around 
him. In turning his curiosity to the 
language itself, he overlooks that he can 
only speak about bounded portions of the 
world. In using natural language to 
describe 'natural language', he restricts 
his description of natural language to a 
bounded portion of natural language. 
In either case the application of 
language to language, leads to a pair of 
languages (the object- and seta-language). 
The two, war within the one (mare or less 
paradoxically). Where the language is the 
meta-language, the logician is in the 
predicament of being silence bound from the 
outset. Where the language is the 
meta-language, the linguist in the 
predicament of the craftaan. In their 
differences, the logician and the linguist, 
thus share the predicament of early 
cybernetics. Where this predicament is 
beginning to be resolved in the language of 
cybernetics (in second order cybernetics), 
the cybernetics of language provides, th" 
. possibility of resolving 
these 
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difficulties. 
In exploring this possibility, I am 
aware that I am merely giving expression to 
thoughts and experiments concerning the 
possibility of expressing the whole as a 
whole, which have, more or less silently, 
pervaded cybernetic thought throughout its 
brief history. It is. to this enterprise and 
the perseverance of those who remained 
committed to its resolution, that I am 
endebted. I hope perhaps to throw some 
light on some of their silences. 
:f 
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OR 
WIfTGENSJEIN'S SILENCE IN THE BLACK BOX 
I have considered cybernetics in terms of 
Wittgenstein's silence, and used it to show 
why I shall mostly be concerned with second 
order cybernetics. I now turn to consider 
how Wittgenstein's silence may find an 
expression in the transition from first to 
second order cybernetics. 
If there is one familiar cybernetic 
notion which carries over from first to 
second order cybernetics, it is that of the 
black box. In the first order sense, we can 
describe ourselves as using watches, pocket 
calculators, telephones, bus systems, and 
the like, as black boxes. We can use a 
thing and know how it behaves, without 
knowing how it works. 
To ask how it is that we can do so, - to 
wonder how it is that we can use a thing 
without knowing how it works, is to ask a 
second order question. But here our ability 
to use things without knowing how they 
work, cannot be explained without 
considering what we do with a"particular 
thing. In the second order sense, the black 
box device cannot be seperated from what we 
do with it. In using a thing as a black box 
(eg a pocket calculator) we are involved as 
intentional and selecting beings. We ignore 
features (eg. its internal workings) which 
are irrelevant to what want to do with 
thing we treat as a black box. To deny such 
involvement, would be to deny the essential 
perceptual mechanisms which allow us to 
ive in a complex world. 
But, if our ability to use things as 
black boxes arises in such perceptual 
mechanisms, we cannot escape using these 
same mechanisms to look at how it is that 
we can use things as black boxes. We cannot 
escape using a black box to study the black 
box. Inevitably, we assume the workings of 
the black box in studying how the black box 
works (we deem the workings of the black 
box irrelevant in our attempt to study the 
workings of the black box)! 
This difficulty closely resembles 
Wittgenstein's notion of the structure 
which cannot itself be said. It cannot 
itself be said, since whatever can be said, 
will need to have this same structure. In 
using a black box, we say that we don't 
know, and don't care to speak about, what 
it contains. Thus the black box is also a 
device for capturing (without in any 
ordinary sense speaking about) what we 
cannot speak about. 
Russell's hesitation (that Mr. 
Wittgenstein manages to say a good deal 
about what cannot be said) becomes apparent 
in the difficulty in using the conventional 
black box to discuss the transformation 
between what is beyond (shown as B) and 
what we can speak about (shown as A). The 
attempt to describe this transformation in 
terms of a black box results in questioning 
the very device of the black box. Consider 
B as the input (I) to our transformation 
(shown as T), and A as the output (0) of a 
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black box lbB)s 
In using a black box, we infer its 
behaviour by comaring (a series of) outputs 
with their respective inputs. -We infer what 
the black box does, seeing what comes out 
and knowing what went an, i. e. 
ýIO 
(z) 
Such comparison, however, relies on the 
comprability of the in- and outputs. To 
compare how what is beyond is changed in 
being spoken about, it is necessary to 
speak about both, what we can speak about, 
and what is beyond being spoken about. 
Where what is beyond must be passed over in 
silence, 'it' cannot be the input to a 
black box, but is rather part of, or 
contained in, the black box, i. e. 
(3) 
rT. l1_1_1 _A 
While this captures Wittgenstein's silence, 
it resultsin a black box with nothing but 
an output! Hence the black box device, in 
the first order sense, cannot be used to 
consider how what lies beyond is 
transformed in being spoken about. 
(Parallel to Russell's conclusion regarding 
the limitations of logic, first order 
cybernetics here runs into the limitations 
of the black box). The black box cannot be 
used to capture something which transcends 
its very structure. 
In terms of second order cybernetics, 
however,. the circumstance that what lies 
beyond being spoken about, must be included 
within the black box, shows the nature of 
the black box. The black box is not simply 
inapplicable to the transformation involved 
in speaking; the use of the black box 
itself, involves this transformation. 
Consider now the interaction between 
what is spoken about and what is beyond in 
the pursuit of a curiosity. Clearly, this 
transformation is not one-directional. The 
process in which the universe of things we 
can speak about is ever-growing arises with 
our curiosity. It arises in that, as soon 
as we have spoken about a thing, we can 
raise a doubt about the distinction by 
which we have distinguished it. Where 
speaking about. a thing is an input to, the 
transformation, something beyond being 
spoken about can be its "output", i. e. 
13 
In isolation, -this makes 
for yet more 
difficulties with the black box, resulting 
in a black box without an outputs 
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(5) A 
But, considered in the process of pursuing 
our curiosities, the failure to capture 
this transformations in terms of the black 
box, shows the black box to be what allows 
us to infer what is beyond being spoken 
about from what we can speak about. Thus 
combining (2) and (5), to show a process of 
switching between speaking and passing over 
in silence: 
ý6ý A-ý f -A 
The difficulties in trying to apply the 
black box to this transformation are the 
difficulties resolved in the transition 
between first and second order cybernetics, 
i. e. the difficulties of trying to apply 
the black box to itself. Where 
Wittgenstein's silence (what is beyond 
being spoken about) is contained within the 
black box, this 'explains' why the black 
box is black. The correspondence between 
Wittgenstein's silence and the black box, 
thus allows for an exploration of how the 
change involved in speaking about a thing 
is captured in the device of the black box 
(and how the black box is captured in this 
transformation); showing Wittgenstein's 
silence as a black box. 
st: 
SILENT BLACK BOXES 
Where the black box is a device for 
infering what is beyond, from what we can 
speak about, what is inside the black box 
cannot, and need not, be infered by 
comparing the input with the output. In 
whatever way the input transformation  ay 
change what is spoken about, the output 
transformation will counteract this where 
what is beyond being spoken about is 
changed in being spoken about. Any number 
of such transforations can be embedded 
within a black box. Any number of "black 
boxes" can be embedded within a black box, 
eg. 
All that can be of concern, all we deem 
relevant in designating a black bdx, are 
the things we DO speak about; 
M) AAA 
All that can be spoken about, all that can 
be explained (using a black box), is spoken 
About or- explained; 
32 
on A-- ; --> A --> ,"A 
In using the black box to speak about or 
explain such things as may have been 
contained within it, the black box is 
opened or whitened. Hence, the "description 
of a black box" (D), which is 
conventionally shown as a white box, 
A, Ay 
«oý 
is nothing but a string of things we (can) 
speak about: 
11) A-4 
Wittgenstein's "What we cannot speak 
about, we must pass over in silence", is 
refleted in the impossibility of either a 
black box without an input (2), or a black 
box without an output (5). Both (2) and 43) 
are results of trying to capture the change 
involved in speaking about a thing 
statically. The difficulty-is resolved 
where this change is considered over time 
(in the process of pursuing our curiosity). 
Wittgenstein's silence is also reflected 
in an oddity in this discussion of black 
boxes. The boxes shown, are all but black. 
The ideograms show what is inside them, 
speaking about what the black box contains. 
The discussion of black boxes, is but a 
string of things we speak about. In 
speaking about what a black box can be 
presumed to contain, i. e. what cannot, be 
brought outside the black box, the black 
box is whitened, and hence eliminated, qua 
black box. Where the black box is spoken 
about, rather than used, this should not be 
suprisingi setting out to explain and hence 
whiten the black box. Where, the black box 
is used to speak about the black box, this 
shows the process involved. 
But the black box is white only insofar 
as it said, or known, to contain what we 
cannot speak about. It is black in that we 
cannot speak about, and cannot know, what 
in particular it may contain on any 
occasion. Hence the black box is a device 
for knowing that we don't (as yet) know. It 
is a device which allows us to pursue our 
curiosities; a device for finding out by 
subjecting what we don't (as yet) know, to 
our curiosity. The black box can thus be 
thought of as placed to raise a doubt or 
ask a question. Thus (temporarily 
substituting a questionmark for its 
blackness to avoid a reification of the 
black box), the ideogram 
,, 
-27 
AÖ 
t12) 
A_ A,, 
- 
_2? shows an answer to a question shown in the 
ideogram 
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(131 AX 
Where the black box is thus taken as a 
place for raising a doubt or asking a 
question, this shows that any answer, 
(whitening the black box in a string of 
things we (can) speak about), can raise 
more doubts, and lead to more questions, 
than it answers. This potential 
(regression) shows why we cannot consider 
the black box without considering ourselves 
and what we do with it. If black boxes were 
placed automatically (if the black box 
raised questions, rather than being used by 
us to raise questions), it would be 
impossible to begin to answer a question! 
No such problem arises where our use of 
a black box, to actually wonder'about a 
, 
thing and pursue a curiosity, is 
considered. In placing a black box to raise 
a doubt or ask a question at a particular 
time (t), an expression stated is changed, 
showing how we use the black box in 
changing our curiosity, eg. (returning to 
, show 
black boxes as black)s 
(14) 
ti state 
A 
L""1., ) 
t2 ask 
&M! 
"1, 
t3 answer 
&C' 
äAv 
resulting in longer and longer descriptions 
of the relation about which we pursue a 
curiosity. 
Similarly, the opposite process to the 
pursuit of a curiosity, i. e. the process of 
accepting relations described, can be shown 
in terms of the placing of black boxes, 
again changing relations stated: 
(15) 
ti state AA 
t2 accept 
t3 state  A. 
t4 accept 
Placed within a black box, descriptions 
made, merge in the act of acceptance (a 
process l will later discuss as the process 
of construction). 
Taking these ideograms to show relations 
between things we can speak about, the 
process of pursuing a curiosity c&n, at 
each point in time, be paraphrased in a 
single proposition of the form 
OX relates Y to Z" 
Instead, a similiar paraphrase of the 
process of accepting rMns into 
difficulties, or is at bast cuabfrsom., sq. 
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"X relates tu Y, 
a ... 11 of which relates to Z, 
... all of which relates to 5. " 
While these paraphrases are notional, they 
show a correlation between the difficulties 
of showing these processes in terms of the 
first order black box, and a corresponding 
difficulty in speaking about them, or 
expressing ttiem in our day to day language: 
speaking, and expressing ourselves, 
'supports' the process of pursuing of a 
curiosity and 'supresses' the process of 
accepting. -This correlation reflects on the 
relation between language and ontology 
(what we take to be the case). It reflects 
on the relation between construction and 
the pursuit of a curiosity, on the nature 
of these processes, and on their 
interaction with language: what is accepted 
is passed over in silence (placed within a' 
black box), while the pursuit of a 
curiosity arises in speaking (whitening 
black boxes, giving rise to more black 
boxes). 
Used as such, the black box bears a 
stricking resemblance to Wittgenstein's 
"Satzzeichen", i. e. that which, being part 
of a sentence, cannot itself be said. The 
placing of black boxes, shows why the 
"Satzzeichen" cannot itself be said. 
Placing a black box between two 
expressions, we change our curiosity, and 
hence bring about a new expression. The 
distinction between the place-holder "? ", 
showing a place where'a doubt can be 
raised, and the actual placing of a black 
bo,: (shown as a black square), corresponds 
to the distinction between the- 
"Satzzeichen" which is not part of the 
Rxpression (but indicative of a connection 
(which might be questioned)) and a part of 
an expression (addressing such a 
connection). If the "Satzzeichen" where 
said, the expression would be changed, and 
the "Satzzeichen" would no longer be a 
"Satzzeichen". The actuall placing of a 
black box involves a consequent answer. If 
the "Satzzeichen" could be said (if the 
placing of black boxes were automatic), an 
infinite regression would result. Such 
automatic placing of black boxes, and such 
a regression, is entailed by the attempt to 
speak about what we must pass over in 
silence, eg. in the expression 
"A1, A2, A3. ", 
three things are related together by some 
unspoken connections, shown by the 
"Satzzeichen" ", " and ". " If these were in 
turn to be said, shown as "o". 1. w. 
"AloA2oA3o", 
and if such saying, were in. turn to be 
treated as part of the expression, the 
connections between the said things "a" 'and 
the other things in the expression would 
eventually need to be considered, i. e. 
"AloooA2oooA3oo" 
and so on and on. 
Where this regression arises in the 
nature of speaking, it is only the silence, 
Wittgenstein postulates. which enables us 
to speak sensibly (without involving 
ourselves in regressions of this kind with 
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every one thing we say). If the point is 
trivial, it is that in every-day life we 
are accustomed to pass things over in 
silence. In its triviality, however, this 
shows the danger of attempts (eg. , 
semantics) to render our silences explicit. 
Such attempts mis-take things spoken about 
for what is beyond being spoken about, and 
in so doing, explore just such a regression 
(generating such hierachies as Russell 
suggested). 
In our actual activities, we avoid this 
regression. We stricke a balance between 
pursuing our curiosity and constructing on 
the basis of what we accept; a balance 
between wondering and accepting; a balance 
between considering things and forgetting 
them; a balance between what we question 
and learn (epistemology) and what we refuse 
to question and accept as given (ontology). 
ss" 
SPEAKING BLACK BOXES 
The black box can thus be interpreted as a 
device for directing, and selecting where 
to direct, our attention, both in the 
process of pursuing a curiosity. and the 
process of construction. 
The possibility of placing a black box, 
raising a doubt, arises in an expression or 
description we have made. In placing a 
black box, this expression or description 
is changedi in directing our attention to a 
particular relation, we change our 
curiosity. An expession cannot be made (a 
relation cannot be stated) and considered 
(and questioned) in the same instant. The 
two must be distinct, i. e. 
(17) AAA to AmAA 
Russell's hesitation arises in a failure to 
distinguish between actual and possible 
expressions. This failure arises in his, 
and in any, generalisation. 
Similarly an expression or description 
is changed in placing it is stated 
relation) within a black box. (accepting 
the relation)i in turning our attention 
away from a relation, we change our 
curiosity. Accepting a relation, placing it 
within a black box, we prevent ourselves 
from placing a black box, raising   doubt, 
on the relation itself. Acceptance merges 
the things related. for all we care to know 
about them, into one. An expession"cannot 
be made (by stating, and hence 
distinguishing, the things related) and 
accepted (merging, and hence obliterating 
these distinctions) in the same instant. 
The two must be distinct, i. e. 
`18' AAA xyx 
Placing an expression within a black box, 
is a forgetting of sortst we accept. and 
remember, the whole, without, any longer, 
distinguishing the parts, in terms of which 
we accepted it. Whatever is placed within a 
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black box is passed over irk silence. 
Both in pursuing a curiosity and in 
constructing we use the black box to direct 
attention and to change our curiosity. Once 
considered, we can accept a relation 
(placing it within a black box). Once 
accepted, we can reconsider a relation 
(re-opening, or unfolding, a black box). 
Similarly, we can wonder about the relation 
between what we have accepted and something 
new, i. e. 
(19) 
tl state 
 `, 
t2 ask 
M! 
ä 
In so doing, we place a black box between a 
black box and an expression, "unfolding" 
the first black box. 
In the light of a new expression we can 
reconsider a number of relations we 
previously accepted. In thus "unfolding" a 
black box, we reverse a process of 
construction, i. e. we reverse the process 
of accepting relations and "enfolding" them 
within a black box. this possibility 
suggests that all that can be unfolded 
(reconsidered) needs to have been enfolded 
(considered and accepted) first. 
However, in relating a new thing to what 
we have accepted, the relation "unfolded" 
need not be one which we earlier 
"enfolded". The relation unfolded  ay be 
new. If nevertheless it is a relation 
*unfolded" out of a black box (suggesting 
that it was in the black box), it was 
presupposed (or enfolded) in the things'we 
did accept. This suggests that the 
sequence, in which we accepted or enfolded 
things in a process of construction, need 
not bear any relation to the sequence in 
which we unfold them. 
The process of construction and the 
pursuit of a curiosity are complementary, 
we cannot begin to consider a relation 
(placing a black box between two 
expressions), without accepting it; 
accepting that there is a relation to be 
considered. We cannot begin to accept a 
relation (placing it within a black box). 
without considering it; considering that 
there is relation to be accepted. W. may do 
one overtly and the other covertly. We may 
distinguish the two,. distinguishing what we 
accept and question explicitly, from what 
we accept and question implicitly. But this 
distinction in turn reflects the 
complementarity between the two processes. 
If it nevertheless these processes appear 
distinct) if the complementarity can be 
difficult to perceive, it is that our 
learning, speaking, and doing, arises in, 
and relies on, our ability to distinguish 
aspects of this complem. ntarity, and treat 
these as distinct; distinguishing between 
what we take to be the case (ontology), and 
what we can learn, may, and do with this 
(epistemology). 
The complewentarity between these two 
processes reflects on the notions of time 
and existence. 
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In the narrow sense of unfolding the 
. possibility of (simply)"reversing a process 
of enfolding, assumes that an externally 
observed sequence in a process of 
construction can be reversed in pursuing a 
curiosity. Similarly, if anything which can 
be unfolded must have been enfolded, the 
things unfolded or enfolded are assumed to 
have an existence which remains unaffected 
by our curiosity and acceptance. (Unless 
such existence is assumed, the 
complementarity between the two processes 
leads to a problem of origin, where 
anything unfoldable would need to have be 
enfolded, while anything enfolded would 
need to have been unfolded first. ) 
Where in the wider sense of unfolding, a, 
thing unfolded need not have been enfolded 
as such , no external time reference is 
assumed. Epistemologically, the existence 
of a thing. as far as we can know of it, is 
brought about by an observer and depends on 
his curiosity and acceptance. Where the 
result of unfolding a black box is 
indeterminate, the use of the black box 
cannot be seperated from its user. 
The indeterminacy of unfolding a black 
box reveals the form of acceptance. 'However 
many things we speak about and unfold 'out' 
of a black box, the black box itself 
remains unaffected in being thus unfoldeds 
(20)  A Aix 
(While we wonder about how a new thing we 
speak about relates to what we have 
accepted, we persist in accepting all 
things which are not brought into question 
by this new relation. ) While particular 
relations are accepted when placed within a 
black box, the black box cannot be 
considered as representing the acceptance 
of a set of particular relations. It 
reflects the wholeness of the act of ° 
acceptance. The wholeness of Wittgenstein's 
silence, within which'nothing can be 
distinguished. In order to be distinguished 
it would have to be brought outside the 
black box. It would, in Wittggnstein's 
terms, have to be spoken about. 
Consider now the point where we refusm 
to further unfold a black boxt 
(21) 
tx ask 
O 
NA 
tx+l answer "' ' A0 
This corresponds to equating the black box 
and what is outside it with what is outside 
it. i... 
(22) A-A, .., 
It might appear that in so doing, we remove 
the black box. But consider 8ertrude 
Stein's well know example of Just this type 
of assertion, 
rc.. ia a *rose is a rosa. 
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Refusing to (further) question what a rose 
is, we accept, and hence place whatever a 
rose is, within a black box. Where we thus u9 
the black box to assert that there is 
nothing (more) to be said about a thing, we 
assert that a thing is itself. We use the 
black box to pass a, thing over in silence 
(so as to be able to do something with it). 
>C-Y 
tt8 
WITTGENSTEIN AND SELF-REFERENCE 
The black box can thus be used to indicate 
that we know that we don't know. Placing a 
black box to direct our curiosity to what 
we don't know, we can pursue this and try 
to come to know. But, more basically, using 
the black box to indicate that we know that 
we don't know, we can begin. (Beginning, in 
the sense of saying "A rose is a rose is a 
rose"). We use the black box, knowing that 
we don't know, and don't Care to know, to 
treat the foundations of our reasoing (or 
more generally, the starting point of a 
particular process of construction) as 
irreducible. 
Similarly, Wittgenstein's observation 
that the world is constituted of all the 
facts (we know), in addition to our 
knowledge that these are all the facts, can 
be shown in terms of the black box; 
(23) 
  
`/7fw, ° VJ. - 
equating all the facts known to us (shown 
as V) and the doubt (black box) as to 
whether these are all the facts with our 
knowledge of all the facts. While the 
concern with a completeness of knowledge 
and the concern with the foundations of our 
reasoning may be seen as oppoite extremes, 
their similarity reflects the 
complementarity between the process of 
construction and the pursuit of a 
curiosity, and emphasises the essential 
role of self-reference in knowledge. While 
logicians have been at pains to graple with 
this in the generalised form of 
(24) f(x) - x, 
it is precisely in this fora that we can 
accept things and limit our curiosities. 
The acceptance or rejection of this form 
underlies the differences between Russell 
and Wittgenstein. In its all-pervasiveness 
this form enables us to limit and to pursue 
our curiosities beyond what we take, at any 
one time, to be the limitations of our 
world. 
Placing a black box we bring about a 
change in our curiosity. Thus, we can begin 
to speak about what we previously could not 
speak about. To say one thing rather than 
another, we pass the black box over in 
silence. In not being spoken about, being 
placed within a black box and thus passed 
over in silence, relations can 
fteaporarily) escape our curiosity. To 
assert and explore any one relation, other 
relations need to be passed over in 
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silence; in Wittgenstein's terms, we can 
only speak about bounded portions of the 
world. If we could not pass things over in 
silence, we could not begin to say anything. 
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`1) A-1 B 
which shows Wittgenstein's notion, that we 
can only speak about bounded portions of 
the world. It also shows the reification 
involved in speaking about a THING, in that 
we need to distinguish the thing we speak 
about. 
But, just as the change involved in 
speaking cannot be shown using the 
conventional black box, it runs into 
difficulties with the notion of a 
distinction, as this is treated by Spencer 
Brown (or with the conventional view of the 
two-sidedness of boundaries). 
To say "I hereby distinguish what I 
speak about fron, what I pass over in 
silence" is to contradict oneself. Where A 
is distinguished from B, and represented as 
in (1), B is spoken about while, at the 
same time, taken to show what is choosen 
not to be spoken about. To say "I hereby 
distinguish A", is to speak about what we 
can speak about, passing what we pass over 
in silence, over in silence. No 
contradiction arises in distinguishing As 
(2) A-1 
Here talk of distinguishing appears 
superfluouss to thus distinguish what we 
speak about (A), is simply to begin and 
(1) A-IB 
which shows Wittgenstein's notion, that we 
can only speak about bounded portions of 
the world. It also shows the reification 
involved in speaking about a THING, in that 
we need to distinguish the thing we speak 
about. 
But, just as the change involved in 
speaking cannot be shown using the 
conventional black box, it runs into 
difficulties with the notion of a 
distinction, as this is treated by Spencer 
Brown (or with the conventional view of the 
two-sidedness of boundaries). 
To say "I hereby distinguish what I 
speak about from what I pass over in 
silence" is to contradict oneself. Where A 
is distinguished from B, and represented as 
in (1), B is spoken about while, at the 
same time, taken to show what is choosen 
not to be spoken about. To say "I hereby 
distinguish A", is to speak about what we 
can speak about, passing what we pass over 
in silence, over in silence. No 
contradiction arises In distinguishing As 
(2) A--1 
Here talk of distinguishing appears 
superfluouss to thus distinguish what we 
speak about (A), is simply to begin and 
proceeds to speak about this. But the 
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distinction between what we choose to pass 
over in silence (B) and what we choose to 
speak about (A), is all but superfluouss 
only such an act of distinction enables us 
to begin to speak. 
To consider how (or that) the act of 
distinction enables us to speak about a 
thing, is to distinguish the thing we speak 
about from the distinction which allows us 
to speak about its 
(3) Ail -ý 
In considering the act of distinction which 
enables us to speak about a thing, we raise 
a doubt about the validity of this 
distinction. We percieve that what we can 
say depends on what we choose to pass over 
in silence. We can go on and on questioning 
such distinctions (pursuing a curiosity). 
But, to do so for its own sake, is judged 
pedantic. A distinction made, tends to be 
accepted. While any distinction between 
what is passed over in silence and what is 
spoken about, can be questioned, such a 
distinction needs to be accepted to speak 
about any one thing. In this acceptance we 
acknowledge the silence. We acknowledge the 
arbitrariness of our beginning. In Spencer 
Brown's Laws of Form, this is shown in the 
cancellation, to silence, of the double 
cross: 
(4) 
In terms of the above discussion of black 
boxes, this potential regression in 
questioning the distinction which enables 
us to speak about a thing, is terminated in 
the refusal to question. Thus the act of 
acceptance can similarly be shown in terms 
of distinctions, 
(s) A1=A, 
which shows why talk of distinguishing 
appears superfluous. Where we cannot speak 
about the distinction between what we take 
to be beyond, and what we speak about, we 
simply begin and proceede to speak about 
whatever we with to speak about. Such 
common sense, however, leads to a 
contradiction in Spencer Brown's terms, 
where crossing a boundary once results in 
silence just as crossing it twice results 
in silence (there being no distinction), 
i. e. 
11 = 
(6) 
= 
Worse, still, such common sense questions 
the very point of considering the drawing 
of distinctions, rendering 
(7) 
T_j_ 
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These difficulties arise in considering 
how what is beyond is changed in being 
spoken about in terms of distinctions and 
correspond to the difficulties, of capturing 
this transformation in terms of the black 
box. They arise in a lack of clarity as to 
whether the distinction between what we 
pass over in silence and what we speak 
about, is itself passed over in silence, or 
whether it is part of what we speak about. 
This lack of clarity lies in. the very 
notion of a distinction. It arises in the 
temporality of the act of drawing a 
distinction. Just as we change our 
curiosity in the act of placing a black box 
the act of drawing a distinction gives rise 
to the possibility of changing our 
curiosity. To begin to speak about a thing, 
is one thing. To begin by saying "Let me 
begin with this. " is another. (Similarly, 
to speak about what we can speak about is 
one thing, while to speak about how we 
distinguish what we speak about is 
another. ) The latter may be implicit in the 
former. But being implicit, it is passed 
over in silence. The difference lies in 
speaking about the distinction by which we 
begin speaking about a thing. To do so is 
to raise a doubt about, and to ask for the 
acceptance of, the beginning chosen. 
Theact, of drawing a distinction cannot 
be considered outside time, for it involves 
time. In drawing a distinction,. we raise a 
doubt, about the validity of this 
distinction. To accept this doubt is to 
pass the distinction over in silence (to 
place it within a black box). To address 
this doubt is to consider the distinction 
itself as part of what we choose to speak 
about. To address this doubt, is to begin 
to pursue a curiosity. To consider whether 
the distinction itself is passed over in 
silence or taken as part of what we speak 
about, it is necessary to consider what we 
do with the distinction. It is necessary to 
consider how we proceede, having drawn a 
distinction. Subject to our curiosity, we 
can take any thing spoken about as 
distinguished (considering the distinction 
by which it is spoken about )x 
(B) A. -A-] 
In treating it as distinguished, 
considering this distinction, we unfold or 
question what we, have said. Similarly, 
subjet to our acceptance, a thing 
distinguished can be taken as a thing 
(9) A1: A 
In accepting A, we enfold whatever was 
passed over in silence in distinguishing 
what is spoken about, into what is spoken 
about. In other words, should we ever 
change our mind and wich to consider how we 
distinguished A (i. e. what we passed over 
in silence in distinguishing it), we can 
unfold this out of A (as though, in the 
narrower sense of "unfolding", we had 
enfolded it). 
It is thus in overlooking, the, 
distinction (! ) between implicit and 
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explicit distinctions (between accepting 
and questioning a distinction) in a 
timeless world (of logic), that the act. of 
drawing a distinction appears pointless. 
aaa 
DISTINCTIONS AND LEVELS 
Consider a distinction between two things 
we can speak about: 
(10) A 
ýA1 
Distinguishing one thing fron another this 
would appear to be a distinction in the 
ordinary sense of a two-sided boundary. 
However, to thus distinguish two things 
from one another, we need to speak about 
them, and hence we need to accept the 
distinctions which enable us to do so. 
Subject to our curiosity, we can reconsider 
these distinctions, i. e. 
(II)4 -7-A-1 AN 
Where Spencer brown's cancellation rule is 
applied to this, it appears that the two 
things. have not been distinguished from one 
another at all: 
«ý, AAI A1 All that appears to be distinguished is 
that we choose to speak about these things, 
passing anything else over in silence! 
Where a notion of levels is invoked to 
prevent a distinction of one sort to lead 
to the cancellation of a distinction of- 
another sort, a distinction between 
different types of distinctions is 
involved. This distinction would, in turn, 
need to be distinguished in type from the 
distinctions it distinguishes, and so on 
and on, leading to an infinite regress of 
types of distinctions: 
(13) 
A 
'1- ilk- I11 
Äi 
More importantly, such distinction in 
levels renders the process of drawing 
distinctions irreversible. Once drawn, the 
drawing of a distinction could not be 
reconsidereds distinctions cannot be 
accepted or questioned across levels 
invoked to distinguish between 
distinctions. In introducing a level, in 
distinguishing between distinctions, the 
role in which distinctions are to be 
treated, is fixed, and hence whatever was. 
accepted prior to this act can no longer be 
questioned. (To introduce levels is thus to 
introduce limits on our abilities to accept 
and question distinctions. ) 
In distinguishing between distinctions 
the reification involved in speaking is 
emphasiseds where levels prevent things 
being questioned and unfolded beyond   
certain point, things distinguished are, 
treated as things given. To invoke levels 
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is to banish the silence; is to place it 
beyond reach. What was passed over in 
silence in distinguishing a thing given can 
no longer be unfolded; what may be said 
about a thing and accepted, can no longer 
be enfolded within it. 
However, the need to introduce 
levels arises only in a timeless world, 
i. e. in a world in which the temporallity 
the activity of, drawing distinctions cannot 
be accomodated., Thus, where at a particular 
point in time we speak about one thing, and 
at another point in time we speak about 
another thing, there is no need (and, no 
possibility) to distinguish between thesm 
two things: each is distinguished in its 
own right, and there is nothing to bring 
the two events together, i. e. 
(14) 
ti 
In order to distinguish the one thing from 
the other (i. e. before we can distinguish 
between them) they need first to be brought 
together (eg. by distinguishing a 
similarity or a relation between thew) 1. e. 
t2 A4 Azý 
The double crossing rule applies, here and 
enables us to bring two separate things 
together, distinguishing them from whatever 
else we pass over in silence, in speaking 
about them: 
(16) !1 !1 
t3 
Having thus brought two things together, 
can we distinguish between them in the 
normal sense of distinguishing one thing 
from another, 
A--1 
(17) 
to 
We thus distinguish one thing from another 
within the distinction (shown dottet) in 
which we speak about the two, passing 
whatever else over in silence). Concerned 
with the relation between two things we do 
speak about, we (can now) pass this 
distinction over in silence (as a trailing 
cross). We may at a later stage reconsider 
it, eg. wondering about something we have 
passed over in silence in distinguishing 
them. 
This trailing cross corresponds to 
Spencer Brown's "unwritten cross"i in a 
timeless system, the trailing cross remains 
unwritten around every expression in the 
system. It is the distinction by which such 
a system is distinguished, and maintained 
outside time. This suggests that there is 
nothing special about this unwritten cross. 
Like any cross (showing a distinction), it 
is either passed over in silence (where we 
accept it) or part of what we speak about 
(where we are curious about it). Like any 
cross, the "unwritten cross" is, in time, 
actively written and unwritten. 
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DISTINCTIONS, LEVELS AND TIME 
Thus Spencer brown's "unwritten cross" 
acknowledges the temporal nature of the act 
of drawing a distinction. With a view to 
time, there are other implicitly temporal 
notions in his a-temporal calculus. Most 
clearly perhaps the cancellation of the 
double cross involves times we need time to 
cross a distinction and then crossed again; 
we need time to cross and "un-" cross a 
distinction. 
More basically, however, the very 
two-sidedness of the boundary we perceive 
as result of drawing a distinction) only 
arises with regard to a fixed point in 
time. This corresponds to Wittgenstein's 
analogy with the field of-vision, which 
while being bounded has nothing visible, to 
us from where we stand, outside it. 
Similarly, the process of drawing one 
distinction after another in pursuing a 
curiosity, can then be likened to the 
process of walking, finding the landscape, 
so to speak unfolding itself as we 
proceede. In pursuing a curiosity we do not 
discover the other side of the boundary. 
The boundary as we perceive it in one 
instant, "disolves" in the next, - just as 
the horizon does not leave a line on the 
lanfscape which we eventually cross on a 
walk. The trailing cross is passed over in 
silence. It is only relative to a 
particular position in time, that we can 
draw a distinction. 
Consider how we may come to know time. 
Going for a walk we perceive the process of 
walking in terms of how the landscape 
unfolds as we proceeds. Similarly, the 
drawing of a distinction does not depend on 
a position in (some externally observed) 
time. We perceive the passing of time in 
the process of drawing one distinction 
after another. We perceive changes in our, 
boundaries. We perceive time in 
distinguishing one event from another. 
Thus, rather than distinguishing things 
and events and establishing a mapping 
between them, as the ordinary notion of 
time suggests, the very act of 
distinguishing the thing, constitutes the 
event. Where the two are one no mapping is 
needed, or indeed possible. 
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... AND THE CYBERNETICS OF LANGUAGE 
It may now appear necessary to turn to how 
this discussion of black boxes and 
distinctions can be applied to language. It 
cannot be applied to language. To be 
applied to language, this discussion would 
have to concern something other than 
language, which, I maintain, it does not. 
The difficulty arises in that we pass 
these aspects of language (eg. the silence) 
over in silence. It is in passing them over 
in silence, that we can use a language, or 
appear to use language. It is in passing 
them over in silence, that we can 
distinguish a language as a thing, or 
believe there to be such a thing as 
language. Moreover, in using language to 
speak about language, we appear to have no 
choice, but to pass language over in 
silence. (In using use the black box to 
study the black box we appear to pass the 
black box over in silence). 
The transformation between the silence 
beyond and what we speak about involves (or 
cannot be seperated from) the notion of 
existence, in the reification involved in 
speaking. Moreover, it involves the notion 
of the existence of language. Where 
language exists in the balance of the 
complementary activities of constructing 
and pursuing our curiosities, the 
reluctance to question its existence (the 
tendency to reify it) is shown in the 
circumstance that the black box remains 
unaffected in being unfolded. No matter 
what we unfold out of the black box, we are 
left with the SAME black boxt no matter how 
much we question and change language, we 
tend to insist that IT is one and the same 
language. Where we ultimately 'unfold' a 
black box by saying that a thing is what it 
is, we ultimately unfold language by saying 
that it is what it is (by saying that the 
language is the meta-language= or, by 
saying that the language is whatever we say 
it is). 
Where, in any one act, the language is 
what we accept and pass over in silence we 
place the language within a black box. 
Unfolding this black box, we unfold parts 
of language, which, in turn we enfold into 
the black box. Thus unfolding and 
enfolding, we explore parts of the language 
in pursuing our curiosities. Where, over 
time, language arises in the interaction 
between the complementary processes of 
constructing and pursuing our curiosities, 
a reification of it may cristalise every 
now and then, but, like the placing of the 
black box language lives in our activities 
(to guard against reification it is better 
to speak of our linguistic activities). 
Where the black box is treated as distinct 
from language, it is both an example and 
model of language. 
. 1, 
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Arising as an activity in the 
interaction beteween these two processes, 
language is a process, and hence involves, 
and cannot be seperated from, our notion of 
time. Our experience of time arises in, and 
with regard to, our (linguistic) 
activities. Our notion of time arises in 
distinguishing activities. 
In the reification involved in speaking 
about language, however, language is cut 
out of the very process in which it exists 
as an activity. In speaking about language, 
its re-ification leads to the introduction 
of levels, distinguishing some things, 
which we (then come to think we must) 
accept, and which we call "the 
language", from others, which we may or may 
not accept and which arise in 'what we can 
do with the language'. To overcome the 
difficulties in speaking about language, it 
does not in itself suffice to speak about 
activities. It is necessary to recognise 
the mutual. interdependence of our 
conceptions of language and what we can say 
about language, and what we take to be the 
function of language= recognising that 
where language is reified in being spoken 
about, it is (bound to be) whatever we may 
say it is (used for). 
Where any one (asserted) use of language 
entails a particular reification of 
language (a particular language), the 
reification in speaking about language can 
be minimalised, or even overcome, in 
considering the interaction between a 
number of uses of language. The reification 
can be overcome in a process of changing 
our curiosity in and about language. I will 
thus unfold language by considering 
(i) that in terms-of a constructive 
function of language, there is no language 
(something is in the process of being 
constructed), 
(ti) in terms of a communicative 
function of language, such a construction 
is in the process of being or not being 
accepted (something is in the process of 
being negotiated) and 
(iii) in terms of an argumentative 
function of languagep a commonly accepted 
language (taken for granted, eg. having 
been negotiated) is necessary to examine 
(or negotiate) things other than this 
language. , 
In the process of changing our curiosity 
about language, the reification of language 
is explored. The reification involved in 
speaking suggests that a language needs to 
be commoly accepted before we can speak 
about things other than language. It 
suggests, that the processes of 
construction, communication and 
argumentation are independent stages in the 
developement of language. But they are not. 
Such stages are indeed distinguished 
where a language is spoken about. They are, 
distinguished in speaking about language. 
They are distinguished in arguing, i. e. in 
distinguishing a language from the things 
spoken about. They are distinguished in 
using a language, i. e. in distinguishing 
between the language and what we can do 
with it. They are distinguished, and 
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invoked as independent (invoking levels), 
where a language is constructed for a 
particular purpose (i. e. artificial 
languages) 
To speak about a language, in turn , is 
to use a language to do so. To distinguish 
these processes and ordain their 
independence, in turn is to use language to 
do so. It is to distinguish the language 
used to do so from our ability to 
distinguish, and thus to distinguish 
between distinctions. The discussion of 
distinctions shows that there is nothing to 
distinguish the "unwritten cross" from any 
other cross, that there is nothing to 
distinguish distinctions, except in how we 
choose to treat them (for a particular 
purpose). Thus, the need to distinguish a 
language from what we do with it can only 
arise in speaking about a (reification of) 
language. To distinguish between, and treat 
the three processes as three independent 
stages in the developement'of a language, 
is to treat language as a thing, as an it. 
To distinguish a thing, to distinguish 
language as a thing, is to step out of the 
process in which we construct, communicate 
and argue. It is to step out of the process 
in which we can change our curiousityi 
surrounding the language we speak about 
with a(n unwritten) cross. 
It is instead, in the activity of 
pursuing our curiosities, in the activity 
of constructing, communicating and arguing 
that the reification of language is 
overcome in the coincidence of what we DO 
and what we speak about. In the process of 
construction, the construction of a 
language coincides with the construction of 
what we speak about. The "two" are one. In 
the event of communication, the 
communication of the language coincides 
with the communication of what we convey. 
The "two" are one. In beginning, to argue, 
the distinction by which we distinguish the 
thing we argue about coincides with the 
distinction by which we distinguish the 
language. Where the "two" are thus one, the 
end is in the beginning. 
In the activity of pursuing a curiosity, 
in constructing, communicating and arguing, 
in doing what we speak about, what can be 
said about construction relies on the 
ability to communicate and argue, what can 
be said about communication relies on the 
ability to construct and argue and what, can 
be said about arguing relies on the ability 
to construct and communicate. 
In the process of pursuing a curiosity, 
this or that janguage may be distinguished 
as an it, for the purpose of this or that 
argument, and with regard to this or that 
curiosity. In changing our curiosity, in 
the process of constructing, communicating 
and arguing, we journey between things we 
speak about and languages we distinguish as 
things. In so doing, we explore the 
complement to speaking, the silence. 
Between things, we explore the complement 
to things. We explore the "I" of language, 
in which we construct, communicate and 
argue (within which we can distinguish 
things and languages as its). 
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WHAT WE CAN SPEAK ABOUT 
MR. NATURAL LANGUAGE 
AT THE BOUNDS OF OBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE) 
Where the "I" of language unfolds between 
Wittgenstein's silence, and its complement, 
speaking, we cannot speak about language. 
Where to speak about a thing is to 
distinguish it, we cannot speak about the 
process within which we can distinguish. 
Where language is what enables us to speak 
about bounded portions of the world, while 
itself being unbounded, and where we can 
only speak about bounded portions of the 
world, we cannot speak about language. 
If nevertheless we can may a good deal 
about what we cannot speak about, we can do 
so in the process of pursuing a curiosity. 
Whatever can be spoken about, is said and 
interpreted within such a process. To speak 
about a thing, is to distinguish it by 
arresting this process. The boundedness of 
what we can speak about arises in the 
absence of'time within one act of speaking. 
To interpret what is said in speaking about 
a thing, is to obliterate the distinction 
by which it was distinguished, is to move 
on in time. Where in the absence of time, 
we can speak and argue about a bounded 
portion of the world we cannot interpret 
this. Where in the process of pursuing a 
curiosity, we can say and do a good deal, 
this cannot, in terms of speaking about one 
thing, amount to an argument. 
While the difficulty of reifying 
language in speaking about it, is overcome 
in a process of pursuing a curiosity in and 
aboout language, a difficulty arises where 
all that can be said is what can be spoken 
about. While a good deal may be said and 
done in pursuing a curiosity in and about 
language, where language cannot be spoken 
about, this would appear not to be said tin 
and about language)! The difficulty of 
reifying language in speaking about it 
arises in the form of speaking. The 
difficulty about what can be said in a 
process of pursuing a curiosity arises in 
the form of interpretation. 
What is said, is what is taken to be 
said. Thus the difficulty arises in part In 
a particular convention about what it is to 
say something. Although it is only a 
convention that all that can be said is 
what can be spoken about li. e. that to may 
something we need to be able to speak about 
the interpretation of what we say), the 
purpose of this convention is to avoid the 
indeterminacy in what can be taken to be 
said. To transcend this convention is thus 
to accept this indeterminacy. 
But as this indeterminacy arises in the 
form of interpretation, it is in involving 
interpretation that language cannot be 
spoken about. To try to speak about 
language (avoiding this indeterminacy), is 
to eliminate interpretation (i. e. in 
artificial languages). To use language to 
do so, is, nevertheless to accept this 
indeterminacy (while pretending not to)! 
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Where our ability to speak about bounded 
portions of the world, and our ability to 
accept conventions (eg. that what can be 
said is what can be spoken about) arise in 
language (activities, i. e. in the processes 
of construction. communication and 
argumentation), it is necessary to 
transcend this convention, to say something 
about language. It is necessary to accept 
the indeterminacy. 
The indeterminacy of interpretation 
bounds what we can say about language (eg. 
we cannot speak about how what is said is 
interpreted) and it is in terms of these 
bounds that we can may a great deal about 
language and about what we can speak about. 
The convention whereby what can. be said 
is what can be spoken about is transcended 
ordinary language, where it is in the 
indeterminacy of interpretation, that there 
can be intelligence. The difficulties with 
this indeterminacy arise in speaking about 
things. They arise in the timelessness in 
which action and interpretation are 
excluded: where there can be a coincidence 
between what we say and what we do, there 
is no need to avoid the indeterminacy of 
interpretation. At any particular point, 
the indeterminacy is removed in the 
coincidence of what is said and done. 
Thus, what can be said about language 
(transcending the convention whereby what 
we can say is what we can speak about) is 
what can be said and done in a process of 
pursuing a curiosity in and about language. 
The indeterminacy about what curiosity we 
pursue, and how we pursue it is removed in 
the Coincidence of what we say with what we 
do. It is removed where what is said about 
language is said in the form of 
interpretation. 
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THE NATURAL AND THE ARTIFICIAL 
The differences between Russell and 
Wittgenstein can be. seen as rooted in 
Russell's concern with the artificial, and 
Wittgenstein's concern with the natural; or 
with what applies to both the natural and- 
the artificial (and to which distinctions 
from within the artificial, and excluding 
the natural, cannot apply). 
The difficulty arises in distinguishing 
between the natural and the artificial. 
Since any distinction is an artificial one 
(artificial, in the sense of being made by 
us), a distinction between the natural and 
the artificial, appears necessarily to lead 
to the artificial. This corresponds to the 
difficulty in speaking about what is passed 
over in silence. The complementarity 
between speaking and passing over in 
silence is reflected in the complementarity 
between the natural and the artificial. In 
distinguishing (or using) the natural we 
create the artificial. In understanding 
the artificial we rely on the natural. 
In the complementarity between the 
natural and the artificial, the open 
process (involving time) generated in the 
complementarity between speaking and 
passing over in silence characterises 
natural language, while artificial 
languages are a-temporal products of this 
process, in which the residue temporality 
of the natural process is unfolded in terms 
of levels. In terms of this distinction, 
the construction of an artificial language 
is a natural language activity, and an 
argument requires an artificial language, 
to the extend to which it needs to stop the 
flow of the natural language process. 
Where an artificial language is 
distinguished from the natural activities 
in which it was generated, the 
interaction between the construction of the 
language and what is said within it, is 
eliminated. In an artificial language a 
distinction between the language and what 
we can speak about is invoked; the 
distinction by which the language is 
distinguished, is ordained distinct from 
the distinction by which things spoken and 
argued about are distinguished; the 
construction of the language is ordained to 
be distinct from the construction of the 
things we speak about and thus the 
communication of the language (eg. of'the 
code) is distinct from what is conveyed 
using the language. 
a: s 
THE ARTIFICIAL AND THE UNWRITTEN CROSS 
The distinction by which an artificial, 
language is distinguished from the natural 
process in which it is generated thus 
amounts to surrounding all that can be said 
within this language with Spencer Brown's 
'unwritten cross'. 
Where in the natural process the 
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construction of a language coincides with 
the construction of what is said (where the 
language is communicated in what is 
conveyed), the language is affected 
(constructed and communicated) with 
everything said. Where what is said affects 
the construction of the language, whatever 
has previously been said is unwritten in 
the process of saying something news to 
speak about one thing other things need to 
be passed over in silence. - 
To distinguish an artificial language 
from the natural process in which it is 
constructed, is to avoid such unwriting. 
Such unwriting is avoided in speaking about 
one thing, rather than another. It ist 
avoided where everything said, is said 
within one distinction between what we 
choose to speak about and what we choose to 
pass over in silence. =. 
To thus distinguish an artificial 
language and surround all that is said with 
an "unwritten" cross, is to limit what can 
be said in that language. It is to limit 
what can be spoken about in the language to 
one and the same thing, passing the same 
things over in silence. 
Just as we can only speak about bounded 
portions of the world, we can only argue, 
in differing about one and the save thing. 
Thus, the distinction of an artificial 
language from the process in which it was 
constructed enables us to argue, knowing 
what we are arguing about. 
But, to insist on speaking about one 
thing alone, passing the same things over 
in silence, is to constrain (and limit, in 
Russell's sense) our curiosity. It is to 
reify our curiosity and thus emphasises 
rather than removes the reification 
involved in speaking. While an artificial 
language is distinguished to pursue a 
curiosity with some rigour, the curiosity 
in arguing must arise outside the bounds of 
this language. Within an argument, there 
can be no point in arguing. 
A distinction between natural language, 
in which we proceeds from speaking about 
one thing to speaking about another, and 
artificial languages, within any one of 
which we speak about one thing only, 
reflects the complementarity between the 
natural and the artificial in the 
difficulty of distinguishing between 
speaking about one thing and speaking about 
another. This difficulty is shown in the 
essential similarity between saying that a 
thing is itself (refusing to further unfold 
a black box (22)) and considering the world 
as a whole (including our knowledge that it 
is the whole world (23)), i. e. 
(1) MAa =A 
ST,; V', 
It is reflected in the one-, rather than tw+ 
sidedness of the distinction between what 
we speak about and what we pass over in 
silence. It is reflected in Wittgenstein's 
observation, that the possibility for a 
thing to occur in a state of affairs, must 
be written into the thing itself. Anything 
may be unfolded in speaking about one 
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thing. To speak about more and more, and 
eventually all, things, is to speak about 
one thing. The two are complementary, and 
as processes come to the same. 
In this complementarity natural language 
is distinct from artificial languages in 
the interaction between our curiosity and 
what we speak about. To speak about a thing 
in the natural process (of continuously 
changing our curiosity), we need to be 
curious about this thing. To speak about a 
thing in an artificial language, we need, 
instead, to adopt the particular curiosity 
reified in the particular language which 
enables us to speak about this thing. In 
natural language our curiosity determines 
what we speak about, while in an artificial 
language our wish to speak about a 
particular thing determines our curiosity. 
In one case our curiosity changes and 
changes what we speak aboutl in the other 
case, one curiosity is used to determine an 
other curiosity, and hence two levels of 
curiosity are distinguished. Where all that 
can be said in an artificial language is 
surrounded by an unwritten cross, this 
cross thus distinguishes these two levels 
of curiosity. 
Spencer-Brown's calculus applies to 
distinctions drawn by someone with one 
curiosity. To apply his calculus, is to 
look upon such distinctions as an Qbserv. r, 
who's own (unwritten) distinctions do not 
effect the calculations. The "unwritten 
cross" thus seperates the observer (and his 
distinctions) from the distinguisher. It 
is, and excludes from the calculus, the 
distinction by which an observer 
distinguishes what he chooses to speak 
about, as a distinguisher. It distinguishes 
distinctions drawn by anyone who adopts the 
particular curiosity distinguished by the 
unwritten cross. 
:s8 
BOUNDED PORTIONS OF THE WORLD AND SEMANTICS 
Within any one artificial language we can 
speak about a bounded portion of the world. 
In natural language, we can speak about a 
bounded portion of the world in every act 
of speaking, and change our curiosity in 
the process of moving from one act to 
another. Where thus what can be spoken 
about within one artificial language is 
bounded and what can be spoken about within 
one speech act is bounded, the question 
arises how what can be said about a thing 
in an artificial language differs from what 
cart be said about it in speaking about it 
(how what can be said about a thing using a 
language differs from what can be said 
about it). 
Consider a language (L) constructed to 
speak about a bounded portion of the world 
(D), and consider how the ability to speak 
about D differs, if it does, from the 
ability to speak about D using the language 
L. In either case D is deliniated by the 
distinction to speak about D and pass 
whatever else over in silence, i. e. 
(2) 
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The construction of L is based on this 
distinction, and the curiosity we can 
pursue in L is bounded by this distinction. 
It is the "unwritten cross" which surrounds 
anything which can br said (shown as "1") 
within L. 
(3) 1 
Within L this distinction must be passed 
over in silence. It cannot be drawn or 
spoken about, within L, without in so doing 
"unwrlting" Li to speak about this 
distinction is to speak, and raise a doubt, 
about what is passed over in silence wihin 
L. This distinction can, however, be spoken 
about, not using L (it is spoken about in 
the construction of U. Not using L, 
moreover, what is passed over in silence in 
L can be unfolded and spoken about. 
Anything which can be said ("1") about D 
using Lo can also simply be said (shown as 
"s") about D (without using L). For each 
"l", there should thus be a corresponding 
"s"", i. e. 
(a) ': ý 
Whatever can be said in an artificial 
language L, can also be said in natural 
language, eg. in the process of 
constructing L. It is in the construction 
of L that what can be said ("1") in L, is 
said ("s") outside L. Whatever can be 
spoken about within L needs to be 
distinguished outside L (using natural 
expressions "s"). The posibility of making 
an "s" corresponding to each "1" is the 
possibility of constructing L. 
Where an L has been constructed, the 
correspondance between "1" and "s" enables 
us to speak outside L tin "s" expressions)v 
about what is said in L tin "I" 
expressions). What can thus be said about 
what is said in L, is said about (what was 
said in) the constuction of L. 
In naturally speaking about what is sold 
within an artificial language, the absence 
of an unwritten cross in our natural 
activities is used; using a corresponding 
"s" to pursue a curiosity about an 01" 
beyond the bounds of L. 
Where the form of interpretation is the 
complement of the form of speaking, what is 
said in L, being bounded by an unwritten 
cross cannot be interpreted in L. It can 
only be interpreted in terms of what we can 
naturally say ("s") about what is said 
within Lz it is interpreted, in time, in 
the silence between "s" expressions. It is 
only in terms of what we can say naturally, 
that the things passed over in silence in 
distinguishing D can be unfolded. 
The possibility of doing so is what is 
refered to as the semantics of a language. 
It is to be able to do so that what can be 
said in an artificial language is what can 
be spoken about. In using natural 
expressions to speak about and explain 
expressions in an artificial language, -the 
"semantics" of a language L is no more than 
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the natural by-product of constructing an 
artificial language. 
The need for a semantics arises only in 
an artificial language. It arises in the 
need to bridge the unwitten cross by which 
the language is distinguished from the 
process in which it was constructed. This 
cross needs to be bridged to move on in 
time, to interpret what can only be spoken 
about within an artificial language for to 
move on in time to change our curiosity). 
Embedded within one act of speaking, an 
artificial language cannot accomodate the 
complementary act of interpretation. Rather 
than constituting an interpretation, a 
semantics simply bridges between a timeless 
language and the process in which, in time, 
things said can be interpreted. 
S's 
INTERPRETATION, INTERPRETATIONS AND SILENCE 
However many artificial languages may be 
embedded within one another, one artificial 
language cannot be interpreted in another 
artificial language, for it is in excluding 
interpretation, that any artificial 
language needs a semantics. There 1s no 
difficulty in the circumstance that natural 
language cannot have a semantics. The 
difficulty rather arises in the notion that 
a language 'has a semantics'; in the notion 
that interpretation can be (or needs to be) 
spoken about. It is this notion which leads 
to a bierachy of languages. It is this 
notion which distinguishes even an 
fiver-changing hierachy of languages from 
the process of (natural) language. 
We interpret things silently. We 
interpret particular things we say at a 
particular time. Should a question arise, 
we may, in addressing this question, speak 
about how we interpreted something. In so 
doing, we change our curiosity, bringing 
what was beyond being spoken about into the 
domain of speaking. In thus speaking about 
what was beyond being spoken about, this is 
transformed. In changing our curiosity, we 
turn away from what we were speaking about, 
changing what we are speaking about. The 
particular curiosity in wondering about how 
we interpreted a thing, moreover determines 
what we can say about how we interpreted 
it. 
To speak about how we interpret a thing 
is to unfold a silence. There Is no way of 
knowing what we will unfold. This is the 
nature of interpretations rather than being 
ambiguous (where we would need to know the 
possible interpretations) or imprecise 
(where we would need to know exactly what 
sort of thing we will unfold) or unspecific 
(where we would need to know the specific 
set of things which may be unfolded), 
interpretation is simply, and essentially, 
unpredictable. 
Natural interpretation (or naturally 
interpretation) is silent and thus 
esentially indeterminate. In the process of 
speaking, interpreting, and changing our 
curiosities, the interpretation of a 
particular thing said, can become subject 
to our curiosity. Where necessary, any 
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doubt concerning a particular act of 
interpretation, can be clarified in the 
very process in which it arises. Given 
time, there is no need to speak about (or 
prescribe) how, in general, expressions of 
a language are (to be) interpreted. 
In time, the process in which a thing is 
said coincides with, and is 
indistinguishable from, the process in 
which we speak about how a thing was 
interpreted. In the indeterminacy of 
interpretation the two processes are one. 
Within this one process, speaking about 
one, is distinct from speaking about the 
other, only in time, i. e. they are distinct 
in curiosity. We speak about one thing on 
one occasion, and about another thing on 
another occasion. 
In an artificial language this time is 
excluded. To argue, we need to know that we 
are speaking about one and the same thing. 
Hence we need to exclude the possibility of 
thus changing our curiosity. In speaking 
about how what is said within a language I. 
interpreted, we change our curiosity and 
hence unwrite the timelessness which such a 
language exists. 
In speaking about how an artificial 
language is interpreted, we prevent such 
unwriting by distinguishing the language 
from the meta-language in which we do so. 
Time spirals on, as we move from language 
to language, in Just the same way as, in 
time, we move between speech acts. Wherever 
we change our curiosity, we leave a 
language behind, in just the same way as we 
naturally pass what we have said over int 
silence (unwrite what was said with every 
new thing said). In moving from language to 
language we move through a silence, in just 
the same way as we naturally interpret 
silently. 
If, to this hierachy of languages there 
can be no end, ýit is that whatever can be 
said (about how a thing was interpreted), 
in turn, needs to be interpreted, silently. 
An end can be made to this hierachy of 
languages where there is no need to speak 
(about how a thing was interpreted). If to 
this hirachy of languages there can be no 
given end, it is, that there are no given 
bounds to. our curiosity. To move from 
bounded language to bounded language, is to 
move naturally from speaking about bounded 
portions of the world, to speaking about 
other bounded portions of the world. 
E12 
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FARADIUM AND THE BLACK BOX 
While there can be no (given) bounds to our 
curiosity, we need to bound our curiosity 
to do or say anything. We bound our 
curiosity in speaking about a thing, 
speaking about one thing rather than 
another. We cannot change our curiosity 
within the act of speaking. The possibility 
of changing our curiosity arises in the act 
of interpretation. We can only change our 
curiosity in the process of moving from one 
act of speaking to another. Any act of 
speaking stands against time. What is said 
within it is timeless, and can only be 
temporal by reference to the act in which 
it is said. 
To be able to change our curiosity, is 
to be able to choose the curiosity we wish 
to pursues it is the ability to direct our 
attention to a thing (for as long as we 
choose). To be able to change our 
curiosity, we must also be able not to 
change it. This is what we choose to do in 
artificial languages, and it is what 
enables us to consider something in depth. 
In choosing not to change our curiosity, 
we embed all we say about a thing into a 
single speech act. Thus in artificial 
languages, the time generated in their 
construction is embedded or enfolded in the 
language (and can be unfolded through the 
semantics of the language). The ability to 
do so is the ability to enfold (accept) 
things in (and unfold (question) things out 
of) a black box. But unlike the 
indeterminacy in unfolding a black box, 
aritificial languages are determinate by 
reference to the particular temporality of 
their construction. 
:s" 
'DESCRIPTIONS' AND DESCRIPTIONS 
In terms of this difference it is necessary 
to distinguish between 'descriptions', the 
'interpretation' of which is determined, 
and descriptions (made in single speech 
acts), which are naturally subject to the 
indeterminacy of interpretation. While 
descriptions are made and interpreted in 
the natural processes, the 'interpretation' 
of 'descriptions' can only be determined 
where this ordained (or prescibed) to be so 
within an artificial language or 
descriptive framework. 
In making and 'interpreting' 
'descriptions' we choose not to change our 
curiosity, so as to be able to pursue a 
thing with some rigour in some depth. In 
choosing'to make a 'description' within an 
artificial language or descriptive 
framework, we choose to pursue the 
curiosity, for the pursuit of which this 
language or paradigm was constructed. A 
'description' can only be 'interpreted' in 
terms of the artificial language or 
paradigm in which it is made. All 
'descriptions' made within a (static) 
paradigm constitute a single speech act, no 
matter how many statei.. nts or scientists 
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are involved. Embedded within one speech 
act, a paradigm constitutes a description, 
which can, in time, be interpreted. It is 
in terms of such indeterminate 
interpretations, that a paradigm is 
accepted, questioned, Changed or abandoned. 
While there can be synthetic 
descriptions (eq. poetry), the very nature 
of 'descriptions' supports their analytic 
character. To be able to speak about and 
determine (define) the 'interpretation' of 
'descriptions', a 'description' must be 
composed of the discrete and distinct 
parts, for which 'interpretations' are 
provided. While descriptions and 
'descriptions' may be composed of very 
similar components, the difference between 
them lies in the distinction of these 
components. The components of a description 
are distinguished by the describer in the 
process of describing (the punctuations 
between components reflect silences in 
which he interprets and passes what he has 
said over in silence). Instead, the 
components of a 'description' cannot be 
thus distinguished by the describer, 
(except in his role of constructing the 
language). The analytic nature of a 
'description' is emphasised, in that the 
components of which it is composed cannot 
arise in the description itself. They are 
the terms made available in the language, 
to which whatever can be said in the 
paradigm has to be reduced. The analytic 
nature of 'descriptions' arises in the 
timelessness in which the interaction 
between the construction of the language 
and what is said in it, is excluded. 
The analytic nature of 'descriptions' is 
further emphasised where 
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paradigm has to 
accomodate the possibility of saying 
something. Where the possibility of saying 
something arises in the possibility of 
saying something different about the same 
thing tis the possibility of making a 
point), a paradigm has to accomodate 
differences. But unlike differences between 
descriptions, or 'descriptions' made within 
different paradigms, these differences need 
to be resolved within the same paradigm. 
Thus the paradigm needs to provide terms in 
which these differences can be expressed, 
leading to further and further partitioning 
of the terms in which 'descriptions' are to 
be made and 'interpreted'. (Where, 
moreover, such differences arise, over 
time, in a partial interaction between what 
is said and the construction of the 
language (i. e. the descriptions and 
interpretations scientists make in speaking 
about their paradigm), and lead to changes 
within the paradigm, the same phenomenon of 
further and further partitioning arises. ) 
This partitioning of terms necessary to 
accomodate differences within a paradigm 
(and necessary to maintain the paradigm), 
is a reflection, within the single speech 
act, of the unboundeness of our curiosities 
in moving from speech act to speech act. 
The process of thus increasing the analytic 
nature of descriptions mirrors the 
wholeness of the silence beyond the 
unwritten cross surrounding the paradigm; 
it mirrors the complementary synthetic 
nature of the aCt of interpretation. In 
this complesentarity, the consistency or 
coherence sought within an unwritten cross 
66 
mirrors the wholaness of the form of 
interpretation. 
Where the fragmentation of 
'descriptions' thus mirrors the wholeness 
of the interpretation excluded from them; 
where speaking and pursuing a curiosity 
about one thing, and speaking about more 
and more and eventually all things, come to 
one, this reflects the complementarity between description and interpretation) the 
complementarity between speaking and 
passing over in silence; the 
complementarity which arises where in the 
act of distinction, in speaking about a 
thing, the wholeness, in which it is passed 
over in silence, is severed. 
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4, 
DISTINCTIONS -A DEJA VU? 
(OR A CONTINUITY IN FORM) 
A complementarity arises where, in the act 
of distinction, a whole is severed. It is 
perceived as a cosplementarity, where we 
perceive the whole severed by our 
distinction. Aspects distinguished are 
perceived as distinct, where the act of 
drawing the distinction is itself passed 
over in silence. The distinction invoked 
between two aspects of a whole, is brought 
into question where the act of 
distinguishing them is perceived. 
The distinction invoked between the 
natural and the artificial is brought into 
question where the act distinguishing thew 
is perceived. Where an artificial language 
is distinguished from the natural process 
in which it is constructed (with an 
unwritten cross), the complementarity 
between the natural and the artificial is 
perceived in considering this unwritten 
cross (as distinguishing them). 
Where artificial languages are 
distinguished from the natural processes in 
which they are constructed, in terms of the 
use of the unwritten cross, the 
complementarity between thew is perceived. 
Where a distinction between, the process of 
speaking and passing over in silence, and 
an act of speaking, is invoked as involving 
an act of distinction, the coa. plewentarlty 
between them is perceived (where speaking 
involves an act of drawing a distinction). 
A distinction drawn is perceived, as 
two-sided where the act of drawing the 
distinction is passed over in silence. the 
one-sidedness of the 
distinction is 
perceived where the act of distinction is, 
itself, spoken about. 
The difficulty, if it is one, arises In 
the coincidence of the distinction we speak 
about with the distinction we draw in 
speaking about this distinction. It is in 
this Coincidence that the distinctness of 
what we distinguish is brought into 
question. It is in this coincidence, that 
the distinction is unwritten. But it is 
also in this coincidence, that the whole 
severed in the act of distinction can be 
perceived. 
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Enabeling us to perceive this whole, 
rather than being a difficulty, this 
coincidence provides the possibility of 
saying something about this whole. It is in 
this coincidence, that what cannot be 
spoken about can, nevertless be said (or 
shown, as Wittgenstein put it). It can be 
said, in the coincidence of what we speak 
about with what we do. (Speaking about 
distinctions, we draw distinctions). 
(Coinciding with this possibility, it is 
in the coincidence of at we say with what 
we do, that our descriptions can be 
interpreted. In this coincidence, the form 
of interpretation is reflected in the act 
of speaking, and thus this coincidence 
reflects the complementarity between 
description and interpretation. ) 
. Where, in 
this coincidence, a 
distinction is unwritten (rather than being 
writen and then passed over in silence as 
Spencer Browns unwritten cross), and 
where, in this coincidence, something can 
be said, without in any ordinary sense 
being spoken about, what is unwritten is 
unwritten, and what is said is said, in a 
process of moving from speaking about one 
thing to speaking about another. What is 
said, is not what is spoken about. What is 
said is said, what is unwritten is 
unwritten, in the continuity of form 
between what is said about one thing and, 
what is said about the other. 
tts 
BLACP. BOXES -A DEJA VU 
It is in capturing this continuity of fore, 
that the black box enables us to consider 
what cannot be spoken about, without in any 
ordinary sense speaking about it. 
where we use a black box in speaking 
about a black box, the coincidence between 
what we speak about and what we do unwrites 
the distinction by which we distinguish the 
black box. In this continuity of form, the 
use of the black box thus both captures 
this continuity and exemplifies the process 
in which, considering the act of 
distinguishing, a distinction is unwritten. 
(Should we care to label the black box a 
description of this continuity, in that it 
captures it, and an example of this 
continuity, in exemplifying it, it is 
characteristic of this continuity in form 
that we cannot distinguish between examples 
and descriptions, between theories and what 
they describe (or between rules and what is 
governed by these rules). 
Like a paradigm, the black box is used 
to direct attention, and can thus be 
considered as a partiular paradigm tor, 
further manifesting this continuity in 
form. paradigms can be considered 
particular uses of the black box). What can 
be described using the black box as a 
paradigm, is thus surrounded by the 
unwritten cross deliniating a "black box 
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paradigm", instructing us how to the black 
box is to be used, and distinguishing what 
can bw spoken about leg. systems or things 
as wholes) from what is passed over in 
silence within this paradigm. 
Moving on in time, a difficulty arises 
in that what is placed within the black box 
is passed over in silence. Used to describe 
specific systems (eg. electronic gadgetry, 
traffic systems and the like), what is 
deemed irrelevant to the description of the 
specific system is placed within a black 
box and passed over in silence. What is 
passed over in silence differs with every 
use of the black box, and hence, there can 
be no one "black box paradigm". 
In the process of considering the 
placing of the black box, the unwritten 
cross distinguishing a "black box paradigm" 
is unwritten (rather than being passed over 
in silence). What, prescribing how the 
black box is to be used, was to distinguish 
this paradigm, concerns how it is that we 
can use black boxes. The instructions for 
using this paradigm, concern the placing of 
unwritten crosses to distinguish any 
paradigm (using, or not using, the black 
box). In the process of unwriting the 
unwritten cross distinguishing the "black 
box paradigm", the discussion of our 
ability to use black boxes, considers, and 
unwrites. the distinction by which a 
paradigm is distinguished, and thus 
concerns our general ability to describe 
things (using, or not using, a paradigm). 
Where thus the distinctions, 
distinguishing uses of black boxes or 
paradigms from our general ability to 
describe, are unwritten, we perceive a 
continuity of form throughout our 
descriptive activities in thinking, 
speaking, learning, constructing languages 
and paradigms. developing theories and the 
like. (Where such activities are 
distinguished in order to be described, 
this continuity is manifest in that, in 
distinguishing and describing any one of 
these activities, the others are passed 
over ºn silence. ) 
0"t 
DESCRIBING DESCRIPTION 
In unwritinq the distinction distinguishing 
a "black box paradigm', the black box is 
Jsed to direct attention to our descriptive 
activities. Where the black box is thus a 
paradigm for describing description, the 
difficulties in the attempt to do so, are 
manifest in the circumstance that we use a 
black box in describing the black box) i. e. 
in the coincidence of what w do and what 
we speak about. 
Consider the use a black box as a 
paradigm to"descrlba' description. To 
ron%idvr how an observer uses a black box 
to makes a description, an gxternal Observer 
needs to distinguish what the observer does 
(using an object- language) from what he 
himself does (using a acta-languaQI to 
describe the obsever's description). The 
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need for such a distinction arises with the 
unwritten cross surrounding the external 
observer's meta-language (or paradigm)i to 
'describe' the observer's description, the 
interpretation of the external observer's 
meta-language needs to be determined, and 
hence, unlike the observer, he needs to 
know what the observer's black box 
"contains". 
But, the interpretation of the 
meta-language can only be thus determined 
where the observer's object-language is 
similarly determined. In the very attempt 
to 'describe' description, the external 
observer thus remains restricted to 
'describing' 'description'! (In requiring 
insight into the observer's black box, 
whitening this, he limits what he can 
'describe' to how an observer can 
'describe', i. e. to how an observer can use 
a box which is at best grey. ) 
Where instead, the observer's black box 
is Iruely black, where his object language 
is natural language, the external 
observer's own black box needs to be 
similarly black. The external observer 
cannot be in an omniscient position 
concerning what the observer does and what 
he is describing in using his black boxt 
the two coincide in their predicament. 
The continuity in form reflected in the 
impossibility of 'describing' description 
without in so doing restricting the 
'description' to one of 'description', is 
the continuity of form necessary to 
describe description; it is the coincidence 
of the black box used to describe and the 
black box described; it is the coincidence 
of the language with the seta-language (in 
natural language). 
iss 
INDETERMINACY AND INTERPRETATION 
Indeterminacy arises in this continuity of 
fors between the describing and the 
described description. It is in this 
indeterminacy, that, in capturing this 
continuity of form, the black box is black. 
Describing description involves a 
silence. Indeterminacy is removed in an act 
of distinction (eg. the unwritten cross 
surrounding an artificial language). In the 
silence involved in describing description, 
the distinction removing the Indeterminacy 
is unwritten= unwriting the distinction 
between the described and the describing 
(description, observer, and language). It 
is in the silence, that the two are 
continuous in forms being continuous in 
form, they can be linked. 
The external observer coincides with the 
observer where they both (use black boxes 
to) try to understand each others to 
interpret in silence what they describe. In 
our attempts to understand (each other), 
all our uses of the black bon coincide. 
Only in an act of interpretation can 
descriptions be linked. But no distinction 
can be sustained between descriptions in 
this act. Descriptions are continuous in 
form in reflecting the form of 
ý4 
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interpretation. the indeterminacy which 
arises in this continuity of form is the 
indeterminacy of interpretation. 
Where interpretations are determined, 
indeterminacy can only be removed in an act 
of description, which in turn is continuous 
in form with all our description building 
activities. (The imposibility of 
'decribing' description, thus arises in 
that the description to be 'described' 
needs already to have been described. ) In 
removing indeterminacy (of not knowing) 
indeterminacy (the description effecting 
the object of description) is created! 
"s8 
CONTINUITY IN FORM AND 
WHAT CAN BE SAID 
In the continuity in form necessary to 
describe description, the indeterminacy of 
interpretation cannot be avoided. Where 
what can be said is not what can be spoken 
about, what can be said is what can be 
taken to be said. The indeterminacy (and 
its source in an act of interpretation) is 
reflected in that all that can be said Is 
what, in an act of interpretation, can be 
taken to be said. 
It is in involving an act of 
interpretation, that what can be said 
differs from what can be spoken about; that 
what cannot be spoken about can 
nevertheless b., shown. It is in excluding 
an act of interpretation, that what is 
spoken about can be spoken about. In the 
complementary act of interpretation, the 
distinction by which it can be spoken about 
is unwritten in the form of interpretation. 
But, while a distinction drawn is 
unwritten where the act of drawing the 
distinction is considered, the 
indeterminacy of interpretation cannot be 
removed in considering the act of 
interpretation (to do so, is, in Itself, to 
wake a description, drawing a distinction, 
which is unwritten in the act in which it 
is interpreted). It Is thus, that what can 
be said, is said (and can be taken to be 
said) in the continuity of forts between 
descriptions. There can, In the coincidence 
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between the described and the describing, 
be no indeterminacy concerning what it is 
said about. 
In the coincidence of the describing and 
described black boxes, the application of 
the black box to itself does not un-blacken 
the black box. (The 'inverse' unwritinq of 
distinctions (distinguishing things spoken 
about) coincides in result with the 
blackness of the black box. ) Hence, In 
describing description there can be no 
indeterminacy concerning the blackness of 
the black box; there can be no 
indeterminacy concerning the Indeterminacy 
of interpretation. It is thus that the 
black box captures the continuity of form. 
Where such indeterminacy is removed in 
what can be said, while being taken to be 
said, description is described. 
The possibility of thus describing 
description in the continuity of form 
between descriptions may be considered a 
special criterion of 'description', I. e. 
specifying "description" as removing an 
indeterminacy in the coincidence between 
the describing (the activity of describing) 
and the described (the description of this 
activity). 
The need for such a notion of 
"description" arises wherever we attempt to 
describe description; i. e. wherever we 
attempt to describe our description 
building activities. The need for such a 
notion of "description` arises wherever the 
attempt 'describe' our description building 
activities is bound to fail in the removal 
of the indetermincay of interpretation, 
reducing these activities themselves to 
'description' building activities (grey 
boxes). It is in overlooking the basic 
predicament of describing description, that 
the omniscient greyness of pseudo 
'description', prescribes limitations, and 
hence creates indeterminacy, by subjecting 
what cannot be 'described' to 
'description'; that it breaks the silence, 
in speaking about what cannot be spoken 
about. 
However, the need for a special notion 
of "description", only arises with regard 
to such attempts at 'describing' 
description. The notion of "description" 
is, and must be, continuous in form with 
the description building activities it can 
be used to "describe". It is none other 
than the continuity in form between 
descriptions which enables us to interpret, 
and reflects the form of interpretation in 
the form of our descriptions. It is none 
other than our ability to remove 
indeterminacy, within any one description, 
In the coincidence between what we say and 
what we do, with regard to the speech act 
in which we do so. In the coincidence 
between the describing and the described, 
what we can (be taken to) say about one, is 
also (taken to be) said about the other. 
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things need to be co. eprable to be compared, 
the continuity in form between descriptions 
provides the basic comprabillty between all 
descriptions (or things we choose to 
distinguish). Similarly, it is in the form 
of interpretation, that we can say what we 
think, think about what we know, know what 
we say, and so on, and it is thus that the 
continuity in form between descriptions is 
essential to all our description building 
activities, reflecting that what activities 
we may distinguish, we merely distinguish 
with this or that curiosity. (Compare for 
example the cumbersome result of a lack of 
such continuity in computers). 
"s 
WHERE WE CANNOT REMAIN SILENT 
Any distinction is arbitrary. In the 
continuity in form between descriptions 
this arbitrariness is complemented by our 
ability to unwrite a distinction, and with 
it, its arbitrariness. We could have 
remained silent. 
But, as Beckett says, 'and yet-you go 
on. * We cannot remain silents where I stop 
speaking to you, I speak to myself and so 
on and on, in the continuity of for.. 'A 
silence holds as many sayings as we care tt 
mention. The number of things we say and 
pass over in silence between any two things 
we say is indeterminate. 
I can only say one thing at a time. The 
distinction is timeless, and in its 
timelessness arbitrary. To speak is to 
raise a doubt. A doubt about the bounds of 
what we speak about, acknowledging the 
severed whole. Acknowleding what is passed 
over in silence. We cannot pass a doubt 
over in silence, and yet we cannot at once 
accept and question a thing 
Icomplementarity). Hence, having question. 
it, we make time to accept it; having said 
it, we make time to question it. 
Doubt after doubt, we are bound to go 
on, and on. We cannot remain silent, where 
time after time 
`Whit we cannot speak about, 
wo must pass over in silence. " 
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IN AND AHQUT LANGUAGE 
Most things that can be said in and about 
language have in some way or another been said 
about something or other'. 
Some have been said about the world, 
reflecting that the world is conceived of, 
and represented through, language. 
Some have been said about thinking, 
reflecting the intimate relation between 
language, thought and consciousness. 
Some have been said about learning, 
reflecting the use of linguistic abilities 
in learning. 
Some have been said about ourselves, 
reflecting that we use and generate 
language and that we use language to 
reflect about ourselves. 
Some have been said about formal 
languages, reflecting the natural 
linguistic abilities used in constructing 
these. 
Some have been said about language, or 
aspects of language, indicating the thing 
language is considered to be. 
To hope to may something new about 
these things would be naive. But to say 
something new in saying lt in and 
about language may be possible, there 1s a 
tendency to overlook the relation between 
ourselves and the language we generate in 
conceiving of the world we take to surround 
us. 
What I as about to say in arid about language 
is simple. It may be difficult only in' 
seeing how what 1s normally said about the 
world, ourselves, thinking, learning, and 
languages, concerns language. Perhaps it 
need not be said. But what need not be said 
is often difficult to see, and seeing it, 
it is often difficult to see the point of 
saying it. The point of speaking about 
things is perhaps to wake significant 
distinctions. But, in trying to speak about 
language, I found that I had to remove 
distinctions; excessive distinctions. We 
seem to think it pointless to remove 
distinctions. If there is perhaps a point 
in saying the things I say, it is as the 
naive child protesting about the cumbersome 
ways grown-ups have of going about things. 
Cumbersome ways which Saint Exupery, the 
child, found to make such grown-ups blind 
to the simplicity of things, when he drew 
his Drawing Number Ones 
It was a picture of a boa constrictor 
digesting an elephant. But the grown-ups 
did not understand. They asked him to 
explain his drawing. They need to have 
things wade explicit to understand the*. He 
reluctantly made his Drawing Number Twos 
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Cutting the boa open to show what is 
going on inside it, spoils the process of 
digestion. Cutting a living whole open, so 
as to be able to describe it, stops it 
being alive and so there Is for was) a 
tendency to describe aliveness as a were 
reflection in a dead thing. Explicitness 
spoils the understanding we may have of a 
thing. Perhaps it is the child in all of us 
who understands the need to pass things 
over in silence, as Wittgenstein put it. 
So, I ask for the understanding of the 
child in all of. us, to whom the simple may 
not appear trivial. I say what I may to 
re-awaken our confidence in our simple 
intuitions. 
. Sometimes 
I will speak as a child 
would. Sometimes I will do what I do, 
. relying on the child in you to understand 
Sometimes I will have to speak as a 
grown-up would. I will have to-explain and 
argue and do the things which give us 
grown-ups confidence that what we do and 
say is important. In exploring language,. 
these two approaches went hand in hand. 
When I was at a loss as to what to say, I 
could fall back on what I had been doing. 
When I was at a loss as to what to do next, 
I could fall back on what I had been 
explaining. The way in which they 
complemented each other gave we confidence, 
made me feel language was showing we its 
way, taking one by the hand. I hope that, 
reading this, you will have the same 
experience and will perhaps fool that it is 
important. 
The-two approaches reflect the 
complementarity between analysing and 
synthesising. It is customary in science to 
emphasise one approach, the analytic or 
rational. To do so, is to interpret the 
complementarity as Exclusive or 
prohibitive, rather than as productive. 
This is inevitable, in that science is 
about making observations and 
understandings explicit, rather than pass 
them over in silence. I need to consider 
and use both approaches to speak about the 
interplay between them. This Interplay is 
what allows us to use and generate 
language. It Is this interplay which allows 
me to write my thesis. The interplay in 
which I write about what I do, and do what 
I write about. 
In this Interplay, science goes beyond 
the 'scientific' in the art of science. It i 
not for me to speak about the art of 
science. It is simply, that language lives 
in this same Interplay and so reflects on 
the art of science. The distinction between 
art and science, is, like every 
distinction, artificial. Each of these 
apparently distinct approaches requires Its 
apparent complement within itself. Whether 
we inquire into the nature of science, or 
look for what is outside it, we encounter 
art. Whether we look into art, or around 
art, we encounter science. The two are 
aspects of one and the same the same 
endeavour to construct and express. 
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ON THE FUNCTION AND EXISTENCE OF LANGUAGE 
To ask about the function is to ask about 
the function of a thing. To ask about the 
function of a thing is to eresuppose that 
it exists. Thus it may seem odd to ask 
about the function of language while 
considering whether or not it exists. 
The problem lies in the circumstance 
that, while it is iwpossibile to ask about 
the function of language without 
presupposing that language exists, it is 
also impossible to do so without using 
language. To ask is to use language. The 
presupposition of a thing's existence 
arises in using language to ask about the 
thing. Language cannot be used to ask about 
the function of language without, in so 
doing, presupposing that its function is, 
in part at least, to ask about the function 
of things. Using language to ask about the 
function of language is to presuppose (at, 
least part of) the answer to the question. 
This difficulty may be approached by 
distinguishing different types of things, 
differnt types of languages, or different 
ways in which a thing's existence is 
presupposed (assumed, or known), In asking 
about its point (its meaning, or its 
function). Thus a fair number of 
distinctions could be explored. Using 
language to do so, again, at least part of 
the function of language would be 
determined. Language cannot be used to 
distinguish without, in so doing, 
presupposing its function in part to be 
that of distinguishing thingsp without, in 
so doing. presupposing that it exists. 
The need to presuppose the existence 
of a thing arises in the act of speaking 
about it. The act of speaking about a thing 
is an act of ordaining its existence. Thus, 
language cannot be used to speak about the 
function of language without assuming both 
that it exists and has a function, and that 
one of its functions is to ordain existence 
to the things spoken or asked about. 
A earadox thus arises. To speak about 
language is to to ordain its existence, 
while its existence is presupposed in so 
doing! It is here that distinctions impose 
themselves, either between languages tog. 
between the describing and the described 
language), or between ordained and 
presupposed existences. But it is just in 
such distinguishing that this 
predicament arises, and no distinction, 
between ordaining and presupposing 
existence has been invoked. 
Where, not distinguishing different 
languages, there is only one language, the 
paradox becomes apparent. It becomes 
apparent as a earadox of means, where to 
achieve an and (i. e. ordain the existence 
of language) a means (i. e. language) is 
required, which can only be brought about 
or generated where the end has already been 
achieved. 
Consider the source of the 
intentionality (l. e. 'to achieve an wnd") 
involved in the paradox. It arises with the 
very quest for the function of language, 
and it is in asking what the function is 
that the predicament becomes paradoxical. 
To ask 'what is language used for? ' is to 
use language, and hence to contribute to 
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and change its use. To use language is to 
use it with a particular intention. But to 
ask for the function of language is to ask 
'what, in general, is language used for? ', 
and particular intentions cannot be spoken 
for än general. It is in just this 
generalisation that the paradox arises. It 
arises as such with regard to every 
function of language we care to examine. As 
a paradox it manifests the dependence of a 
'function of language' on the 'existence of 
language'; and the dependence of the 
'existence of language' on a 'function of 
language'. This paradox finds its 
resolution in our particular activities. 
But this paradox arises in speaking 
about language and the ordaining of 
existence involved in speaking. The 
reification of language arises in speaking 
about language. As a consequence of 
speaking about language, the result and its 
means are considered to be one and the same 
thing, i. e. 'language'. Considering that 
what is spoken of as 'language' is a 
generalisation over particular activities, 
the paradox looses such of its force. The 
difficulty arises simply in the act of 
speaking about language. It arises in 
generalising particular and distinct 
acivities as constituting *language'. The 
particular activities, whatever they may 
be, in themselves need not give rise to the 
paradox. 
- The paradox arises in using language (to 
speak about language). Even where it is 
only this particular use which, at any one 
time, cannot be spoken about, there is 
necessarily more to language than can be 
captured by saying language (or the 
function of language) is this or that. 
Where to speak about 'language' thus 
involves a choice, to speak about language 
is to ordain 'language' to be one rather 
than another sort of a thing. Thus, the 
paradox is reflected in the circumstance 
that whatever is taken to be language is 
ordained to be language (witl, regard to 
either the linguist, the speaker or the 
community who take it to be so). 
Propositions of the sort 
"Language is ." 
are unfalsifiable, 
"becaus" 
they-are 
definitions of what is considered to be 
language, or, what comes to the same, 
statements of an acceptable use of the word 
'language'. They are not observations on 
the nature of language (though they may 
indeed be based on and reflect such 
observations). 
This reflects the essential difficulty 
in speaking about language in general. but 
it also manifests the essential ability to 
construct languages with and for particular 
purposes. The interdependence between the 
'function of language' and the 'existence 
of language' manifests the constructive 
ability, in which the function of a 
language is determined in the process of 
constructing (or designing) it. It 1  here, 
that tha '4unction of* a language cannot be 
considered independently of the intention 
with which it was for Is) constructed. 
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The paradox of means. can thus be locally 
resolved in terms of the intentions whith 
which a language was (or is) constructed. 
This however relies on a sharp separation 
(and hence distinction) between the 
language and its construction. A separation 
which, restricts what can be said about 
language to what can be said about 
particular languages constructed for 
particular purposes (artificial languages) 
and to what can be said about particular 
(intentional) uses of natural language on 
particular occasions. The possibilty of 
this resolution is significant, for it is 
the only resolution of the paradoxical 
predicament in speaking about language 
where the content and the particular shape 
and form of a language such as English, 
French etc. are to be discussed. beyond the 
prescriptive, it determines what linguistic 
inquiry can say about such languages. 
Where, however, the constructive ability 
is considered a linguistic ability, the 
paradox remains, and reveals the nature of 
the difficulty. For the constructive 
ability, in the ability to distinguish, and 
to ordain a thing's existence in speaking 
about it, is all-pervasive and essential to 
every act of speaking, and cannot be 
considered external to language in its 
ordinary use. If the paradox of means is 
trivial, with regard to functions commonly 
associated with natural language (eg. 
communication, representation, statement, 
questions and commands, and the like), it 
is that the language presupposed in thesis 
paradoxes can indeed be or have been 
constructed for just these purposes. But 
where, beyond particular constructions, we 
are concerned with the abiltiy to 
construct, the paradox becomes central. 
Central, but nor necessarily paradoxical. 
It is indeed paradoxical to ask how we 
construct the language which enables us to 
construct languages. But it is paradoxical 
only in the assumption that such a language 
is required. To consider 'the language 
which enables us to construct' is to 
consider a contradiction in terms.. Where 
construction is concerned, there is no 
language (it being in the process of being 
constructed! 
While the process of constructing a 
language does not require a given (prior) 
language, a given language can be used to 
construct a new language. It is in this 
special ability to generate languages, 
given a prior language, that the apparent 
paradox of means arises (in the assumption 
that one language is needed to create 
another). Here the paradox arises in 
overlooking the temporality involved in 
using the product of one activity in a new 
activity. The ability to use what has been 
constructed, to construct something new, is 
essentially temporal. It is only in this 
temporality that it is possible to speak of 
experiences or learn form mistakes. Without 
it no learning would be possible. 
The ability to construct relies on the_ 
ability to accept something (possibly 
previously constructed) as given, or to 
eventually treat something constructed as 
given (to be used as a basis for doing 
-something now). 
The difftcuittups in Speaking of the 
1 
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'function' or 'existence' of language thus 
reflect these features of construction. 
Having constructed a language, it is used 
to do what it was constructed for 
('function'). In so doing it is accepted as 
given ('existence'), and is In turn (in 
time) used to construct something new (eg. 
another language, with another 'function'). 
The paradox of means simply reflects the 
dynamic nature of the process of 
construction (or learning). On any 
occasion, a language constructed for a 
particular purpose is, in being used, 
accepted as given and thus naturally leads 
to the creation of a new language for a new 
purpose. Thus it is impossible to speak of 
'the function of language' in general. We 
can only speak of particular languages used 
on particular occasions. Beyond the 
particular, we can speak about the 
processes in which languages are 
constructed (being as yet 
non-existent), 
used (and effected by this use) 
accepted (and in such acceptance, 
having an 'existence') 
and in turn used to construct new 
languages. It is in these processes that we 
can speak in general, and without 
difficulty, about important linguistic 
abilities, just as it is in this process 
that we do not, in every day life, run into 
the paradox of weans. It is in these 
processes that the nature of language 
reveals itself. 
"s 
ON THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE 
Where construction can, but need not, rely 
on the existence of a prior language used 
to construct, the constructive ability 
could be considered a linguistic ability 
only where a given language is used in 
constructing a new language (thus, for 
instance, the ability to construct 
artificial languages using natural language 
might be considered a linguistic ability, 
while a painter's ability to develops a 
pictorial "language" might not). Where such 
a distinction is invoked, linguistic 
construction does rely on the existence of 
a prior language. and hence leads to the 
question of the origin of language. 
To thus m. kr construction dependent on 
the existence of a prior language is to 
attempt to unfold the paradox of means in 
historical speculations which cannot be 
proved or disproved. Where instead, 
construction does not rely on the existence 
of a prior language, It can be shown to 
account for the occurance of the problem of 
the origin of language. 
In considering the 'origin of language' 
it is by no weans clear in which dimension 
this is to be pursued. There are as many 
possible dimensions In which to seek the 
origin of language as there are possible 
'functions of' language (beyond dimensions 
concerning its nature). This 
interdependence "rise% in that to ask for 
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the origin of a thi,, q is tu assume that it 
exists. Where, however, languages are 
constructed, and hence brought into 
existence, the quest for the origin is 
paradoxical, and once more, reveals the 
difficulties in generalising from this or 
that language, Lnowrº to have been 
constructed, to language in general. Just 
such a generalisation is involved in asking 
for the first or original language. 
Thus again, the quest for the origin 
arises in the act of speaking. It arises in 
the reification involved in speaking about 
such a thing as language, where the 
'existence', the origin of which is sought, 
is that presupposed in the act of speaking. 
It is in the nature of construction and in 
the form of speaking that what 'origin of 
language' we can speak of, is to be sought. 
But the problem of the origin of 
language cannot be resolved in terms of the 
forms of speaking and constructing, 
without, in so doing, using the form of 
speaking, i. e. the very for., which gives 
rise to the problem to be resolved. It will 
thus be necessary to construct a language 
to speak about both the forms involved in 
construction and the form of speaking. I 
attempt to begin to do so, with the 
ideograms I will develop in the course of 
my discussion. Speaking about the process 
of construction, I will also be 
constructing a simple ideogramic language. 
Consider the assumptions made in the 
quest for an origin. To ask about the 
origin of language Is to assume that there 
is indeed such a thing as language 
(whatever it may be). It is, moreover, to 
assume that present existence of a language 
does not in itself account for its coming 
into being. Thus, the existence of a 
constructed language will not in itself 
raise a question of origin (the abilities 
used in its construction, or the origin of 
the person constructing It, may). But, to 
ask for the origin of a thing, is to 
perceive the existence of the thing (shown 
as ". ") as relying on something prior, and 
unknown (shown as "? "), 1. e. 
(1) ? --> 
In the case of the ability to construct 
languagesq given a language, this is to 
percieve the existence of'any one language 
as relying on (emerging from) some temporal 
process in which It was developed from 
similar, possibly more and more 
rudimentary, lanpuage%, i. e. 
(2) ? -'!.. _.. >. --), 
This ideogram captures any of a series of 
origin problems, and reveals a number of 
oddities. To ask for the origin is to 
assume (as in the construction of new 
languages from given languages) that all 
the data (languages) linked by the arrows 
(particular constructions) are in some 
sense THE BLAME and to assume that the 
origin (1. e. the '? ') must be in some sense 
be DIFFERENT. To ask for the origin is to 
assume to know something about all the dots 
(languages) and something about all the 
arrows (languages being used to construct 
now languages), and, by virtue of such 
knowledge. to be prepared to hang dots and 
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arrows together as one process, thw origin 
of which, is sought. Knowing the 
similarities between any given language and 
the new language constructed using it, 
(knowing the relation between any one dot 
and the next), a dimension (eg. time) is 
invoked, along which languages are assumed 
to have developed, i. e. 
(3) >, --j, --), . --> . -4 
different same 
Apart from the oddity of the sudden loss of 
confidence in this generalisation, such 
questions of origin manifest the further 
oddity of considering every language (dot) 
at once the 'result' of a construction and 
the 'means' for the next construction. 
Thus, the quest for the origin arises in a 
confused temporal resolution of the 
paradox, in which different languages are 
distinguished in time, while nevertheless 
assuming these to constitute one and the 
same language. 
Showing the circularity of the paradox 
as a circle, the problem of origin ("7"1 
can be replaced by the paradox of weans, 
i e. 
to> 
The generalisation and reification 
involved in speaking about a thing (eg. 
language) arises in the assumption that the 
dots (eg. languages) are in so~ sense THE 
SAME. It is in generalising the similarity 
between instances that we assume there to 
be a thing (i. e. such a thing as language). 
But such instances (repeated dots) have in 
turn arisen in a generalisation from 
limited knowledge. W1iat is known, is not 
the process represented in the ideogram, 
but only the similarity and the relation 
between any two languages. Thus such 
questioning arises in the knowledge of the 
circularity whereby languages are 
constructed while being used to construct, 
i. e. 
(5) 
CD 
Where the knowledge of this circular 
relation is thus shown as a circle, the 
very process (evolution) and the dimension 
(in which the origin is sought) are invoked 
in the act of speaking, i. e. In unfolding 
this circular relation. It is in speaking 
about language that one language is 
distinguished from the next. It is in 
speaking about language that time is 
invoked to distinguish one from the newt. 
Hence, the reification involved in speakinc 
arises where 
(i) the knowledge of a general 
circular relation 
(ii) needs to be Linfolded to be 
described, 
(iii) and once described, the 
generalisation of the similariss between 
the described parts leads to the Infer nice 
that a thing was described. 
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The difficulty in speaking about 
language in particular arises in the 
circumstance that these three steps are by 
no means peculiar to speaking about 
languages. (it) reflects the form of 
speaking (describing), whereby any whole 
needs to be unfolded to be described, and 
(iii) is necessary to grasp the general 
pattern in what was described. Hence, no 
matter what (I) is, its description will 
take the form of (it) which will 
consequently be understood as in (iii), ep. 
(j) . -i"--i-4-4 
(jj) --> - ---> . ---) - -4 
(Jjj) 0 
The difficulty is aanifort in the 
difficulty in interpreting the difference 
between the (t) and (J) sequences. Let (j) 
show a process. i. e. a sequence of 
events which are actually distinct in. 
time. Thus, the )-sequence shows a process 
of grasping a pattern in a sequence 
of distinct events, observed over time. In 
contrast, (i) represents the knowledge of a 
general circular relation, and the 
i-sequence shows the process of describing 
such a relation. Together the two sequences 
show the difficulty (or inposibility) of 
distinquishinq between a description of 
circular relation and a description of a 
sequence of related events. 
The problem of the origin of language 
(and predictably a number of similar origin 
problems) arises In the difficulty of 
distinguishing between two such 
descriptions, eg. time is Invoked in the 
description of a circular rulationj the 
description, is than taken to describe an 
actual sequence of events, which, together 
with the knowledge of the circularity 
involved, lwads to the question of how such 
a sequence could begin. Where thus the 
problem of the origin of language arises in 
ep. akiny about language, It is an 
'ecknowlwdgeaent' of what evades being 
spoken aboutl 'acknowledging' the circular 
relation which, as such, evades 
description. 
Consider the nature of this descriptive 
blindspot. Where (i) shows the knowledge of 
the circular relation, this is 'already' 
grasped, suggesting, that fur it to be 
grasped, it must have been grasped in a 
description of an actual sequence of events 
observed. Suggesting, in other words, that 
(i) should be considered as corresonding to 
(JJJ), i. e. 
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iiii) C) 
(1111) ý"ý"ý"-ý 
(11111) 
here, invoking time to account for our 
process of describing and graspping (a 
circular relation). Thus, the blindspot is 
magnified, where any i-sequence is thus 
seen to originally arise in a J-sequence, 
and hence any circular relation (i) would 
be seen as having at some stage to be 
grasped in terms of observations of an 
actual sequence of events. Where no 
evidence for the sequence of observations 
(1) is available, this say in turn lead to 
invoking any number of steps (11) - (111) 
to explain the knowledge of a circular 
relatioi. It is thus in the nature of 
description to reinforce the blind spot by 
invoking regressions within regressions, 
i. e. 
(1) (1)) (111) (1111) (11111) 
Such rrplicatica) of sequences of 
descriptions in speaking about 
descrlptiort-building activities indicates 
the need tu unfold things in order to 
describe them. The unfolding involved in 
describing, and the unification involved in 
grasping a pattern underlying a 
description, are reflected in the 
circumstance that the whole of the 
1-sequence is no more than the instant (/1) 
above, i. e. 
(7) " --ý" -i"--i 
in which every dot corresponds to a 
sequence of descriptions, i. e. 
(a) .. "'ý1. 'ý"ý 
and every arrow corresponds to a grasping 
of a general pattern in such a sequence, 
(9) 
Ih* distinction between the sameness and 
the difference in (3), and the problem of 
origin, is thus a chicken-and-. gg problem 
in choosing whether to begin with a 
description to dot) or with a pattern 
grasped (an arrow), i. e. 
.. -) ... 4 . -ý " . -i (10) 
reflecting the complementary nature of 
these two activities. In speaking about a 
thing, a dot is replaced by a sequence of 
dots, (as in (8)). lsadifig to the Infinite 
regress implicit In (7), resulting in the 
1-sequence, which disallows the grasping of 
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circular º. Irtlum., uniws thwºy are derived 
from that ob. rvatlun of a eequvnce of 
actual evvnt%, I. W. 
(11) 
As a complement tu this, In grarping, a 
'dot arrow dot' sequence 1s substituted by 
a circle connecting a single dot (as In 
(9)) eventually collapsing the entire 
sequence, wherever such grasping may begin 
or end, i. e. 
412) 
While the problem of origin arises In 
speaking about a thing, no problem arises 
in grasping it. 
The distinction between the observation 
of an actual sequence of events and the 
description of such a sequence of events 
(i. e. the distinction between (J) and (. JJ) 
or (1) and (I1)) differentiates the above 
(7) ý.. ý.. _ý 
from 
fill "...... j. ý.... ý 
and appears to prevent the infinite 
rapresuion. This distinction is invoked as 
'actual' and distinguishes between 'the 
real world' and descriptions wade of this 
world. Where, the 'real world' (whatever 
this may bei does not impose itself upon us 
in such sequences as (j) or (l), such 
'observation' is in turn a description ° 
made. Where our notion of reality relies on 
descriptions of descriptions, there 1s no 
given cut off point, and thus, 
arid hence 47) Is indistinguishable from 
(11). But the absence of a cut off point 
does not effect the grasping whereby the 
notion of the 'reality' of a thing arises 
In tine commonality grasped between 
descr l pt l o, ºs, I. e. 
(14) "": 0 
and hence (7) is resolved as In 412). Thus, 
any distinction between 'actual' 
observation and 'sere' description, is one 
between what is or is not taken for 
granted. What, having grasped it, 1s 
accepted, and what, being "splored, Is 
questioned. 
The r"ificat/on (the urdalninn or 
presupposing of a thing** existence) 
Involved in speaking about a thing. ari N% 
In the stop fro. (11) to (111) above, I. e. 
in the inference that there is one thing 
(so.. th)ng) underlying the pattern 
discerned in a description. Were the two 
dot. In the original (7) are replaced with 
the circle to show that a pattern grasped 
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Its taken for yranlad, this reification 
appeares to underlie the very notion of a 
'reality'. Taking the circle thus to show 
that. In grasping it, a thlnj is assumed to 
waist, we can represent the origin problem 
(the question of hu« a thing copses to 
exist) as asking how a circular relation 
can come about, in terms of (1) above. 
(13) 
ß_)C) 
Mverr the arpuwwit prucasdes as above, it 
lvadb wv. ntually las In (12)), to consider 
(16) Cj3> ''! Cj 
ýýýý 
cj-)Ö 
in which (as in (3)) thu originating circle 
Is (by virtue of the nature of the question 
of origin) to by considered different from 
the arrows and dots and the circle in which 
the thing Is taken to exist. Thus the two 
circles remain sumrhuw distinct. 
The resulting fore is of interest. Where 
uno of the circles is originating and the 
other reproductive, the 'existrººce' of a 
system of this form, would arise (the 
originating circle) in whatever the system 
was doing (the reproductive circle). This 
form thus captures the Interaction between 
the 'function' and the 'existence' of 
language. It captures the observation that, 
while a given language may be used in 
constructing a new language, the existence 
of such a language is not a necessary 
requiremwºt for construction. With regard 
to the problem of 'origin', a system of 
this fur, would be *continuously 
originating", bringing itself into 
existence with whatever it does. Thus such 
a system is whatever it does, and cannot be 
known to be what it Is without seeing what 
It does, on any particular occasion. 
(17) C2) 
A continuously-originating system cannot be 
described, falling apart when unfolded. 
Rather than 
(181 ---) ? ---) ? -) ? -4 
the result of unfolding such a 
'continuously orlplnating* system, 
obliterates the descriptive contlnultyo' 
f ... 
7 
19) \ 
.,. ^ý 
--> 1 «, V 
J F 
12b 
the attempt tu unfold such a system thus 
reveals the crucial assumption of a 
thing's continuity made in describing It. 
this assumed continuity is reflected in the 
description (a. o. the saaetress of every 
circle we unfold). It is in turn what 
allows the inference from (or 'recognition' 
in) the description that a thing must have 
beery described (unfolded). It is also with 
regard to such assumed continuity that we 
can speak of a 'reproductive' circle. 
Where a continuously-originating system 
is whatever it does, and can change what it 
is and does, there can be no such 
continuity. There can be no sense in which 
a relation known can be reproduced (by 
invoking times). The description or 
unfolding of a continuously-originating 
system results in a set of random 
manifestations. 
The impossibility of describing a 
originating system arises in the absence of 
a continuity, where, the absence of a 
continuity cannot be recognised. It is the 
constancy in the description which allows 
us to recognise a system. Thus only systems 
which have already been described can be 
described! This reflects the difficulty in 
distinguishing between 'observation' and 
'description' lshowrº in (13) and (14)) in 
the description 1jutldir. q activities which 
underlie the ruiflcrtlwº in speaking about 
a 'thing'. 
Hut, where a continuously-originating 
system, falls apart when unfolded, It is, 
so to speak, that It ceases to be observed 
when ºrnfoldedl that it ceases to be 
described when described! The difficulty 
arises In the interaction between the fors 
of a continuously-originating system and 
the form of description. It is this 
interaction which renders a continuously- 
originating system undescrlbabls. To 
nevertheless speak of a system here, the 
observer who Imposes a distinction must be 
considered (as part of the system). The 
observer distinguishes a thing for pattern) 
in the random manifestations Into which a 
continuously- originating system 
disintegrates if described, 1. e. 
In other words, a continuously-originating 
system has an 'existents' only in the eye 
of the beholder, for It is he who brings it 
into existence by treating It as 
manifestations of one and the same 'thing'. 
The peculiarity of a continuosly 
originating system lies In the distinctness 
of the two circles, whereby the system does 
not go on doing the same thing. For 
sur-thing to originate, it cannot have 
existed. For something to do something 
different, what lt was doing has to be 
taken appart. The unfolding in which the 
system falls apart, is necessary to 
recreate the system. It Is in being the 
system of unfolding and grasping that the 
continuously-originating system can exist 
In the eye of a tieholdt r, i. e. 
12U 
4zi) 
the downward arrow illustrates the grasping 
of whatever the observer takes to units the 
random manifestations. The upward arrow 
illustrates the unfolding in which what was 
grasped is disassewbeled again. In terms of 
the two circles the downward arrow 
represents the originating circle and the 
upward and downward arrows together 
represent the reproductive circle. 
Constancy (i. e. the coincidence of the two 
circles) is shown where the same pattern is 
discerned over a number of repetitions of 
the process. Beyond allowing for the system 
to change what it does, the unfolding of 
something grasped can be used to test the 
continuity of what is grasped. 
Thus a'continuously-originatinp'systea 
falls apart where to unfold it Is to unfold 
unfolding. In unfolding unfolding the 
coaplesentarity between unfolding and 
grasping becow. s apparent= the 
cowple. entarity, in which any description 
is of an understanding, and any 
understanding is, eventually, itself a 
description. 
Where the problem of origin arises in 
the forms of description and construction, 
the domain in which language 'originates' 
and can have what existence two can speak 
of, is the domain of observations, ideas, 
understandings, thoughts and the like. 
Language is entertained by an observer/ 
describer and only has an existence in 
being thus entertained. 
<-' ' e` 
j 
0 
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CONSTRUCTION 
Is 
EXISTENCE 
Let, there be an observer. 
Let there be random manifestations M. 
Let the observer have the ability to 
grasp ll) (distinguish or impose) a pattern 
(P) in or amongst the random 
manifestation*, i. e. 
c1) (, 
(Assuming that, for a thing to exist, it 
has to be discerned by an observer, this 
£onstructlon explores how far this 
assumption can be taken). 
Let the observer have the ability to 
unfold (2) what he has grasped, and In so 
doing, obtain random manifestations, i. e. 
(2) R 
If 
in which he may in turn discern (1) a 
pattern, and bring sowthing into existence 
by thus discerning it. 
The observer may go an and on grasping 
and unfolding. There is no way of knowing 
what he grasps on each occasion, or that it 
is the saws on any two occasions. 
Let the observers activity of thus 
oscillating between grasping and unfolding 
give rise to randow manifestations (3), 
i. e. 
4s) 
R 
fý1 t 
I. 
Note, that assuming these manifestations 
(3) to be random, is not to assume the 
observer's grasping and unfolding to be 
ordered in time nor even (and here the 
ideograms may be misleading), that they are 
sequentially ordered. (Should a space, in 
which these manifestations become apparent, 
be required, assume such a space). 
Let the random manifestations 43) not be 
distinct from those in (1) and (2), unless 
the observer distinguishes them, and hence 
let there be no a-priori distinction 
between random manifestations subject to 
his grasping and random manifestations 
resulting from his grasping and unfolding. 
linder these assumptions, an observer may 
construct whatever world he will, but 
neither he nor an YAtenal observer can 
know that, or what, he is constructing. ihm 
observer cannot reflect on his 
constructing, and cannot distinguish 
hi. s. lf from his construction. if an 
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observer thus constructs, he cannot help 
constructing. 
To be able to distinguish random 
manifestations (MI) from random 
manifestations (R3) the observer would need 
to grasp his grasping or unfold his 
unfolding. 
Lot thus his grasping, or-unfolding, in 
turn give rise to random manifestations 
(R4), which may or may not be observed. 
a... 
{4) '.. 
Iý% i% t2 
ä. 
without assuming such manifestations (R4) 
to be distinct, unless they are 
distinguished by the observer. 
From an external point of view, 
overlooking that manifestations (RI), (R3) 
and (R4) are not a-priori distinct, it 
might be observed that by 
(i) grasping a pattern in the original 
random manifestations, an observer would 
bring about a transient existence, 
(ii) grasping a pattern in the random 
manifestations, (R3) of his grasping and 
unfolding activities, an observer would 
bring about a temporal existence tog. 
recognising that he keeps on grasping "the 
s+ae thing". "a slightly chancing thing", 
`an oscillating thing". "(randoal things"), 
(sit) graspi'. q a pattern in the random 
a. nifastations (1i4), an observer could 
Coaputcr relatii. s between temporal or 
transient rKistences. in turn bringing 
about trarisivrit. and eventually temporal, 
eN4stvncrr. bot«ven .. hich in turn he could 
co«pute rrlatscNbs. acid so on and so on. 
Nu«rvvr. fw the of . rver to speak of 
thus bringing about existences, he would 
have to be able to observe what he is 
doing. and distinguish such 'levels' as Hf. 
R3 and H4. tinder the assu. pt i ens goo have 
made. an observer can grasp patterns, and 
patterns in patternsl he can bring things 
into trarºsi.. it and terxporal existence{ he 
can gravp patterns in his grasping and 
unfuldin0. Pººt, unable to di44. rent$ate 
between cxºe pattern and another, he remains 
unable to I. rºow what hr is doing. 
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TIE 'SEIF-SYSTEM' 
To cow know .. hat he is doing, an obsever 
needs to comes to know of his own existence. 
He can only come to know of his existence 
by distinguishing hiwselfs 
distinguishing himself as having a 
transient existence, in grasping a pattern 
In the random manifestations of his 
grasping and unfolding activitlesp 
distinguishing himself as having a 
existence over time, by in turn unfolding 
this pattern to grasp the same self pattern 
again and again in such manifestations; 
distinguishing himself as having an 
identity, by computing the grasping of his 
grasping and unfolding of his unfolding to 
have one source, i. e. his own activities. 
But, here an observer confounds a level. 
paradox ; identical in predicament to the 
paradox of mans). To be able to 
differentiate what he does, to be able to 
distinguish the 'levels' of manifestations, 
he needs to distinguish himself. To be able 
to distinguish himself, he needs to 
differentiate his activities an just these 
levels! 
this predicament arises in the attempt 
to describe an observer and his activities. 
It arises In the distinction Invoked in 
speaking about an observer (and Is resolved 
where such a description is wads from the 
observer's point of view without 
differentiating what he cannot 
differentiate). It arises in the 
assumptions which had to be made as a 
matter of exposition. 
Firstly, the initial random 
manifestations have no existence except as 
manifestations of the observer's 
activities, and hence any R is necessarily 
an R3 or R4. 
Secondly. the random manifestations of 
an observer's activities, being his 
activities, cannot be random. However 
little coherence there may be, there must 
be some, or the activities would not be 
his) there would be no one observer. It is 
only In such coherence that an observer can 
distinguish ('recognise') himself. It is in 
this coherence that, before knowing of his 
existence, he exists as, and not distinct 
from, him activities. 
Thirdly, there is no distinction between 
his ability to grasp and unfold, and his 
ability to differentiate between things he 
does ton different 'levels'). To 
differentiate 'levels', an observer unfolds 
the pattern No grasps in the manifestations 
of his activities (as a whole). 
Lot there be but en" Qbs. rv. r. 
1. r. there Is no distinction between MI 
and R3 (or R4) the observer can 'switch' 
between those non-distinct manifestations. 
It Is the formulation of the 'level' 
paradox which I. inappropriate. This 
however, does not remove the observer's 
difficulty of distinguishing himself, or 
answer the question of how he can 
distinguish such levels. 
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For the observer to be able-to grasp a 
pattern in manifstations, these must at 
least be of transient existence. They must 
be there to be compared. In the act of 
grasping, the observer implicitly makes a 
distinction which corresponds to that 
between RI and R3. Where his ability to 
grasp, similarly, involves an implicit 
computing of an identity between at least 
transient existences, 'he implicitly draws 
distinction corresponding to that between 
R3 and R4. Thus, distinctions between 
patterns, and patterns of patterns he 
discerns, arise in what the observer does 
(with the patterns he grasps). They arise 
in what he does with the manifestations of 
his activities, rather than in the 
manifestations themselves. 
To distinguish himself the observer 
needs to distinguish between the 
manifestations of his activities, or 
between the patterns he discerns and what 
he is doing. In other words, to make 
explicit the distinctions he implicitly 
makes in grasping, he needs in turn to 
grasp what he is doing. Such. a distinction 
needs to manifest itself in his activities. 
It arises where a pattern he discerns is, 
in itself, distinct from what he does with 
it. Where, in other words, the obsever 
distinguishes between discerning a pattern 
and doing something with a pattern (or 
patterns) he discerns. This distinction 
arises as a difference in his concern. 
Where he is concerned with what he 
discerns, he checks that in unfolding (2) 
the pattern he discerned (1), he can grasp 
(1) the same pattern again and again (as a 
result of which he can see (1) it to be 
"the same"1, i. e. 
R 
cs> 0 
P 
1' 
, 
"thw same" 
Where he is concerned, to do something with 
patterns he discerns, he proceeds to grasp 
(1), and unfold (2), patterns IP) in the 
manifestations (R) of his activities. 
(6) R 
PR 
jo ("the same") 
He may find, as in (5), that he keeps on 
grasping "the same" pattern, but, rather 
than confirming this, he would be 
discovering it (in manifestations of his 
activities). There is no ordering between 
'levels', as he may need to discover a 
thing before he can confirm it. While (5) 
is closed (over a pattern grasped), (b) is 
open (over whatever patterns he grasped), 
reflecting the difference in concerns, 
whereby the observer chooses, either to 
focus on a pattern he has grasped (3), to 
establish its constancy (or existence over 
time), or to consider the manifestations of 
his grasping. Closure allows his to come to 
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know of the existence of a pattern, and 
openess allows him to grasp new patterns. 
In (6) the observer grasps a pattern 
(perhaps the "same") in which he implicitly 
distinguishes between patterns, and 
patterns in patterns he grasps. In (5) the 
observer is explicit about the (sameness of. 
the) pattern he is concerned with. Thus, 
the distinction between confirming and 
discovering, reflects the choice between 
DOING (6) (i. e. discerning patterns) and 
making explicit a pattern he discerned, 
i. e. SAYING what he discerned (5). The 
distinction between saying and doing is 
thus shown in these forms, i. e. 
rR 
R 
(7) P1ý, 
J 
R 
Pý1 
p 
SAY DO. 
Where the observer needs to know what he 
is doing to know of his own existence, the 
saying configuration, being explicit, 
allows for knowledge. In other words, where 
the observer's grasping activities give 
rise to the existence of things, it is in 
grasping patterns in his grasping 
activities (in the closed form) that he 
comes to know of such things. But, asjthere 
is no a-priori distinction between these, 
there is no distinction between the 
existence of things and the existence of 
knowledge of things, beyond the observer's 
treating them as one or the other. 
To distinguish himself in what he does, 
the observer needs to make explicit what he 
implicitly does. He needs to make explicit, 
what he is doing (to 'say what he is 
doing') while nevertheless doing it (i. e. 
'doing what he says he is doing'). For in 
doing he grasps (himself as the doer) and 
in saying he makes explicit what he grasps 
(i. e. 'his same self'). The observer must 
thus bring together the saying 
configuration and the doing configuration, 
so as to be able to discern the patterns 
resulting together, i. e. 
cep R 
POPO 
The two patterns (P) are in turn 
manifestations IR), unless the observer 
brings the two configurations together. To 
do so he must in turn grasp a (or the) 
pattern in this pair of P's, i. e. 
(9) R 
PR 
P 
It is in grasping this pattern, that the 
observer grasps himself, i. e. that he 
grasps "I", and hence let this bw shown as 
'P"I"', and the pair of P's be 'P DO' and 
14Ö 
'P SAY', with respect to (7) and (8). As a 
consequence of thus grasping P "I", the 
pair of P's need not and cannot be 
considered random manifestations (i. e. be 
replaced by R). The pattern. arising 
necessarily in bringing together the saying 
and doing configurations is such that, in 
each of the P's in the pair, the pattern of 
the other P is grasped, i. e. 
(9i) SAY (PC. ' 
W 
PIV 
and hence the pair, 
i 
uü SAY 
In the triplet of P's in each P the pattern 
in the other two P's is grasped. Just-as P 
"I" is the pattern grasped in the pair of 
P's, either of the P's in the pair is the 
pattern grasped in P "I" and the other P. 
In these cyclic relations the three Ps are 
patterns of each other, i. e. 
SAY P, ý 1POO 
lýýu 
fE Y 
ix) 
1 
SAY JI' 
These relations arise necessarily wherever 
the observer brings a saying and a doing 
configuration together. In the necessity 
with which this configuration imposes 
itself, he can grasp himself (grasp "I') In 
any such pair of P's, and his ability to do 
so is not affected by what particular 
patterns he considers. Thus the form of the 
triplet of P's is a form in itself. It 1s 
the form in which the observer grasps, and 
grasps himself, grasping his "I". In 
grasping himself, he grasps (the whole of) 
this form, and thus, the whole of this form 
can in turn be treated as the "I" 1. s. 
PIP 
P 
iT 
Call this form a 'self-system'. It is 
the form in which the observer exists as 
(the whole of) his construction, before he 
distinguishes himself. Where he grasps the 
whole of his construction, he grasps it in 
this form. It is in the coherence of (at 
least) this form, that the manifestations 
of his activities cannot be (completely) 
random. He unfolds this form in his 
description-building activities. 
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DESCRIPTION AND INTERPRETATION 
Where the observer grasps himself, his 
knowledge of himself merges with his grasp 
of his construction, rather than enabeling 
him to distinguish himself. The 
inevitabilty of grasping the pattern of the 
self-system as a whole excludes such a 
distinction= excludes unfolding. Both the 
ability of grasping (1) and of unfolding 
(2), are involved in and affected by the 
form of the self-system. The observer has 
to distinguish a pattern to grasp it, but 
this distinction is excluded in grasping 
the self-system. Similarly, the distinction 
required to unfold the self-system is' 
excluded. Unfolding is excluded in the 
circumstance that the observer can grasp 
himself in ANY pair of P's, i. e. In the 
form in which he grasps himself, rather 
than in the particular patterns grasped. 
A difficulty arises in the notions of 
grasping and unfoldingo unfolding involves 
describing, where the description is made 
in grasping, and grasping involves 
interpreting a pattern, while at the same 
time describing it. This difficulty can be 
resolved by using the notions of 
description and Interpretation, instead of 
those of grasping and unfolding. This 
change in distinction only concerns how the 
circular relation is severed, and does not 
otherwise affect what has been said so for. 
Thus, the form of the self-system as a 
whole is the form of interpretation. In 
this form, the P's are patterns grasped, 
rather than graspings of patterns, and 
hence token descriptions (slots to be 
filled by particular descriptions). Hence 
the P's can be replaced, and shown by. D's. 
repeating (10), i. e. 
(11) D_D 
D ; 'i' 
The distinction by which the observer 
distinguishes himself from his construction 
is excluded in the form of the self-system. 
It is excluded in the form of 
interpretation. This exclusion arises in 
the Lomplementarity between description and 
interpretation. The complementarity in 
which the form of interpretation cannot 
accomodate the form of a description being 
made. Hence a distinction (by which the 
observer can distinguish himself) must pen 
the self-system. In opening the self-system 
to distinguish himself, the observer 
distinguishes a pair of token descriptions 
D (the pair of P's, shown in (9), in which 
he first grasped himself) from the taken 
description D "I" (the pattern grasped, P 
"I"), i. e. 
D-D c12) -- 
D: 'T 
The open self-system reflects the form of 
the closed self-system; the'fora of 
interpretation. The relationships between 
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the token descriptions are those of the 
closed self-system: in the complementarity 
an open self-system needs to be closed to 
be interpreted. 
The opening of the seit-system captures 
the speech act. The two D's (P SAY and P 
DO) of the pair arm token descriptions for 
aspects of the speech act (what is said and 
what is done), while D "I" is a token- 
description of the actor (layer/ doer) with 
regard to whom a speech act can be 
interpreted. Artefacts, statements, 
questions, commands, etc, are examples of 
opened self-systems. But opening the 
self-system need not entail an utterance. 
It is the act of drawing a distinction 
which comprises the 'saying' and 'doing' 
aspects and remains tied to (or indicative 
of) the observer who draws the distinction. 
Hence, let the pair of token descriptions D 
as a whole be a description or an artefact. 
The token descriptions are descriptions 
made implicitly in the act of 
distinguishing (an observer can be taken to 
make them). They can be treated as 
descriptions in an interpretation of a 
description or an artefact. 
The making of descriptions by opening" 
the self-system provides the observer with 
new possibilities in bringing things into 
existence. He and his description can 
exist independently. Having distinguished 
himself from his construction, he can step 
back, look at it, and change it. He can 
dissociate himself from his construction, 
seeing it's weaknesses. Such independence 
allows for learning and designing; it 
allows the observer to use the artefacts or 
descriptions he makes. He can discern - himself in the things he does and can, 
choose to discern himself in some, and not 
in other, things he does. He can know of 
his existence by interacting with 
descriptions of himself and the artefacts 
he makes. He can change his descriptions 
and what he does and thus construct his own 
identity. 
His construction or description squires 
an observer-independent existence (iv), as 
an artefact, as a thing made. It is a trace 
of the observer's description-building 
activities, and acquires a life of it's own 
where it is observerd and interpreted by 
others. It may eventually acquire an 
interpersonal existence (v) across the 
interpretations of a number of observers. 
It is such independence of descriptions or 
artefacts (tools, chairs, cups, buildings, 
theories, languages and the like), which 
allows for the construction of an 
(interpersonal) reality, inhabited by 
artefacts and descriptions. As yet the 
distinction by which the observer 
distinguishes himself from his construction 
only gives rise to these possibilities, 
without in itself realising them. The 
observer and his descriptions and artefacts 
only acquire independence where they are 
actually treated as Independent. Thus, the 
notion of independence bears out the 
assumption that a thing's existence depends 
on being distinguished, by, and possibly 
from, an observer. Descriptions and 
artefacts cannot be treated as independent 
in isolation. To treat a description or 
artefact as this or that is to interpret 
it. 
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To identify the closed self-system with 
tie form of interpretation is to say that 
n3thing can remain distinct in the form of 
äAerpretation., What, was distinguished is 
na longer, distinct. In the act of 
interpretation, the observer and his 
construction are one. 
To distinguish (what was interpreted or 
tow it was interpreted) it is to break open 
the self-system. It is to make another 
description. The "content" of , interpretations arises in the particularity 
of such descriptions. Where there is only 
one observer there is nothing to 
distinguish one interpretation from 
another. There can be no ambiguity. The 
form of interpretation imposes itself 
necessarily on any description. It is in 
the act of interpretation that things come 
to cohere, hold together, and stand against 
the fragmentation of the random 
manifestations assumed. 
In the form of interpretation, 
descriptions and artefacts have an 
existence complementary to the independent 
existence they can have in an open 
self-system. It is in reflecting the form 
of interpretation that descriptions can 
become independent. The pair of D's, 
reflecting aspects of the act of 
distinction, allow for the form of 
Interpretation to be grasped, allow the 
self--system to be closed over a 
description. Thus it is the form of 
descriptions which enables different 
observers to close the form of 
interpretation over a description or 
artefact and hence it is the form of a 
description which allows it to acquire an 
interpersonal existence, i. e. 
(13) 
ýýD 
8$ 
TIME 
In constructing the self-system, unfolding 
was excluded. It was excluded in that time 
was excluded in the observer's act of 
grasping the self-system. The distinction 
between unfolding and grasping assumed the 
time in which a pattern could be unfolded 
and in turn grasped. The exclusion of time 
in the grasping of the self-system thus 
made it necessary to change the distinction 
(between grasping and unfolding) to the 
timeless notions of description and 
interpretation, so as to eliminate this 
assumed time. 
It is in the absence of timey that the 
exclusive nature of the coaplesentarity 
between description and interpretation 
arises. In the absence of time the 
distinction by which the observer 
distinguishes himself from his construction 
is excluded from his grasping of the 
self-system. In the absence of time a 
description or artefact made cannot be 
accosodated in the form of interpretation. 
In the absence of time a description or an 
interpretation can only be considered in 
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isolation. In their timelessness these 
notions are in mutual exclusion and hence 
complementary. 
The complementarity between these forms 
leads the observer to generate time (before 
and without as yet distinguishing it as 
such). The act of making a description, of 
opening the self-system calls for it to be, 
in turn, closed in an act of 
interpretation. The act of interpretation, 
of closing of the self-system, in turn 
calls for it to be opened to make a new 
description. What is excluded in the 
interpretation imposes the need for a 
description. What is excluded in the 
description imposes the need for an 
interpretation. Hence the observer is 
involved in a process of opening and 
closing his self-system. This process 
becomes identifiable as a process with 
regard to the time generated in this 
oscillation, and in so doing, the observer 
creates the dimension of events he will 
later distinguish as time, i. e. 
(14) D^D DAD V :DD :DD: = D 
`\Dl ~D1`, IP ~D~ `\9 
In the process of oscillating between 
opening and closing his self system, the 
observer makes a description (opening the 
self-system), steps back to consider and 
interpret this description (closing the 
self-system), and in turn makes a new 
description (opening the self-system), and 
so on. In such interaction with his 
description, the observer can change, 
develop, and build upon, a description in a 
new description. The process is that of 
construction, or design. 
The process of construction is formally 
governed by, and formally governs, the form 
of the self-system and the forms of 
description and interpretation. The time 
generated in the process of construction 
reflects the forms of description and 
interpretation. Similarly, the form of the 
observer's descriptions and interpretations 
reflect the nature of this process. 
As a consequence of this complementarity 
the observer can, only 'say' one thing 
within any one description in the process 
of oscillating between descriptions and 
interpretations. The notion of 'saying' 
here concerns saying one thing rather than 
another) making this point rather than 
that. (It is not that of 'uttering', ands 
does not presuppose that an utterance has 
or will be made. ) Thus, the notion of 
'saying' arises in the process of 
oscillating between opening and closing the 
self-system. The observer can only say one 
thing at a time as there is no point in 
saying more than one thing at a time. There 
is no point in saying more than one thing 
at a time as all that can be said in a 
description is merged into one in the form 
of the subsequent interpretation. 
In the complement interpretation, it is 
impossible to say how a description is 
(will or should be) interpreted. All that 
can be said is that a description was 
interpreted. How it was interpreted can 
only be considered after the event in terms 
150 
of the subsequent description(s). To say 
how a description was interpreted it is 
necessary to move on in time to open the 
self-system. It cannot be known within the 
act of interpretation how something is 
interpreted. To consider how it- is 
Interpreted is to distinguish what is 
interpreted from the way in which this is 
interpreted. The form of interpretation 
cannot accomodate distinctions. To say how 
a description was interpreted is to press 
on in time and make the next description. 
The complementarity between description 
and interpretation thus formally provides 
the dynamics of the observer's 
description-building process. The observer 
generates time in oscillating between 
opening and closing the self-system. The 
form of the time generated arises in the 
complementary forms of description and 
interpretation. The observer and his 
description merge with every act of 
interpretation. The distinction by which a 
description was made is obliterated. The 
form of interpretation cannot accomodate 
distinctions. In the act of interpretation 
the observer cannot distinguish himself. He 
cannot distinguish the description he is 
interpreting. While generating time he 
cannot distinguish this time. He can have 
no notion of time. With every act of 
interpretation, with every closing of the 
self-system, the observer accumulates time. 
The form of the time generated is that of 
such accumulation. To notionally illustrate 
such accumulation, or embedding, let "I" be 
an abbreviation for D "I", and D an 
abbreviation for the pair of token 
descriptions, i. e. 
(15) ((((I) D) D) D) 
but rather than being embedded further and 
further inside his descriptions, the 
observer remains outside them, to make 
them. Instead, accumulated In the act of 
interpretation, time is accumulated within 
the observer's self-system, within the 
observer's "I". To capture the form of the 
time generated in the observer's 
description-building process 
(construction), it is necessary to 
distinguish between the complementary open 
and closed phases of the oscillation. Let 
"I", according to (10) above show the 
closed and "I" sD show the open 
self-system (reflecting the distinction 
between the observer and his description). 
The form of the time thus accumulated, can 
be shown ass 
(16) "Ir - (T: D) 
The rightward arrow represents an opening 
of the self-system, and the leftward arrow 
a closing of the self-system, and the 
brackets contain the description merged in 
the act of interpretation. With every 
closure of the self-system the observer's 
"I" accumulates time. 
What independence the observer acquires 
in distinguishing himself, he looses in 
interpreting his description. The simple 
process of opening and closing the 
self-system requires the observer to accept 
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the descriptions he made in the act of 
interpretation. In this simple process he 
appears thus limited to an uncritical 
existence. He can discriminate only by 
choosing not to interpret his descriptions. 
The simple process of opening and closing 
the self-system allows the observer to 
build on his descriptions and in this sense 
it allows him to develop his descriptions. 
In this process of construction the 
observer accumulates time, and his "I" is 
ever-growing. It is in this construction 
that the observer has an existence. 
-4. 
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TOWARDS COMMUNICATION 
In the process of construction the observer 
is quite alone. There is only one observer, 
and even he cannot sustain distinguishing 
himself. In the simple process of 
construction the observer cannot begin to 
conceive of others. The form of. 
interpretation necessarily leads him to 
interpret everything ego-centrically, and 
treat the world as his own. 
y. 
Hence, communication cannot simply be 
considered in terms of the interaction 
between two such observers. Being 
ego-centric, if not solipsistic, such 
observers would not and could not interact. 
For one observer to begin to communicate 
with an other observer, he needs to 
distinguish himself, and distinguish the 
other. It is in the interaction between the 
processes of, construction and communication 
that an observer can make the distinctions- 
necessary to begin to communicate. This 
interaction needs to be considered before 
we can speak about communication. 
The need to consider the interaction- 
between construction and communication 
arises In the form of exposition and arises 
in the need to begin and to distinguish one 
process from another. There can be no 
separation between construction and 
communication. The notion that an observer, 
begins to communicate arises in the 
expository beginning. The interaction. 
between construction and communication is 
manifest where the exposition of the simple, 
process of construction is also indicative 
of aspects of communication. In turn, this 
interaction is manifest in the notion of 
asking how the observer may come to 'speak 
to himself'. 
The need to consider the form of 
exposition is not accidental. It arises in 
the coincidence between the form of 
exposition and what we address.. It is in 
this coincidence that the paradox of means 
is overcome. It is in this coincidence that 
the interaction between arbitrarily 
distinguished processes can be captured. 
The coincidence of the constructive form 
of exposition, in addressing construction, 
lies in the observation THAT-there must be 
a beginning. In addressing construction the 
particular distinction by which we begin is 
arbitrary. The coincidence of the 
communicative form of exposition in 
addressing communication lies in 
considering HOW we begin. In addressing 
communication the intention in beginning is 
relevant. Similarly, the switch from the, 
discussion of construction to the 
discussion of communication is a switch 
from observing THAT an observer interprets% 
and describes to asking HOW he interprets 
and describes a particular. 
The need to consider particulars 
pervades any discussion of communication.. 
To communicate, an observer needs to say 
something In particular, rather than 
anything. He must have something to say. 
Where 'saying' involves making a point, it 
is only In particulars that he may or may 
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not be doing so. Unly particulars can be 
relevant. But the discussion of 
communication cannot be concerned with this 
or that particular point the observer 
wishes to make. All that, can be said is 
THAT he must have a particular thing to 
may. 
The significance of the switch between' 
the discussion of construction and the 
discussion of communication Is manifest in 
that it is possible and necessary to posit 
THAT the observer constructs. To posit, 
instead, THAT the observer communicates is 
to evade the very question of 
communication. All that can be posited for 
occasions of communication is the 
observer's wish to communicate. Hence, the 
discussion of communication involves the 
observer's intentionality. It is just this 
intentionality which marks the switch 
between observing THAT and asking WHAT or 
HOW. In the simple process of construction, 
the observer has no choice in oscillating 
between opening and closing his 
self-system, which is why his 
intentionality, in doing what he does, need 
not be considered. Without choice, and 
without intentionality, communication is 
inconcievable. 
Particularity, choice and intentionality 
are implicit in speaking of an act of 
distinction. This manifests the interaction 
between construction and communication. But 
where these notions are left to be 
accounted for in terms of an 'ability to 
interpret', such an account is excluded in 
the fore of interpretation. Thus it becomes 
necessary to show how they arise naturally 
in the form of description and 
interpretation in the observer's use of the 
self -system. 
$$ 
DISTINCTIONS 
In the process of construction the observer 
can distinguish himself from his 
description while making a description, but 
he cannot sustain this distinction in the 
complementary act of interpretation. He 
accumulates descriptions within his- 
self-system and remains unable to 
distinguish himself from his construction. 
Similarly, he accumulates the time he 
generates in the process of construction, 
unable to distinguish this time. To 
distinguish himself, and to distinguish 
himself from his construction, he needs to 
step out of the process of construction. To 
distinguish the time he generates, he needs 
to step out of his time, and again needs to 
terminate the process of construction. The 
notion of steping out of the process of 
construction requires the observer to have 
an intentionality to stop doing one thing 
in in order to do another. 
. To avoid inadv. rtodly assuming the 
observer to have such intentionality, 
consider the case where, the process of 
construction coincidentially constitutes a 
process of communication, seeing how this 
intentionality arises in the limitations of 
this tale. 
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NO DISTINCTION 
(OR SYNCHRONISATION) 
For two observers to coincidentially 
communicate in the process of construction, 
they must be involved in the same process 
of construction, and hence they must be 
synchronised. Two observers 
cannot be distinguished in terms of this 
process. In the act of interpretation, they 
close one self-system, and hence they merge 
into one. To nevertheless speak of two 
observers is to ordain then distinct on 
grounds external to the process. 
The case of complete synchronisation is 
of interest to the interaction between 
construction and communication-, It is a 
case of complete communication or, complete 
understanding. As such it shows that the 
extent to which two observers can 
understand each other depends upon the 
extend to which, in such understanding, 
they do not maintain their distinctness 
(identities). Moreover, in such 
synchronisation, the step in which the 
observer distinguishes himself froe. his 
construction coincides with the step in 
which two observers distinguish themselves 
from each other. It is thus in 
distinguishing himself as an other, that 
the observer can distinguish himself, and 
hence the possibility of distinguishing 
himself arises in interaction between two 
observers. It arises in the interaction 
between construction and communication. 
The limitations of such coincidential 
communication in the process of 
construction are indicative of the nature 
of communication. These limitations are 
evident where such coincidential 
communication is commonly described as 
"thinking aloud" and "talking to oneself". 
Where I am accused of "thinking aloud", it 
is implied that 
(a) I don't know what I want to may or 
have nothing to say, and/or 
(b) I don't consider how I may what 
I want to say. 
Where I am accused of "talking to myself" 
it is implied that 
(c) I don't consider how someone also 
can follow what I may, and/or 
(d) what I say is of no relevance to 
anyone but me. 
In terms of the simple process of 
construction, the observer is far from 
equipped to venture into the domain of 
every day communication reflected in these 
two expressions. These objections however 
concern his ability to distinguish himselfi 
(a) and (b)'require the observer to step 
out of his time, and distinguish himself 
from his descriptions (c) and (d) require 
him to distinguish himself and an other, 
which in turn amounts to distinguishing 
himself from his construction. These 
distinctions arise in, and lead to, a 
de-synchronisation between two observers. 
Thus, the simple case of complete 
synchronisation indicates the requirements 
the observer imposes upon himself with the 
wish to communicate. In the first instance 
he needs to distinguish himself. The need 
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to dlstinyulsh himself thus arises with the 
very wish to communicate. Whyp in general, 
he should wich to communicate can only lead 
toispeculations. What ic, of concern is THAT 
the wish to communicate motivates him to 
dictinctinguish himself and thus motivates 
him to stop constructing and begin to 
communicate. 
: ss 
DISTINCTION 
To begin to communicate the observer needs 
to be able to distinguish himself from his 
construction. To distinguish himself from 
his construction he needs to stop 
constructing and begin to communicate! But 
there is no paradox, as the distinction by 
which he distinguishes himself, the 
distinction by which he distinguishes an 
other, and the distinction which allows him 
to step out of his time, are one and the 
same distinction. The observer thus needs 
to draw a distinction across his process of 
construction (thereby distinguishing 
himself from his. construction, stopping 
accumulating descriptions and time, 
distinguishing his time, and 
desynchronising himself from an other), 
i. e. 
DDUDD 
In. drawiny this distinction the observer 
terminates the process of construction (16) 
and thus reifies this process. 
Distinguished from the process of 
construction, the ever-growing "I" becomes 
an IT, which has accumulated, rather than 
is accumulating, the time which was 
generated in the process of construction 
before it termination, i. e. removing the 
arrow-heads to indicate that the process 
has been terminated, 
D) 
Where the observer has stopped accumulating 
time, it appears that he can reverse the 
process of construction, unfolding the time 
he has accumulated, i. e. notionally, 
(19*) '1'(_'('I I D) 
which suggests that the time accumulated 
within the "I" could be embedded within a 
description. 
With this distinction the observer 
notionally begins to satisfy so&e of the 
requirements for communication. With the 
reification of his process of construction 
(18) the observer begins to have something 
to say (meeting the reproach (a)). 
Considered as a learning process, the 
process of construction is terminated by 
distinguishing what has been 'learned' (18) 
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and reversed in a process of explanation 
(19*) explaining this to an other. This 
'reversal' provides the observer with the 
possibility of explaining how he 
constructed IT and of considering how to 
explain what he has constructed (meeting 
the reproach (b)). By thus removing himself 
from what he explains, and not necessarily 
revealing how he constructed it, it becomes 
possible for the observer to maintain his 
identity in explaining his construction. 
Maintaining his identity, he can consider 
how to explain a thing to an other (meeting 
reproach (c)). He can consider whether or 
not it is of any relevance to the other 
(meeting reproach (d)). 
:$t 
DISTINCTIONS 
However, these possibilities and the 
reversal illustrated in (19$) remain 
notional, in that the observer needs to 
draw more than one distinction. With the 
single distinction (17) he distinguishes 
his 'I" and everything he has constructed. 
If he were to unfold his construction as 
(19*) suggests, he would run into an 
infinite regress of ew. beddings, i. e. 
(20) "i"--("1' = D(D(D(D... o, 
in which the observer's "I" would be 
totally consummed in the process of 
explanation (should he be able to overcome 
the difficulty of at once doing the 
unfolding and being unfolded). 
In the simple reversal suggested in 
(198) the observer remains as unable to 
step out of the time he generated as in 
(16). To distinguish the construction he 
unfolds and be able to maintain his 
identity in explaining, the observer must 
thus draw two distinctions, distinguishing 
a particular segment of his process of 
construction, i. e. 
D 
\d) 
IDD 
With two distinctions, the observer can 
adopt the role of the reified "I" to unfold 
and explain the segment of descriptions 
distinguished, as if he were this "I". In 
explaining, the observer makes a 
description which in turn needs to be 
interpreted, and thus an explanation is a 
description he treats AS an explanation. 
1b4 
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TIMES 
To consider a segment of his process of 
construction, the observer needs to step 
out of this process and treat different 
times as the same time. He needs to 
accomodate time within his self-system. To 
consider a particular segment of his 
process of construction, he needs to close 
his self-system over this segment. To 
explain, and hence describe it, he needs^to 
open his self-system. In closing his 
self-system he can treat different times as 
the same time. There is, and can be, no 
time in the form of interpretation. In 
interpreting, the observer merges with his 
construction and with his process of 
construction, i. e. 
D=D -4 CI* ; D) (22) 1 -. -"--- 'J ýýJ 
In openlny his self-systew he can treat the 
same time as different'tiwes, as he does in 
treating a sequence of descriptions as one 
description. i. e. 
Y, Y 
-' -- -- 
treating descriptions as token 
descriptions, i. e. 
424) D 
[) 
Thus the observer can treat a sequence of 
descriptions, as a description, and in turn 
treat this as a token description. For any 
two descriptions linked in a closing of the 
self-system, the observer can treat the 
closed self-system as a sequence of 
descriptions, and hence he can contemplate 
any length of segment he chooses. 
But thus the two distinctions postulated 
in (21) arise in the distinction by which 
the observer opens an enlarged self-syst"a 
(over a segment of his process of 
construction), as if it were a simple 
self-system, i. e. 
(25) 
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The two distinctions postulated in (21) 
hure correspond to the two descriptions whict 
he treats as token descriptions in this 
enlarged self-system. The possibility of 
such treateaent arises in the form of 
interpretation, in which the closure of an 
enlarged self-system as indistinguishable 
from the closure of the simple self-system. 
beyond particulars, the observer's 
ability to treat one thing as another 
(shown in (22), (24) and (25)), leads to a 
multidimensional temporal structure of 
possibilities, beyond description. If every 
token description were to be treated as a 
description, without considering the 
observer's intentionality, a structure of 
infinite regressions in every dimension 
would ensue, i. e. 
(26) 
ýýý 
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This structure of possibilities arises 
wherever the observer's activities in 
general are considered (wherever 
generalisations and idealisations are 
invoked to avoid considering his 
intentionality). 
To actually open and close an enlarged 
self-system, the observer has to choose 
between possibilities. It is in this choice 
that the observer's intentions are manifest 
in his activities. They are manifest in HOW 
the observer chooses to treat a particular 
form. 
It is this choice which marks the 
transition between construction and 
communication. Within the time he 
generates, in the process of construction, 
the observer has no such choice, and all 
that can be said is THAT he constructs and 
generates his time. Instead, with regard to 
communication, the question does arise as 
to WHAT he wishes to communicate or HOW he 
chooses to treat a particular form. It is 
thus that the observer's intentionality has 
to be considered both in communication and 
in discussing communication. 
1bB 
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QUESTIONS RAISED 
(OR, A DOUBT) 
The observer's ability to treat one form as 
another gives rise to questions. His 
intention in treating one fora as another 
is subject to questioning. The question 
arises as to his motivation in enlarging 
the self-system as illustrated in (23). 
Where the observer chooses to distinguish 
himself, the question arises as to why he 
should choose to do so. 
Descriptively, these questions are 
reflected in the questions as to how in the 
observer's use of the enlarged self-syst"s 
differs from his use of the simple 
self-system, or how he can treat one form 
as an other. These questions call for an 
explanation of the enlarged self-system. 
The observer's motivation to treat one 
form as another arises with a question, or 
doubt, concerning his construction. A 
question or doubt about his construction, 
calls for an explanation of his 
construction and leads the observer to 
unfold the time he has accumulated in the 
process of construction. The observer 
distinguishes himself in asking questions 
about himself. 
In the simple process of construction, 
the observer and his construction are one. 
He cannot (set out to) question his 
construction. The question or doubt which 
leads the observer to distinguish himself 
must arise naturally, or accidentially, or' 
the observer would need to have 
distinguished himself already. 
Where the observer is unable to close 
his self-system, over a *faulty* 
description he has made, he finds himself"' 
distinct from this description. Since he 
can only consider a description after he 
has made it, he can find himself distinct 
from a faulty description without having 
set out to distinguish himself. But this 
very complementarity presses him on in time 
to close his self-system over this faulty 
description. Once made, a faulty 
description thus leaves the observer in the 
perdicament of having to close his 
self-system without being able to do so. 
Due to the redundancy of the self-system 
(9), the observer's inability to close his 
self-system over a description must arise 
in an incongruity between its token 
descriptions. Where the observer can fail 
to close his self-system over a 
description, its token descriptions must be 
desynchronised. What he grasps in one token 
cannot coincide with what he grasps in the 
other. The desynchronisation arises as an 
incongruity between what the observer says 
he does and what he actually does. 
To interpret a description its tokens 
must be synchronised. The form of 
interpretation cannot accomodate time. 
Hence the observer has to choose to close 
his self-system over either one of two 
desychnoniswd token descriptions. He can 
either accept (and later proceeds to make 
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explicit) what he was doing or accept (and 
later procewde to do) what he was saying he 
was doing, i. e. 
D?, U 
(271) 
ti- 
D 
To close his self-system over one of the 
two tokens he needs to enlarge the 
self-system, treat a token description as a 
description, and switch to the time in 
which he can close his self-systes over 
this (token) description, i. e. 
D 
D 
D` DpD 
(27ii) 
`nom 
DI- D 
all , 
In terms of the simple process of 
construction, the observer's ability to 
treat a token description as a description 
thus allows for the correction of 
de-sychronised descriptions, and hence 
allows the observer to construct, or learn, 
by trying and changing descriptions. In 
view of the comlementarity between 
description and interpretation this simple 
ability is essential. 
Considering which of the two token 
descriptions to accept, the observer begins 
to raise questions. "He may for instance 
wonder what he was doing, how he came to 
make a faulty description, and how what he 
was doing relates to this description. 
Formally the question raised by the faulty 
description is manifest in the distinctions 
resulting from the expansion of the token 
descriptions. These correspond to the two 
distinctions postulated in (21), and 
distinguish the segment of the observer's 
construction to be explained. 
in terms of the requirements for 
cummunnication, it is necessary to consider 
how the observer chooses between the two 
token descriptions, and how this choice 
reflects the his intentionality. To 
consider how he chooses one token in 
preference to the other it is thus 
necessary to consider the notion of 
relevance. 
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as 
RELEVANCE 
In the process of, construction the observer 
can have no notion of relevance, just as he 
can have no notion of time. Whatever he 
does is relevant. Where it not relevant, he 
would not be doing it (inasmuchas this can 
be said concerning a situation where we 
cannot consider what the observer could do, 
but does not). Relevance cannot be a 
criterion external to the observer's 
process of construction. 
But, while there can be no notion of 
relevance in the process of construction, 
what relevance a thing may have it has with 
regard to this process. It is in the 
process of construction, and due-to the_ 
form of interpretation, that the notion of 
saying is that of making a point, and 
making only one point at a time. Just as 
the observer can have no notion of. time, in 
the process of construction he can have no 
notion of relevance, precisely because it 
is in this process that he generates his 
relevance. It is unnecessary to invoke a 
distinction between the time and the 
relevance the observer generates (except to 
show how the much-mystified notion of 
relevance arises). 
To consider the requirements for 
communication, it is necessary to consider 
how the relevance generated in the process 
of construction is reflected in the form of 
this process. The complementarity between 
description and interpretation gives rise 
to a continuity in the process of 
construction. This continuity arises as a 
consequence of the form of interpretation. 
As all distinctions merge in the form of 
interpretation, any description can only be 
interpreted in terms of the previous 
construction as a whole. This single depth 
of interpretation is the complement of the 
notion of saying one thing at a time. Thus 
the continuity in the process of 
construction arises in that, at any one 
time, a description can only be accepted in 
terms of the construction so far, as a 
whole, and hence must cohere with this. It 
is in this coherence that a description 
must be relevant for-the observer to close 
his self-system over it, for the observer, 
to be able to interpret it. 
To consider how relevance is generated 
in the process of construction is to ask 
how the observer puts descriptions together 
in his time. In the simple process of 
construction his relevance and his time are 
one. How he puts things together, and how 
he oscillates between opening and closing 
the self-system, are the same. As he can 
only say one thing at a time he can only 
put things together in how he deals with 
them, one at a time. 
To consider how he puts things together 
the observer needs more that ona thing. 
Formally, the possibility for putting 
things together in his time arises in the 
complementarity between the two token 
descriptions. The observer can choose to 
keep one token description constant while 
changing the other. Keeping aD SAY token, 
constant, he can change what he does, 
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provided this remains within what he says 
he does. Keeping aD DO token constant, he 
can change what he says he does, provided 
the D DO describes what he dots. by 
accumulating a number of descriptions, in 
which one token remains constant, the 
observer can thus put things together in 
his time, i. e. ,, 
4q)-, u D': if 
---- (28) UD 
The relevance thus generated in a 
particular process of construction, arises 
formally,. where descriptions share a common 
token. 
Where the observer extends what he does 
or says, beyond the point where it is 
described by the token he keeps constant, 
the two token descriptions became 
desynchronised (26). Unable to close his 
self-system, the observer must thus choose 
to close one of the two token descriptions 
(27). In choosing, considering how he put 
things together in his time, he thus 'uses' 
the relevance he generated in the process 
of construction (28). His choice is one 
between accepting an old token (kept 
constant), rejecting the new token, or 
accepting a new token and reconsidering the 
old one. In either case he needs to 
reconsider his description. Accepting the 
old token, the desynchronisation raises a 
doubt about his (recent) constructing. 
Accepting the new token, he questions the 
old and needs to consider the new, within 
his construction as a whole. 
The intentionality in the observer's 
choice, to accept one of two desynchronised 
token descriptions, is manifest in the form 
in which the observer put things together 
in his time. To reconsider his descriptions 
the observer has to unfold his 
construction. Since all distinctions are 
merged in the form of interpretation, the 
observer's ability to unfold his 
construction involves intentionality. Like 
the process of construction, the process of 
unfolding is a step by step proceedure (as 
a consequence of the single depth of 
interpretation). However, the observer 
cannot know, or have any memory of, how he 
put things together in his process of 
construction. Hence, he cannot simply 
reverse (as the term 'unfolding' 
unfortunately suggests) the process of 
construction. In any particular instance, 
ANY description may be unfolded 
(indeterminacy). To consider a doubt raised 
by the desynchronisation between token 
descriptions, the observer has to unfold 
particular descriptions (relevant to this 
doubt). To consider particular descriptions 
he has to look for, or re-invent, these, in 
the process of unfolding. It is in such 
'looking for' or 're-inventing', that the 
observer's iººtentionality is manifest in 
the process of unfoldirºg. 
In unfolding, the observer can explore 
his construction, and reorganise how he 
puts things together. His intentionality is 
reflected iii How he puts them together. His 
relevance remains simply determined by what 
he does, l. e, by what particular things he 
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puts together. 11i choosing to accept one of 
two token descriptions (in reorganising how 
he puts things together), the observer can 
have a notion of relevance, with regard to 
the particular descriptions he puts 
together. This notion of relevance 1s 
peculiar to the observer, and remains tied 
to his particular activity (his 
constructing or unfolding). It remains 
determined only in THAT the observer doesa 
particular thing at a particular time. 
Relevance cannot be generalised. To 
consider how things can, in general, be put 
together, is to determine what intentions 
people may have on any occasion! 
$" 
THE COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN 
SAYING AND DOING 
The complementarity between the two token 
descriptions reflects the form of 
interpretation in the form of a 
description. The observer can only close 
his self-system where the token 
descriptions are synchronised; where he can 
discern a common pattern between what he 
does and what he says he does. Hence, the 
complementarity between the token 
descriptions is one between what the 
observer does, and what he says in making a 
description. 
A complementarity arises where two 
aspects of a whole are distinguished. The 
complementarity between saying and doing, 
only becomes apparent as such, where the 
observer distinguishes between the two 
token descriptions. It becomes apparent 
where he enlarges his self-system to 
distinguish between the token descriptions. 
It becomes apparent where aspects of the 
speech act as a whole are distinguished. It 
becomes apparent in communication, wherever 
one observer considers what another 
observer says or does. Similarly, it 
becomes apparent in considering what the 
observer does, rather than that he does it, 
and hence arises in the interaction between 
construction and communication. 
The possibility of putting things 
together in hii tim. arises in the 
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'redundancy' which allows the salt-systes 
to be closed. In closing or grasping the 
self-system (10) any one token describes 
the pattern the observer grasps in the 
other two. This 'redundancy' is reflected 
in the complementarity between the two 
token descriptions, where the self-system 
is opened. It only becomes perceivable as a 
redundancy where the observer distinguishes 
between the token descriptions, and hence 
it only becomes perceivable in the enlarged 
self-system. 
Where the self-system is enlarged, the 
complementarity between saying and doing 
leads to an essential indeterminacy. This 
indeterminacy arises where aspects of the 
speech act are distinguished. It reflects 
the wholeness of the speech act, in which 
saying is in itself an activity and doing 
is in itself saying something (the act 
itself is indicative). Where the observer 
distinguishes token descriptions and 
enlarges aD MAY) token, he makes explicit 
what he says, and in so doing describes 
what he does, namely, that he says it, i. e. 
D (SAY) s D"1" Q (DO) 
tiý 
Where he distinguishes token descriptions 
and enlarges a D(DO) token, he wakes 
explicit what he does, and in so doing 
describes what he says in doing it (the 
point in doing it), i. e. 
U (DO) D"I" D(SAY) 
As these enlarged tokens can in turn be 
enlarged, the extent of the indeterminacy 
is such that any D(SAY) token can be 
treated as a D(DO) and/or a D(8AY) token, - 
and any D(DO) token can be treated as a 
D(SAY) and/or a D(DO) token. The 
indeterminancy arises in questioning (and= 
hence distinguishing) which it is at any 
one time. 
Due to this indeterminacy a token 
description distinguished, in turn has the 
form of a description, and hence it 1s this 
indeterminacy which enables the observer to 
treat one form as another. It is this 
indeterminacy which enables him to enlarge 
his self-system. But the enlarging of the 
self-system in turn arises in, and cannot 
be separated from, the complementarity 
between saying and doing. Where, in 
enlarging his self-system, the observer 
treats a token description as a 
description, he makes explict (i. e. says) 
what he says or what he does. In contrast 
to the simple self-system, in which the 
observer does whatever he does, in the 
enlarged self-system he can thus say what 
he is doing. Where the observer enlarges 
the self-system treating one form as 
another (according to (24)), i. e. 
D n"*-"D. D 
DAD nD 
(29) 
D D: D 
D 
1U0 
he treats the dsescription he makes in a 
simple self-system as a DIDO) token, i. e. 
u .ý 
D 
D°" 
and a description he makes by enlarging the 
self-system as a D(SAY) token, i. e. 
U ~' D 
I)ý D 
D 
The indeterminacy is moreover reflected in 
the circumstance that the enlarged 
self-system, as a whole, comprises both a 
description (-d) which the observer can 
treat as a D(SAY), and a description fwd) 
he can treat as a D(DO). Thus the wholeness 
of the speech act is reflected in the form 
of interpretation. But, where the observer 
must close his self-system over one or the 
other of these descriptions, the 
complementarity between saying and doing, 
thus generates a dynamic (a number of 
changes) in which the observer must switch 
between descriptions, treating one form as 
another. 
The redundancy in the enlarged 
self-system arises as a redundancy only in 
severing the wholeness of the form of 
interpretation. The redundancy in the parts 
distinguished in making a description, 
reflects the wholeness of the form of 
interpretation. It reflects the form of the 
whole in the form of the parts. The 
complementarity between saying and doing 
becomes apparent where the observer 
distinguishes between the two token 
descriptions and enlarges the self-system. 
The ensuing redundancy allows a token 
description to be treated as a description 
of what the observer is doing or saying. In 
distinguishing between what he does and 
what he says, the observer can make what he 
says or does explicit, he can begin to say 
something. 
To say something is to make a point. The 
very possibility of saying something arises 
in the redundancy in the enlarged 
self-system. This redundagcy underlies the 
notion of relevance. The complementarity 
between saying and doings the 
coaipleoentarity between the two token 
descriptions, enables the observer to put 
things together in his times and thus 
generate his relevance in the process of 
construction. 
To communicate, the observer must have 
something to say. Formally the possibility 
of having something to say arises in the 
closure of the self-system, where any taken 
is the pattern the observer discerns in the 
remaining two tokens (the 'redundancy' in 
the simple self-system which gives rise to 
the redundancy in the enlarged 
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self-system). In remaining the same, the 
token which is kept constant over a series 
of descriptions in (28), is redundant. This 
redundancy allows the observer to begin to 
say something even in the simple 
self-system. To close his self-system, the 
new token must be the pattern the observer 
discerns between the old token and D "I". 
(28i) I) ' .1 1). 
: I) 
llI) '1' 
Due to the 'redundancy' in the simple 
self-system, the observer can use this pair 
of token descriptions as a description, or 
recepie, for making new descriptions. Thus 
the 'redundancy', in the simple self-system 
allows him to look for new descriptions, 
and provides a form in which the observer's 
intentionality can become manifest. If he 
were to make this recepie explicit, he 
would be saying how he goes about making 
new descriptions. The redundancy of 
descriptions thus provides the form for the 
observer to have something to say. 
To have something to say, there must be 
a point in saying it. The relevance in 
saying something can only arise in the 
observer's activities. the point of making 
explicit how he goes about making new 
descriptions, can only arise in the 
activity in which he is combining new 
tokens with a token he maintains constant. 
The relevance of new descriptions arises in 
that they are new relative to old 
descriptions. The particularity in making 
points lies in the relation between the new 
and the old. To make a point is to make a 
particular point. The relevance of a 
description lies in its particularity. The 
possibility of saying something in 
particular (the possibility of making a 
point) arises in the redundancy of 
descriptions. The point of saying something 
lies in saying something new about 
something old. 
The point in making explicit how he goes 
about making new descriptions, thus arises 
where the observer wants to consider a new 
way of going about making descriptions. It 
arises with the wish to change a recepie or 
description of what he is doing (in (28)). 
The recepie itself becomes an old token 
maintained constant in a new recepie. The 
relevance of making a recepie explicit, 
thus arises where the observer percieves 
the redundancy he is using in making new 
descriptions. In making the recepie 
explicit the observer is saying something 
about what he is doing. To make a recepie 
explicit he thus needs to distinguish 
himself. 
Let the redundancy in the enlarged 
self-system be shown by numerals reflecting 
aspects of the speech act (where it cannot 
be known which tokens are saying-, doing- 
or "I"-tokens). Thus let the numberals 1, 
2, and 3 each represent on. of the three 
tokens, I. e. Di, D2, D3. Let the 
indeterminacy in the enlarged self-system 
be reflected in the use of these same 
numerals with regard to descriptions and 
enlarged descriptions, such that each 
numeral represents one aspect of the speech 
act throughout one ideogram. Corresponding 
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to siAp1Q self-systvs 
D 
the indeterminacy and redundancy in the 
enlarged self-system 1s shown (statically) 
in the general relations between 
descriptions and token descriptions, i. e. 
ti 
(30) 
1, 
D p, 
D, 
Let =1, w2, =3 and in general =d, show 
small descriptions distinguished by -d 
distinctions (there is no need to 
distinguish between descriptions and the 
distinctions by which they are made). 
Let c=1, c-2, c-3 and in general c=, 
show closures of the small self-systems 
opened by -d distinctions (show 
interpretations of -d descriptions). 
Let -1, -2, -3 and in general -d, show 
the larger (or the only) descriptions 
distinguished by -d distinctions. 
Let c-, show the closure of the larger 
(or the only) self-system (show the 
interpretation of -d descriptions). 
Let Dl, D2, D3 and in general D show the 
tokens as used in the ideogram. 
Let -d(-d=d) or -d(D, D) show -d 
descriptions, where the content of the 
brackets specifies the tokens involved in 
the description and similarly let -d(D, D) 
show sd descriptions, 
Let -d(.. d-d)id or -d(O, D)D show the 
whole of the self-system in which a -d 
description is made, where the -d or D 
outside the brackets indicates the third sd 
description, or the third token not 
involved in the -d description. Similarly, 
let -d(D, D)D refer to a small self-system, 
and within this notation let c- and c- 
indicate the closures of the whole, or 
parts, of the enlarged self-system. 
fhe Indeterminacy in the wnlarged 
self-system is reflected in that -d 
distinctions show the larger, or the only, 
distinctions, and hence -d distinctions 
arise only relative to -d distinctions. 
Beyond this the indetermincy extends in the 
observer's treatement of tokens D, as token 
descriptions -d, and in further 
enlargements in which he treats -d 
descriptions as token descriptions -d, or 
tokens D. However, the indeterminacy shown 
is sufficient to capture these extensions. 
The redundancy in the enlarged 
self-systew is such that, the large -d 
descriptions are explicit versions of the 
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small -d descriptions. Similarly, for each 
closure c- over a small and description, the 
tokens reflect how every small self-system 
is closed, by grasping the common token in 
the remaining two descriptions, i. e. 
D1 (in a2 & -3), 
D2 (in =3 & -1) and 
D3 (in -1 & -2). 
lt is thus that the observer can use a -d 
description to make the corresponding -d 
description explicit, and/or to explain how 
he goes about making this -d description. 
Both the indeterminacy, and the 
redundancy, in the enlarged self-system 
arise in the complementarity between saying 
and doing. Hence they only become manifest 
in the observer's activities. In using the 
indeterminacy and the redundancy, the 
observer can distinguish between what he 
says and what he does. In turn, his process 
of making and interpreting descriptions, 
using this indeterminacy and redundancy, is 
formally governed by the complementarity 
between saying and doing. 
Where the observer cannot close his 
self-system over a description he has made, 
he can step back as in (27) to consider how 
he made it and switch from the simple to 
the enlarged self-system, treating a 
-d(D, D) description as a -d(ad-d) 
description, eg. 
D D, 
D, 
-1 130.1) 
- 
-1(D2, D3)D1 to 
-d(D. D)D to -d( d-d)-d 
In an doing he makes explicit what he is or 
was doing, using the compleeentarity 
between saying and doing to enlarge the 
self-system. The difference between waking 
explicit what he is, or was, doing is 
temporal, and hence can only arise in the 
observer's process of making and 
interpreting his descriptions. It arises as 
a difference in the subsequent closure of 
his self-system. Duo to the coeplementarity 
between saying and doing, the observer must 
close his self-system over one particular 
description in the enlarged self-system, 
i. w. over the -d choosing to say, or over a 
-d choosing to do. 
Miere In making a -d description the 
three small self-systems are open, the 
observer is at once DOING something (making 
a description) and SAYING what he to doing 
(making an explicit description of the 
description he is making). For instance, in 
making -1(-2-3)-1, what the observer is 
DOING is making -1, and what he is SAYING 
makes explicit how he is making -1.1. e. 
lee 
-1('2-3). eq. 
D `f" g 
(30.2) 3 
D, ý Dt 
U, 
-1(=2-3)-1 
-d(sd-d) -d 
Here the observer oak" explicit what he is 
doing, and hence (30.2) describes a state 
in the observer's process of opening and 
closing his self-system. The possibility of 
saying what he is doing, while at the same 
time doing it, arises in the wholeness of 
the speech act, and hence in the form of 
interpretation. Any speech act can be 
treated as having this form, and to treat 
it as such is to consider the speech act in 
terms of the complemontarity between saying 
and doing. It is to consider the 
possibilities of interpreting a speech act. 
To actually interpret a speech act, the 
complementarity between saying and doing 
requires the observer to close his 
self-system over a particular description. 
A number of choices arise. 
In the form of interpretation, all 
distinctions merge. Hence in the first 
instance, any closure over a description 
which the observer treats as a -d 
description leads the enlarged self-system 
to collapse to the simple self-system. Thus 
collapsing the enlarged self-system in the 
act of interpretation, the observer 
switches from saying (making explicit) to 
doing. 
In a'closuru over any of the enlarged 
-d(-d=d) descriptions, the form of 
interpretation cannot sustain the -d 
distinctions and thus the closure of the 
enlarged self-system c- is 
indistinguishable from, and the same as, a 
closures of the simple self-system c-, i. e. 
A-r, ýký .-n 
'n, 
_: p> 
FDJ 
Vi 
, 
c-I-d-d)-d to C- 
c-(D, D)D to c- 
Similarly, where the observer treats a 
-d description as a -d description, closing 
his self-system over any of the -d 
descriptions, treated as -d descriptions, 
the enlarged self-system collapses, eg. 
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'. p- yE 1, r 
D: Z7 Di 
(30.4) 1 
r-. 
-1(C-2-3)-1 to [-2 
-d(c--d)-d to c- 
-d(-dc-)-d to c- 
-d(-d=d)-c to c- 
Here the observer's choice arises in which 
of the three -d descriptions he treats as a 
-d description. In the act of treating a -d 
description as a -d description, the 
observer chooses to DO rather then SAY. The 
choice between the three tokens is a choice 
, between aspects of the speech act. Thus, 
what the observer is DOING (and proceeding 
on the basis of doing) is closing his 
self-system either over 
a description of what he is DOING or 
a description of:. what-he is SAYING or ° 
a description of his "I". 
Thus the enlarged self-system provides the 
observer with a twofold choice between 
aspects of the speech act. Firstly, 
treating a -d description as a -d 
description, and/or collaping the enlarged 
self-system, he switches from saying to 
doing. Here the aspect of the speech act, 
i. e. his choice to DO rather than say, is 
manifest. In thus using the indeterminacy 
to treat one form as another, the observer 
removes this indeterminacy. Secondly, in 
choosing to close one of the small 
self-systems, the observer's choice between 
aspects of the speech act remains 
indeterminate. 
This twofold choice between aspects of 
the speech act provides the observer with 
the possibility of closing a small 
self-system as a small self-system, whithin 
the enlarged self-system. It is thus, that 
the observer can maintain the enlarged 
self-system and begin to say something, 
accepting that he has said or done 
something. 
Where the observer closes a small 
self-system c-, while maintaining a -d 
description, he accepts what he DID so as 
to be able to consider SAYING something 
about what he did. By enlarging the 
self-system (30.1) and by distinguishing 
between -d and -d descriptions, the 
observer chooses, irr the first instance to 
SAY rather than do. In the second instance, 
the difficulty arises that, able to say 
something only by enlarging the 
self-system, the form of interpretation 
leads the observer to collapse the 
self-system, and hence to doing. The 
difficulty of maintaining an enlarged -d 
description, given the complementarity, 
however reflects on the nature of saying. 
Where the complementarity requires the 
observer to do something, the nature of 
saying requires him to accept the thing he to 
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saylisy a&ewthlntl aliuut. l1welco. what tile 
ubs. irr vier do. , to C1ueilrsij a boall 
'b. r11-sy1btem =c lr accepting what he did tx' 
%aid , dccrptiny the atrpect of his speech 
act about wluth that rilrhur tu say roeeth ng. 
511t11 acceptance th., r rllo. +r hi. to occept 
THAI ter nsada a vebcr tptiurt withuut 
"cceptlasy tlur dw crlptlon ltoelfr wy. 
U, 
(SO. 
D 
-1 (="1-3)c+l 
-d(=d=d)c= 
Fur inrt. ºncv, in waking -11=2=3)c=lr In 
clusing the small self-system c-l, while 
making explicit what P. did in it, 
-1(a2=3º, the observer can accept that he 
has wade =l, so as to be able to consider 
what he did in making at. 
Wier w trite small self -syst.. he closes is 
within the -d description, the observer 
accepts part of what he wishes to say. In 
accepting part of what he wishes to say, 
the observer changes his curiosity. In 
terms of (2(1) he changes how he goes about 
making new descriptions, and hence changes 
what hw is doing. Thus, closing one of the 
c= sealf-sy%te. s within a description, leads 
to a switch in the -d distinction he is 
considering. He is accepting the -d 
description corresponding to the c- 
self-system he closes, and hence switching 
to this -d description from the initial -d 
description containing the -d he closes. 
For instance, the closure c=2 within 
-1(c=2=3) will lead to a switch to 
-2(=3=1)c-2, eg. 
D= D''" p, 
D D, 
(30.6> 
, 
DD/ 
D, 
-1(c-2-3)-1 to -2(-3-1)c-2 
-d(c--d)-d to -dl-d-d)c- 
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QUESTIUNS ASKED 
The ability to accept, by closing a small 
self-system within an enlarged self-system 
without collapsing this, enables the 
observer to actually come to say something. 
The need to enlarge the self-system arises 
where the observer finds a difficulty in 
closing his self-system (27). It arises in 
form of the doubt raised by his inability 
to interpret a description he has made. The 
ability to accept that he has made such a 
description thus enables the observer to 
address this doubt, and to ask himself a 
question about this difficulty. Where, in 
the process of construction, he finds a 
difficulty In closing his self-system over 
a description he has made, i. e. 
-d(D, D)D, 
eg. -1(D2 D3)D1, 
wondering about this description,, he 
enlarges the self-system according to 
(30.1), i. e. 
-d(D, D)D to -d(=d=d)=d, 
eg. -1(D2D3)D1 to -1(=2=3)=i, 
Here the observer can choose either to 
proceede in doing or saying. Where he 
chooses to do, rather than say, he opts for 
the correction discussed in (27). This is 
captured by (30.4), where the observer 
treats one of the three -d descriptions as 
a -d description and closes his self-system 
over this description c-. Thus collapsing 
the enlarged self-system, he can switch 
back to the simple process of construction, 
deem a part of the initial -d(D, D)D a 
mistake, and return to doing whatever he 
was doing before he ran into this 
difficulty, i. e. 
-d(-d=d)=d to -c 
(via, -d(c--d)-d, 
or -d(=dc-)=do 
or -d(-d-d)c-) 
eq. -it=2=3)ý1 to c-123. 
Instead, choosing to say rather than do, he 
chooses to address the doubt raised by his 
difficulty and ask a question. Before being 
able to question a description he has 
difficulty-with, he has to accept THAT he 
made it, according to (30.5), i. e. 
-d(-d=d)-d to -d(-d-d)c-, 
eg. -1(=2=3)=1 to -1(-2-3)c-1. 
To address the doubt raised by a faulty 
description, and ask himself a question 
about it, the observer has to further 
expand the enlarged description -d( -d-d), 
in turn enlarging one of the -d 
descriptions to a -d( -d-d) description, 
according to (30.1), i. e. 
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-di=d=d)c- to -d(-d-'-d? (-d-d? )-d)c=, 
eq. -l(=2=3)c=1 . 
to 
-1(=2ý'-3? (a1=2? T=3)c=1. 
In thus enlarging one of the -d token 
descriptions the observer chooses to SAY, 
rather than DO (29). He chooses to make 
explicit the doubt -d(=d=d) raised by his 
difficulty with -d(D, D). In thus expanding 
the enlarged self-system, the observer 
explores the redundancy of the enlarged 
self-system. This redundancy in turn 
governs what he can say. Where to say 
something is to make a point, the expanded, 
-d? description must be a question to be 
said, or it. would be redundant. In terms of 
the example shown, -2 and -3 in are 
explicit versions of what the observer 
said, and did in making -1(D, D). Accepted, 
they can notionally be paraphrased, eg. 
(assuming 2 to be the DO aspect, and 3 to 
be the SAY aspect, ) 
c-2 as 'I said such and such' and 
c-3, as 'I did such and such'. 
Considering only -2?, the accepted c-3, can 
notionally be, paraphrased 
_ 
c-3 as 'I did such and such 
saying such and such', 
(and similarly, had -2 been expanded, 
considering a similar =37, paraphrasing 
c-3 as 'I said such and such, 
doing such and such'). 
Thus, unless -3? is a question, allowing 
for a further expansion, its closure would 
merely amount to accepting what the 
observer already accepted in closing c-i, 
i. e. THAT he DID say or do whatever he did. 
Hence, we can similarly paraphrase, 
-3? as 'What did I do, 
saying such and such? ' 
fand similarly 
-2? as 'What did I may, 
doing such and such? '), 
The redundancy (whereby in all cases 'such 
and such' paraphrases -1) thus shows why 
c-i needs to be closed in order to ask the 
question, eq. 
"What did_I do, saying -1? "(or 
`What did I say, making -1? "). 
Seeing that the observer's difficulty in 
closing his self-system over -1(D2, D3) 
arises in the do-synchronisation between 
the D(DO) and D(SAY) tokens, the observer 
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could be predicted to attempt to resolve 
his difficulty by asking such a question. A 
question of this form, arises in the very 
form of the self-system, due to the 
redundancy of the enlarged self-system and 
the complementarity between saying and 
doing. 
is 
SELF AND I 
OR 
THE REVERSAL OF SAYING AND DOING 
FOR ONE AND THE OTHER 
Where the observer is able to ask a 
question, he begins to fulfil the 
requirements for communication. In the 
process of asking himself a question, he 
distinguishes himself as another. The 
closing of c=1, accepting that he made the 
description he questions, enables him at 
once to ask and subject himself to his 
question. 
The observer distinguishes himself 
where, accepting cm, he expands upon the 
enlarged self-system, treating a -d token 
description as a -d(-d=d) description, from 
which he in turn distinguishes this as a 
token description -d in -d(-d=d)-d. Thus 
switching -'-'_ (eg. -'-'-3 in (31)) 
between treatements of this token 
description, the observer switches between 
treating himself as an "I" and treating 
himself as an other, as though he were 
switching between himself and an other. 
This switch is manifest, in the reversal of 
saying and doing between one and an other, 
as a reversal between how one and an other 
perceive what is said and done. 
The complementarity between saying and 
doing in turn arises with the distinction 
between one (speaker or doer) and an other 
(listener or observer). Where the one says 
something, the other in the first instance 
perceives what he is doing, i. e. saying 
something. Where the one does something, 
the other in the first instance perceives 
what he saying, i. e. what his doing 
indicates. The first case anchors the act 
of saying something. It anchors the 'speech 
act', and is reflected in the notion of 
'making an utterance'. The second case 
provides the basis for treating actions 
(including speech) as indicative, without 
which there could be no meaningful 
interaction. Without the first, the one 
could not observe what, or that, the other 
said. Without the second, the two could not 
begin to wonder about each other. 
The reversal between saying and doing 
for one and another captures the very 
'problem' of communications what is a 
description, for one, must remain but a 
token of a description, for the other. What 
is an explicit description -d(-d-d), for 
one, is but a description of tokens 
-d(D, D), for the other. But, with the use 
of the indeterminacy (29), the 
complemantarity In turn provides the 
dynamics for communications where one does 
something about which the other wonders. 
Like the observer, the other is bound to 
ask a question about what the observer did, 
acccepting that he did it. 
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Thus the reversal is one between 
expanding according to (30.1) and 
collapsing according to (30.3)s where the 
one says (expanding his self-system), the 
other perceives hie as doing, (and 
collapses the one's expanded description), 
eg. 
Df D' 
ether 
SAY' - DO 
ß D, 
(32) D, - D,. 
Where the one does, collapsing his enlarged 
self-system, the other percieves his as 
saying something, expanding on the one's 
act. 
other D, D, 
D. 
DO - SAY 
Dp Dl D; - 1), 
. ý... pone 
In distinguishing each other's 
descriptions, the two distinguish an 
interface, from which they distinguish 
their "I" and across which they distinguish 
each other. 
In asking a question, the obsever 
similarly treats the intermediary 
description in one instant as the one, in 
another instant as the other. As the one, 
making it explicit he expands it, as the 
other, distinguishing it, he expands one 
token, treating this as an act wade by one 
and percieved by the other. Thus, as the 
one, he distinguishes himself as an other, 
and as the other, he distinguishes himself 
as the one. 
v 
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In distinguishing himself as an other, the 
observer treats himself as'someone he can 
speak and ask questions about. 'He can do so 
as a consequence of accepting that he did 
something (i. e. as a consequence of closing 
c=), accepting that he made a faulty 
description -d. In thus being able to 
distinguish and speak to himself, asking 
himself a question about himself, the 
observer begins to satisfy some of the 
requirements for communication. 
Accepting that he made a faulty 
description, the observer accepts something 
he can wonder and ask questions abouts he 
accepts something to speak about. What he 
speaks and asks questions about, he must 
accept, and can only accept. 
In such acceptance, the observer has 
something to say. In terms of (28) he 
treats his acceptance c- as the fixed 
token. In making new descriptions, only 
acceptance allows him to treat a token 
(description) as constant, and hence as 
given (for instance his difficulty with 
-d). 
Where, the observer needs a curiosity, a 
plan, or an intention, to unfold his 
construction, his acceptance of his 
difficulty with -d provides him with 
something to look for. His curiosity is 
implicitly represented in the token 
description -d(D, D) over which he closes 
cs. It is made explicit where he wonders 
and enlarges this description to -d(-d. d). 
With this intention he can ask about his 
difficulty in interpreting -d, and pursue 
his particular curiosity. "Thus, his 
acceptance of c- renders his questions 
particular, with regard to his curiosity. 
In asking a question, the observer draws 
the two distinctions postulated in (21), 
i. e. distinguishing a segment of his 
process of construction, to secure his 
identity (or prevent his construction from 
being consumed in an infinite regression). 
In distinguishing himself as another, 
accepting that he cannot accept -1, the 
observer restricts his questioning to his 
difficulty with this description. In 
leaving -di=d-d) open he frames what he may 
find out, and in thus framing his 
curiosity, he focuses his unfolding on a 
particular segment of his construction. In 
unfolding, he may change his curiosity and 
go beyond this frame, speaking and asking 
questions about something new. 
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PACKAOINU TIME 
(OR EXPLANATIONS) 
Having asked a question as in (31), the 
observer can pursue his curiosity and 
unfold his construction. To do so he needs 
to accept that he asked the question, or 
accept part of what he has asked. Where he 
thus needs to close one of the small 
self-systems c= in the expanded 
self-system, his choice leads to a number 
of' possibilities. 
In closing a c=, the complementarity can 
lead him to collapse the enlarged 
self-system, and hence to, proceed 
constructing. Thus, in order to pursue his 
question, the observer also needs to 
maintain the two distinctions which frame 
his curiosity, while closing one of the 
small self-systems c-. In thus maintaining 
the enlarged self-system, the observer 
further enlarges it, accomodating more 
distinctions, and thus more time, within 
his self-system. 
His choice (in closing either of the 
three small self-systems involved in his 
question (31), while maintaining the 
expanded self-system) characterises three 
formally distinct processes. The 
significance of these processes arises in 
why the observer maintains the distinctions 
of the expanded self-system (i. e. in his 
intentions). 
In his question (shown in (31), the 
observer can thus close either one of the 
two token descriptions -1 or. -2?, or he can 
close the token description -'-'-3 he 
expanded in asking his question. Closing 
either of, the token descriptions within his 
question, i. e. c=1 or c-2?, will lead to a 
switch in distinction (according to 
(30.6)). Closing the token description he 
expanded, i. e. c='"-'=3, leads to a collapse 
of the expanded self-system (according to 
(30.4)), unless the observer re-opens the 
small self-system cml he had to close to 
ask his question. 
sss 
REMINDING 
Consider first his choice to close c-1 
within his question (31), notionally 
paraphrased above as 
'What did I say, making -1? ' 
respectively, 
'What did I do, saying -1? '. 
Formally, the closure c-l within him 
question leads to a switch from the 
question 
-3? ýc=1=2? > to -1t=2? -3>c=1 
and enables the observer, in turn, to ask a 
question by expanding upon either -2? or 
=3. Expanding on the latter =3, the 
redundancy would lead hie to re-ask his 
question. Instead, expanding an =2?, the 
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observer can use the complementarity 
between saying and doing to re-trace (ask 
questions in an attempt to re-construct) 
his construction, i. e. 
Q -: t), 
t. ý 
-1(-2? =3)c=1 to -1( '-2? (-3-1)-2-3)c-1 
In closing the c-i within his question, the 
observer accepts a part of his question. 
This c=1 corresponds to the c-1 he accepted 
in order to ask his question. To ask his 
question, the observer accepted that he 
said, or made, -1, as the ONE. In accepting 
c-1 within his question, he accepts 
whatever he may have said, or made, (in 
making -1), as the OTHER. In other words 
the relation between the two c-1 closures 
c-1 correponds to the reversal between 
saying and doing between one and the other. 
Thus, where the observer chooses to accept 
part of his question in closing c-1, he 
accepts what he asked about himself as an 
other, and does so as if he where an other. 
His question can simlarly be notionally 
paraphrased as 
'What could I have done, saying whatever 
I was saying (making -1)' 
or 
'What could I have said, doing whatever 
I was doing (saying -1)? ', 
Thus conversing with himself as another, 
the observer can use the complementarity 
between saying and doing in an attempt to 
reconstruct his construction. Accepting the 
description he made, i. e. the first c-1, he 
can use one aspect of the speech act to 
wonder about the other, and accepting what 
he gathers he may have said or done, 
proceed, in turn, to use this to wonder 
about the next, and so on. Having accepted 
one he can use this to remind himself of 
the other, i. e. 
t 33') D, y4D 
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TESTING 
Consider next the observer's choice to 
close c=2? within his question (31). As 
above, the closure c=2? of a token 
description, within his question, formally 
leads to a switch from the question 
-3? (=ic=2? ) to -2(=3=1)ca2?, 
and enables the observer, in turn, to ask a 
question by expanding upon either s3 or -1. 
In either case, the redundancy leads the 
observer to reconsider his initial closure 
of c=1. Where he exapnds =1, i. e. 
-2(=3=1)c=2 to -2(=3="-1(=2=3)=1)c=2, 
he cannot at once accept and question the 
same -1. Hence the -1 he maintains open and 
expands must be distinct from the c-1 he 
accepted initially. Where he expands -3, 
i. e. 
(34) U, 
-2(=3=1)c=2 to -2(='-3(c=1-2)-3s1)C=2 
the c=1 he initially closed, forms part of 
the new question. The complementarity 
prevents a description from being at once 
open and closed, and hence the -i, he 
maintains open, must be distinct from the 
c-1 he. initially accepted. 
The distinction between these two -1 
arises in the observer's process of 
unfolding, eg. in the process (33) of 
retracing what he could have said or done. 
It is a distinction between a c-i he 
initially accepts and a c=1, or. -1, he 
reconstructs. Thus, this enables the 
observer to check what he has reconstructed 
against what he had accepted. Buch testing 
can notionally be paraphrased as 
'Could I have been doing such and such, 
assuming I said such and such, 
in making -1? ' 
or 
'Could I have been saying such and such, 
assuming I did such and such, 
in saying -17' 
Reversing the process of retracing (shown 
in (33")), by closing i2? s, the observer 
can thus check a description he 
reconstructed back to his initially 
accepted c=1. Where the tests are 
successful the observer can close his 
questions. In so doing, he accepts what he 
gathered he may have said, or done, and 
assumes that he did may this, or did do 
that, and thus proceeds to reconstruct what 
he questioned, i. e. 
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Where instead, the test fails, and the two 
=1 do not correspond, the observer can 
expand -1 as above. In so doing, he deems 
the description he initially acccepted, 
a mistake. Alternatively, he may return 
to his acceptance of c-1 by expanding s3, 
and in so doing deem his re-construction a 
mistake. He can then re-iterate his 
question (31), and his re-tracing (33), and 
attempt another re-cunstruction. 
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EMBEDDING DR 
EXPLAINING 
Where the observer chooses to close the 
token description c='-'=3, he expanded to 
ask his question (31), he accepts that he 
asked his question, which can notionally be 
paraphrased as 
. 
'1 asked: 'What did I say, making -1? " 
or 
'I askeds 'What did I do, saying -1? " 
But since =3 is a token description within 
his initial wonder about -1, its closure 
leads to a switch i. e. 
zº 
x 
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.,.. -1(-2c-3)c=1 
to -3(C-1-2)C-3. 
between two unstable forms. Either of these 
forms, in turn, leads to a switch to -2. 
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Unless, /the token descriptions -2-and c. 3 or 
c=1 and -2 in the resulting descriptions 
are desynchronised, the enlarged 
self-system collapses. Formally, the 
distinctions -1 and--3 preclude each other: 
the complementarity here manifests itself 
in the need for the observer to choose 
between either 
-1(=2c-3)c"1 or -3(c-1a2)c=3. 
The desynchronisation of tokens within an 
enlarged description -d(=dc=d), enables the 
observer to embedd time in such aI 
description (embedding the time which 
seperates the desynchronised token 
descriptions). Such a desynchronisation 
arises in the expanded -3(=2c=1) in (34). 
It enables the observer to, test what he has 
re-constructed (the open token) against 
what he had accepted (the closed token). 
Beyond such testing the de-synchronisation 
of tokens within an enlarged description 
allows the observer to say something, (the 
open token) about something he has 
accepted, (the closed token) within one 
description. 
,, The embeddeding, which arises with the 
desynchronisation of tokens within an" 
enlarged description is manifest in the 
circumstance that while all distinctions 
are merged in the closed token, i. e. 
the tokens of the open token description 
can be specified, i. e. 
=d(D, D). 
The time embedded in an enlarged 
description where the token descriptions 
are desynchronised car%hus be shown in 
terms of, this difference, i. e. 
-d(=d(D, D)c=)c=, eg. 
-3(=2(D3DI)c=1)c=3. 
By expanding the open token description, 
the observer can further and further embedd 
descriptions (time) within a description, 
oscillating between -2 and -3, i. e. 
(33') 
-3(-2(D3D1) c"l)c=3 " 
(-2(=3(DID2) c=1)c-2) 
ie. 
-3(-2(-3(=2(.... )c=1)ca3)c-l)c=2)c-1)c-3 
The brackets show the desynchronisation 
between the descriptions he thus eebedds. 
Such embedding enables the observer to 
postpone the act of interpretation, and 
hence enables him to make distinctions 
within his descriptions. Embedding time 
within one description, the observer can 
unfold the time he accumulated in the 
process of 'construction, and explain his 
construction. 
In the act of interpreting such a 
description, the descriptions embedded 
within it are synchronised. The 
distinctions embedded within such a 
description collapse in the form of 
interpretation. Thus, the form of 
interpretation requires the observer to be 
able to synchronise the descriptions 
embedded within a description. Formally, 
the coherence of a description or 
explanation arises the in possibility of 
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thus synchronising the descriptions, 
obliterating the distinctions embedded 
within it. 
Where the observer can only synchronise 
parts of a description or explanation, he 
can interpret only these parts. Where he 
can synchronise a c-)c' configuration, 
this switches into a -d description 
-d(c-c-) which collapses into c-. The 
apparent difficulty, in using'ordinary 
brackets to show the embedding of time 
within descriptions, thus shows that the 
ordinary use of brackets suggests a' 
step-by-step process of Interpretation, - 
i. e. 
(35") 
-3(-2(-3(=2(.... )c=1)c-3)c-l)c-2)cý1)cý3 
( c-2) 
( c-3) 
r ,1 c-2) 
However, to speak of a process of 
interpretation, proceeding from the 
interpretations of parts to that of the 
description or explanation as a whole, is 
to speak of, a process of-oscillation 
between descriptions and Interpretations. 
It is only in-such a process that such 
-steps can be distinguished. 
To conclude, we have shown how, by using 
the cowplementarity between saying and 
doing, the observer begins to satisfy some 
of the requirements of ordinary - 
communication. In asking a question he 
distinguishes himself. In pursuing a- 
curiosity, or constructing on the basis of 
, an assumption, he has a plan-or-intention. 
In unfolding his construction, he has 
something to say with regard to his 
intention. In embedding descriptions within 
descriptions, -he can begin to consider how 
he says what he says. / ti.. 
The redundancy of the enlarged 
self-system provides the observer with a 
multiplicity of choices. While we have only 
explored the basic patterns, the observer 
can at any point choose to-switch from one 
to the other, eg. pursue a question, stest 
an assumption, return to pursuing his 
question, construct with an assumption, and 
embed descriptions within descriptions. 
x. 
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COMMUNICATION 
8 
TOWARDS ARGUMENTATION, 
UR THE "I" OF LANGUAGE 
Where the discussion of the interaction 
between construction and communication was 
concerned with how the observer can 
distinguish himself as an other, the 
discussion of communication itself concerns 
the interaction between construction and 
argumentation, and how an observer can 
distinguish himself from an other and, 
eventually, from a language. Where the 
observer's existence depends an his ability 
to distinguish himself, as an other, the, 
existence of a language depends. on being 
similarly distinguished,. by one or more 
observers. 
Just as the need to unfold the time 
accumulated by the "I", and embed. it within 
descriptions, arises only in connection 
with the requirements for communication. so 
the need to distinguish, unfold, and 
explain, a language, and embed IT within 
another language, arises only in arguing. 
The possibility of doing so arises only 
where such a language is constructed and 
communicated. The construction and 
communication of an ever-growing language 
of things we convey in silence, 1s 
continuous in form with the ever-growing, 
time accumulating, "I". Thus, the 
discussion of construction and 
communication concerns the living "I" of 
language, while the discussion of 
argumentation involves languages as lTs 
(languages as they l! ) are normally 
considered). While the "I" of language is 
continuous in form with the "I", with the 
self-system, and with the ever-growing "I", 
the IT of language is continuous in form 
with token descriptions, descriptions, and 
explanations. This continuity underlies the 
paradox of means, which arises where the 
"I" of language is overlooked in using, and 
hence reifying, a language. 
To distinguishing *the "I" of language' 
is to reify it, and hence treat it as an 
IT. Just as in the process of construction, 
the observer generates his time, unable to 
distinguish it, the discussion of 
communication can only explore the "I" of 
language from within, without 
distinguishing it. It is due only to the 
continuity in form between the discussion 
of communication, and that of the process 
of construction, that the "I" of language 
can be mentioned here. 
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WHERE TWO MUST BE ONE: 
UNDERSTANDING, 
OR THE EVENT OF COMMUNICATION 
Distinctions proliferate in saying, doing 
and questioning. They proliferate, in the 
complementarity between saying and doing 
(in the redundancy of the enlarged 
self-system), with the opening of the 
self-system, with the severing of a unity, 
with the raising of a doubt. All 
distinctions merge in the form of 
interpretation. In the closure of the 
self-system there can be na distinction. 
Whatever distinctions are made between 
closures are obliterated in the act of 
interpretion. 
If one observer or communicator is to 
understand another, it is not in 
proliferations of distinctions, but in the 
closure in which two communicators serge 
into one. No matter to what extend 
something has been explained, no matter to 
what extend communicators distinguish 
between each other, or between 
understanding and knowing that they 
understand each other, - in understanding, 
in the event of communication, all such 
distinctions are obliterated. They merge 
into one. In events of communication, the 
communicators are synchronised in the 
simple oscillation between description and 
interpretation, i. e. 
D 
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In terms of the form of interpretation, 
the problem of`communication 1s one of 
distinction or independence between 
communicators. In terms of the form of 
description, the problem of communication 
is one of overcoming such distinction or 
independence. The two come to one, where 
these forms require any distinction to be a 
particular distinction, made by a 
communicator involved. 
To take a distinction between 
communicators as given, is to overlook 
their ability to distinguish themselves, 
and each other. It is to deprive them of 
the possibility of understanding, i. e. 
closing the self-system over this 
distinction. To take a distinction as given 
(on external grounds) renders the event of 
communication impossible. To take 
interpretations as given, similarly renders 
the event of communication impossible. In 
so doing, the distinctions by which given 
interpretations are distinguished, are 
taken as given, disallowing communicators 
to close their self-system over such 
dirtinctions. 
Instead, to take only the forms of 
description and interpretation as given, is 
to ask how communicators can come to 
distinguish each other. It is to consider 
how a communicator can distinguish himself 
from an other. It is to consider how he can 
become independent and maintain his 
independence by communicating with an 
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other, only as an other. It is also to 
consider how he may come to treat 
descriptions, interpretations, and things, 
as given, and distinguish himself from them 
in using them to communicate with an other. 
Where, in the event of communication, 
communicators are one, this is not to may 
that the one is not a mystery to the other. 
In the form of interpretation, one is a 
mystery to himself, should he care to ask, 
since there are no distinctions and since 
any distinction needs to be made (by an 
observer asking'about himself). Where, in 
communicating to an other, an obsever may 
come to know this other, he comes to know 
himself in the same way, if not in the very 
same process. 
as 
TO BEGIN TO COMIMJNICATE 
To begin to communicate (with himself) an 
observer needs to distinguish an other (or 
himself as an other). He distinguishes 
(himself as) an other in distinguishing a 
beginning and, in distinguishing a 
beginning, begins to communicate. 
To begin is to distinguish an other 
where two become desynchronised. Thus, the 
observer may have begun by distinguishing a 
beginning in -1 above. But except by being 
the other (distinguished), there is no way 
of knowing. If thus the observer may have 
communicated all along, this manifests the 
interaction between construction and 
communication. All that can be known 
concerns the form in which one begins by 
distinguishing an other= the farm in which 
two begin by distinguishing themselves in a 
beginning. In the interaction between 
construction and communication, this form 
is continuous with the fore in which an 
observer accepts what he did (as one) and 
distinguishes himself as an other. 
Thus, one can begin. where a difficulty 
in closing his self system leads the one to 
distinguish themselves as two, i. e. 
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37 
136.1) 'ý °' - ý/ 3 
4'T Dý 
Cý=: D, F) l), 
which is a reflexive version of the form of 
asking a question ((31) above), in which 
the other (as which the observer 
distinguishes himself), in turn, 
distinguishes, and asks questions of, the 
one. Where as in (35) above, c=3 is closed, 
i. e. 
p, ß 
(36.2) 
[ D, D-- ) 
U, 
a pair of desychronous descriptions, 
sharing the open -2 token description, 
result. One distinguishes an other as an 
other, where he can synchronise his own 
description, but remains unable to collapse 
the enlarged self-system as a whole (i. e. 
synchronising his own description would 
lead to a switch, and collapse c-i and c-3 
into c-2). Two merge into one where each 
synchronises his own description, leading 
the pair of desynchronised descriptions to 
switch and collapse into -2 or c-2, i. e. 
o' 
D n, 
nýD, D :D 
(3 6.3) `ý 
ry 
/0? 
DI 
Two are synchronised in a common 
co-operative action -2, for instance in 
lifting a rock. Here each of the c-1 is 
synchronised with the common s2. The 
desynchronous descriptions collapse and the 
two merge into one, unless they distinguish 
themselves and each other In the -1 
distinctions. Thus, where -2 is a common 
action, the -Is distinguish the "I" and the 
other, the =2s are doing tokens and the -3s 
are saying tokens. Where (in 36.1) a 
question is raised, eg. 
'What did you do, in making -1? ', 
the -1 is a 'you' and the a2? concerns the 
doing aspect of the speech act. For the 
case of doing things together, the two can 
be synchronised in such a common action and 
carry on doing as one, i. e. 
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(36.4) 
D: 7-'I) u: %D D Dy 
u 
U, q 
oscillating between opening and closing 
their self-system. In the first closure, 
c-3, the two coincide in seeing their own, 
and each other's, part in the common 
action, and hence they no longer 
distinguish each other. 
Where two are synchronised only in the *" 
common act -2, and one or the other in turn 
expands =2, he proceeds from the common 
act, to make and embed desciptions within a 
description of the other, persuing 
questions about the other. In so doing one 
or the other uses -1 as the distinction by 
which he distinguishes himself from the 
other i. e. 
(36.3) 
D, =+ R '*~ D, D, D, : D, 
4Qß 
D, ý D, RA D, 
D, 
In so doingg one, and/or the otherv uses 
the coon act -2 as a beginning. 
To begin to co. unicate, two need to 
explore their de-synchronisation together. 
They begin by expanding on their coawan 
act, each expanding 
-2 to -2? (-3-1? ). 
As -1? Is a question about the other, in 
asking it they accept the common act -2 
together, and hence the closure c-i 
represents a "we", and the question -2? 
concerns the decynchronication between 
them, in terms of what they DID, wondering 
how, having done something together, they 
are nevertheless distinct, i. e. 
226 
(36.6) 
i« 
` i-. 
ý11 D. . X, 
we 
n, D 
In turn expanding 
=17 to -1(=2=3), 
each one distinguishes what-he, or the- 
other, DID, and, in turn, accepts this in 
closing 
cm1. 
Where one (a) closes the small self-system 
over his "I", the other (b) closes it over 
the "other", and vice versa, i. e. 
(36.7) c=1 as"1". bs"other" 
=2ý! =3 
rýT 
=I? 
c=1 2a& bt "we" 
=3 `ý, =1? 
-2 
-a3 
C-1 as "other'", bi "I 
For either one, and/or the other, the act 
-2'and the c-i, in which he distinguishes 
himself ("I"), are synchronous. Where one, 
and/or the other, does not wish to maintain 
the distinction -1, by which he 
distinguishes himself, this synchonicity 
leads to the collapse of his enlarged 
self-system into c-3. One, and/or the 
other, can thus procoede to open and close 
his own self-system seperatly, in a process 
of construction, about which the other can 
know nothing, i. e. 
c36.6) 
c-3 -x c-x.... 
=1? 
cal =2 
:3 
/+1? 
C-3 
Alternatively, where one, and/or the other, 
maintains the distinction -1, maintaining 
cml, he can in turn expand 
-3 to -3(-1-2), 
and in turn ask a question about the cow. on 
act s2, by expanding 
-2 to 
Since -3 here shows the saying aspect of 
the speech act, this question concerns what 
was indicated (or 'said') by his own, 
and/or the other's, part in the common act 
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(-37). Lg. 
"What did you (1) indicate in doing that? " 
or 
"Why did you (I) do that? ", i. e. 
(36.9) "I" X 
=1? =2 
(=2ýr =3) 
Due to the reversal of saying and doing 
between one and the other, the other will 
in turn see this question as an act, 
collapsing 
-2(=3? -1)? to =2, 
seeing what the one does in asking a 
question, i. e. 
(36.10) » 
(-2 -3 
=3 =1? -2 
C-1 s2 "(-377 =1)? " 
(=3 17) -2 
(=2 
--w 
3) 
«1" 
The other may 'recognise' the initial 
common act in the act =2 (eg. he might 
himself have tried to ask this question). 
He may in turn expand 
-2 to -2(-3a1)c=2, 
in answer to the one's question. In closing 
c=2 the whole structure will collapse, if 
the one in turn distinguishes the common 
act in the other's answer, i. e. 
(36.11) »1» 
(=2 -3 
(=3 =1? 
ý 
-2/c- 
c-1 -2 "(=3? =1)? /: " 
(=3 =1? ) -2/c- 
(-2 -3) 
"1» 
Thus, beginning in a common act, one and 
another distinguish themselves (01" and the 
"other") and their common act They 
merge into one, in the event of 
communication, by coinciding in how they 
distinguish their act and each other. Where 
they continue as one, it is now the "we" 
which accumulates time, i. e. the time of 
their common construction. 
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ACCEPTANCE 
Where one thus asks about, and the other 
thus distinguishes, a common act (=2), two 
communicate. They communicate in being 
synchronised in their common act. In terms 
of the simple oscillation between 
description and interpretation, their act, 
together with their question/answer 
constitute one description, i. e. 
(37.1) 
D2 D3(-1? =3)? /! 
This comprises one opening of the 
self-system which is closed in the event of 
communication, in which all distinctions 
collapse. Such a description is 
asynchronous only with regard to the 
distinctions by which one and the other 
distinguish themselves ('I"? ), and each 
other ("you? "). These distinctions are 
obliterated where such a description is 
synchronised with the inclusion of c-i 
("we") in the token description of the 
common act. As a consequence the 
description collapses, i. e. 
(37.2) 
D2(c=1=2) tiý D31=1? =3)? (! 
Where communicators are to remain distinct 
in the process of communication, a 
description is thus essentially 
asynchronous. This asynchronicity arises 
in, and is maintained by, an arbitrary 
distinction, whereby c-i, the "ire", is 
maintained outside the description or the 
common act. It is arbitrarily maintained by 
one and the other, where they remain 
distinct in the event of communication. It 
maintains a description in its asynchronous 
form, where, beyond merging in the event of 
communication, one and the other wish to 
confirm that they communicate. 
Where two remain distinct, in the event 
of communication, they communicate in the 
roles of one and an other, in which they 
thus distinguish themselves. In the 
instance shown above, they thus communicate 
as '3's, i. e. 
(37.3) . »I. 
t-2 / -3 
(=3 / -1? .2 
--% a--- 
(-3 \ =1? ) ý2 
(°2 " -3) 
"I" 
With regard to a new common act 4=2), they 
Can adopt the roles they ottributu to each 
other, communicating as =l7's, 1. e. 
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(37.4) 
(=2=3) -17 
(=3=1? ) =2 =3 
c=1c=2 ý "(=3? " =1)? " 
' 
=2 
(=3-1? ) =2 =3 
(=2=3) =1? 
"1" 
which in turn, as doers -2's, they can now 
question in terns of the previous "we", 
i. e. 
(37.3) 
(=2=3)=1? ) -2 
(=3=1? )=2) -3 -1? 
c=1c=2c=3?. 1? 4=2'-"-- -3)? /! 
(=3-1? )-2) -3 =1? 
(=2=3)-1? ) -2 
wl. 
Where two remain distinct, this 
essential asynchronicity thus allows one 
and an other to link new descriptions to 
old ones. In the process of so doing, the 
"we" accumulates time in just the same 
manner as does the "I", in the process of 
construction, i. e. 
(37.6) 
C. 1 "2 "(=37 =1)? /! « 
C31c=2c° ? "º "" -1? " 
Where two remain distinct, a description 
in communication is thus of the general 
form 
(38) 
D-D *D 
`w 
D: DD D 
D DD 
D 
in which the smaller token description 
arises in the acceptance of the 
ever-growing "«e", i. e. 
XD- 
DD 
:D 
DDD 
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The general form of a description, where 
two remain distinct, thus comprises a D(DO) 
and a D(SAY) token description (see (29)), 
no matter what aspects of the speech act 
are related within these tokens. In the 
form of a description where two remain 
distinct, the complementarity between 
saying and doing thus reflects the 
acceptance of the ever-growing "we". The 
possibility of linking new to old 
descriptions thus arises in the act of 
acceptance. In the act of relating one 
thing to an accepted or assumed other. 
r- ýs 
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"WHY IS A RAVEN LIKE A WRITING-DESK? "' 
Where thus the outermost saying and doing 
aspects of the speech act are determined in 
the general form of a description where two 
remain distinct, it is for the first time 
possible to give an example. An example of 
the act of acceptance. Due to the form of 
interpretation, however, the act of 
acceptance becomes apparent, as such, only 
where one negates what he is assumed to 
accept, and hence the all-pervasiveness of 
acts of acceptance, in which two begin to 
communicate, can only be shown indirectly. 
Consider the exchange between Alice and the 
Hatter in Lewis Carroll's account of A Mad 
Tea-Party, 
"'Your hair wants cutting, ' said the 
Hatter. He had been looking at Alice for 
some time with great curiosity, and this 
was his first speech. 
'You should learn not to make personal 
remarks, ' Alice said with some severity) 
'it's very rude. ' 
The Hatter opened his eyes very wide on 
hearing this; but all he SAID was, 'Why is 
a raven like a writing-desk? '" 
In making his comment, the Hatter 
expects Alice to allow his to comment on 
her hair, which (only) becomes apparent in 
Alice's refusal to accept this assumption 
(presumption). She objects to the outermost 
doing-aspect of the Hatter's speech act. In 
so doing, Alice in turn expects the Hatter 
to allow her to comment on his manner, 
which the Hatter in turn refuses to accept. 
Where his reply is not taken as a riddle, 
he too questions the outermost doing-aspect 
of Alice's speech act, objecting to Alice's 
presumption in commenting on his rudeness; 
objecting perhaps to any assumption about 
what he will accept. 
In their refusal to accept each other's 
assumptions, Alice and the Hatter show the 
importance of an act of acceptance In 
begining to communicate. In objecting to 
each other's acts (i. e. to what the other 
does rather than to what he says), they 
illustrate the form of a description (38) 
where two remain distinct, in which it is 
the outermost doing-aspect of the speech 
act which links what is, or here is not, 
accepted, to what is said. 
The form of a description (38) applies 
to all occasions where two remain distinct. 
Thus, two who have been doing things 
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separately (eg. 36.8) need to accept, or 
invoke, the acceptance of something to 
begin to communicate. Where two begin, one 
or the other invokes a structure of the 
form of (38) in which two distinguish each 
other and accept or assume a common "we". 
Any speech act can thus be taken as the act 
by which to begin. Where two remain 
distinct, the form of a description is such 
that two begin to communicate with every 
one thing they say (and hence any speech 
act can be interpreted locally). 
In the form of a description where two 
remain distinct, the outermost aspects of 
the speech act are determined in their role 
in allowing two to begin. In general, the 
complementarity between saying and doing 
renders it impossible to determine (without 
earticipating in an exchange) what is said 
rather than done, and done rather than 
said, in any particular comment. This is 
reflected in the tokens embedded within 
tokens, in the continuity in which one form 
can be treated as an other. What is said 
rather than done, and what is done rather 
than said, is a matter of choice in 
interpreting a description. But, where two 
remain distinct in beginning, the outermost 
aspects of the speech act are determined, 
in that they use the coaiplementarity 
between saying and doing to accept or, 
assume a beginning. Since It is the 
outermost doing-aspect which links whatever 
IS said or done, to what is accepted or, 
assumed (i. e. the "we"), to question this 
act, is to question the beginning proposed; 
is to deny that begining as a beginning. 
In denying a beginning as a beginning, 
another beginning is invoked. This 
beginning, in turn can be questioned, 
invoking another beginning, and so on and 
so on. But, while every beginning thus 
assumed can be questioned, the need to 
accept or assume one thing or another in 
beginning, cannot be questioned. Where the 
need to accept a beginning is itself .4 
questioned, the conversation is disrupted, 
precisely because it cannot begin. 
In asking why a raven should be like a 
writing-desk, the Hatter may indeed be 
questioning any begining, and thus question 
the need to begin. If it were not for Alice 
treating this as a riddle, their 
conversation would be disrupted. The Had 
Tea-Party, if not the whole of Caroll's 
story, is an exploration of the extent to 
which we are prepared try and give 
beginnings. It shows the pains we take to 
defy such questioning, to find something 
acceptable. 
Where one attempts to find something 
acceptable in an other's questioning the 
need to begin, he reveals more and more of 
his person. He reveals the distinctions by 
which he tries to maintain his 
distinctness, revealing the fact that the 
distinction by which one distinguishes 
himself, and the distinction by which he 
distinguishes what he assumes or accepts, 
are ultimately one and the same 
distinction. 
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NEGOTIATION 
Beyond acceptance, the event of 
communication can arise in a processes of 
negotiation. 
Two begin to communicate with every one 
thing they say. In any beginning, something 
(a "we") is accepted or assumed. It is in 
terms of a beginning, that what is said can 
be questioned and negotiated. 
What is said and done can be questioned, 
and negotiated, due to, and in terms of, 
the basic asynchronicity in the form of a 
description where two remain distinct (38). 
This asynchronicity arises in the 
beginning; in the acceptance of a "we". 
Since in the asynchronicity of the form 
of a description where two remain distinct, 
the roles of the outermost aspects of the 
speech act are determined, it is possible 
to distinguish two types of questions, in 
the negotiation of what is said, or done. 
The outermost D(DO) arises in beginning, 
and connects what is accepted with what is 
said. Thus, to question what is done, 
expanding the outermost D(DO), is to 
question the beginning invoked= is to 
question the "we", or what is assumed or 
accepted in beginning. To question what is 
said, expanding the outermost D(SAY), is to 
accept the beginning and question what is 
said, in terms of this beginning. Due to 
the complesentarity between saying and 
doing, to question the outermost D(SAY) Is 
to accept the beginning, to question what 
is done with it. 
sss 
CO-OPERATION 
In a beginning, where two remain distinct, 
the form of a description thus indicates 
the direction in which the one beginning 
wishes to proceed, or he would not begin 
where he begins. An other co-operates, 
where he accepts the beginning proposed, 
and questions only what the one says or 
does with this beginning, i. e. where he 
expands the outermost D(SAY). But he also 
co-operates in questioning the beginning 
proposed. To question where the one begins, 
expanding the outermost D(DO), an other 
must at least accept that the one made a 
description= that he did what he did or 
said what he said. In so doing, however, 
the other in turn proposes a beginning, and 
asks for the one's co-operation, in 
accepting this beginning. 
Without co-operation, two cannot begin 
to communicate. Thus, to begin to 
communicate, is to propose what might be 
accepted, and ask for its acceptance. To 
co-operate is to accept a beginning 
proposed, or to propose another beginning 
IN the beginning proposed. Two co-operate 
in communication whenever there remains 
some link between what one and the other do 
and say. To co-operate with an other is to 
do or say something with, or in terms of, 
what he said or did. 
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It is thus, that to begin to 
communicate, there must be a common act. 
Two can distinguish each other in any act. 
Where one cannot co-operate with an other, 
he cannot distinguish an other. Where two 
do not co-operate, they can only be 
distinct with regard to some external 
distinction. In each other's constructions 
they are not distinguished, and hence do 
not exist. They are neither dependent nor 
independent of one another, since 
independence involves co-operation in 
accepting a "we", accepting the distinction 
in which two distinguish themselves and 
each other. 
Where in the act of co-operation two 
remain distinct, any description is of the 
form of (38). Any description where two 
remain distinct proposes a beginning. Due 
to the form of interpretation, all 
distinctions merge in the acceptance of a 
"we", no matter what one accepts in an "' 
other's beginning. Where two co-operate in 
accepting a beginning, all distinctions 
concerning previously proposed beginnings 
are merged. 
The Hatter, for example, does not, and 
need not, return to insist that Alice's 
hair needs cutting] Alice does not return 
to insist that the Hatter was rude. It has 
been said that her hair needs cutting, it 
has been said that he was rude, but the 
failure to co-operate an these points, 
leaves it open, whether her hair needs 
cutting or whether he was rude. Where a 
point is not taken, it is not accepted, and 
has no existence in the "we", mg. the 
Hatter's possible point about questioning 
beginnings. Where Alice invokes the game of 
riddles as the Hatter's beginning, and the 
March Harr accepts this beginning, whatever 
beginning the Hatter may have proposed, 
remains of no significance; at least until 
the Hatter himself accepts this beginnings 
"'Have you guessed the riddle yet? ' the 
Hatter said, turning to Alice again. 
'No. I give lt up, ' Alice replied. 
'what's the answer? ' 
It haven't the slightest idea, ' said the 
Hatter. 
'Nor ), ' said the March Hare. 
Alice sighed wearily. 'I think you might 
do something better with the time, ' she 
said, 'than waste it In asking riddles that 
have no answers. '" 
H. then has to deny it, as a beginning 
proposed by him, knowing no answer to such 
a riddle. The exchange shows, that the need 
for co-operation is such that a beginning 
may be accepted (mg. that there is a 
riddle) simply in order to begin and carry 
on. What is thus accepted, in an attempt to 
co-operate, can later be questioned or 
denied. 
sý . 
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"WASTING TIME" 
Where all distinctions concerning previous 
beginnings are obliterated, in accepting a 
beginning, it is only the intentionality 
with which a beginning is proposed which 
distinguishes what beginning is accepted. 
All that can and need be known about the 
intentionality with which a beginning is 
proposed, is manifest in the form of a 
description where two remain distinct-(38). 
The only intentionality which can and need 
be considered, is that manifest in the 
directionality were two remain distinct. 
This directionality allows one to indicate 
the direction in which he proposes that the 
"we" shall proceed to accumulate time. 
In making a description where two remain 
distinct, one's intentionality iiq that of 
asking acceptance of what he does (D(DO)), 
and putting forth for discussion what he 
says (D(SAY)). Abbreviating the fore of a 
decription where two remain distinct (38) 
as 
(38.1) 
and (38.2) 
D"'D^D-D 
the intentionality with which a beginning 
is proposed can simply be shown with an 
arrow in the direction in time in which the 
one proposing the beginning proposes to 
proceed, i. e. 
(3u. 3) - -3 
D^D'1% D 
What he intends the other to accept, 
accepting what he says into the common 
"we", is shown with a dotted bracket, 
showing the larger self-system which is 
closed where what he proposes is accepted, 
i. e. 
c 3B. 4) 'ý'! 
D' D 
The event of communication in such 
acceptance is shown with the brackets 
showing the closure in which these 
self-systems collapse, I. E. 
(38.3) 
D D%%-.. o 
While (38.2) to (38.3) thus show th" 
basic asynchronicity of a description ah. r" 
two remain distinct, (38.3) shows the 
synchronisation in which they understand, 
close their self-systems, and hence waro" 
into one, in terms of the description they 
thus accept or understand. 
246 
Where the form of a description thus 
manifests the intentions with which one 
proposes a beginning, and an other accepts 
and/or questions it, it is possible to 
speak about how the interaction between 
their intentions increases, decreases, or 
removes, the asynchronicity of a 
description where two remain distinct. 
For something to be said, for a point to 
be made, two must be distinct and hence an 
asynchronicity in the description is 
necessary. For a conversation to be 
constructive, two must co-operate to the 
extend that their overall intentions 
coincide in direction, allowing for an 
event of communication in which their 'we" 
accumulates time. Where two are at odds, in 
the directions in which they propose to 
proceed, to the extend that no overall,, 
coincidence in intentions appears possible, 
they may cease to co-operate altogether, 
feeling that they are "wasting time". 
In order to question either what the one 
said (D(SAY)), or did (D(DO), the other 
needs at least to accept that the one has 
indeed said or done whatever he said or 
did. Where the other chooses to question 
what the one did, expanding the outermost 
D(DO), he proceeds to cross purposes with 
the one; the direction of his intention is 
the opposite of that of the one. He can 
either question what the one assumes or, 
accepts (the assumed "we"), i. e. 
(39.1) 
-9 
? D-D^"'D-D 
or question the relation between what the 
one does (the outermost D(DO)) and what heY 
says (the outermost D(SAY)) i. e. 
(39.2) -+ 
D D^D =D 
e- 7*--. * 
Where he chooses-to question what the one 
is saying (the outermost D(SAY)) he 
proceeds in the direction in which the one 
intends him to proceed, i. e. 
(39.3) 
Uý``Dý D D---D? 
In all cases the other accepts that'the 
one said whatever he said. Thus he can 
leave the outermost D(SAY) open (just as 
the observer can question a -d distinction 
by accepting c-d that he has made it). 
Where what the one said thus remains open, 
the one can accept what the other assumes 
in questioning, and can accept a change in 
the direction in which they proceed, - 
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trusting that, as a result of such 
questioning, they will eventually return 
to, and accept, this description. The one 
will begin to see time wasted where the 
desynchronisation, between such questioning 
and the description left open, increases 
without prospect of returning to his 
beginning. Where one takes the outermost 
D(SAY) in a beginning as left open, he will 
begin to see questioning which has no 
prospect of closing his descripton, as 
being irrelevant. 
A beginning is taken to be left open. 
Where a beginning is not accepted, it does 
not exist in one or the other's 
construction, unless it is taken to be left 
open. Only one who takes a beginning to be 
left open can know it to be so. A beginning 
proposed has no existence beyond the act in 
which it is proposed, unless its 
distinction is re-made by one or the other. 
In the indeterminacy of the form of 
interpretation, the distinctions by which 
something was said, or done, collapse. A 
conversation finds a new beginning in every 
one thing said. 
Due to the redundancy of a description 
where two remain distinct, it is 
unnecessary, and at best pedantic, to 
ensure that nothing is left open. To be 
explicit about what is accepted, is to 
waste time. To insist an negotiating 
everything is to disrupt a conversation. 
In questioning what one did or said , 
the other is bound to accept enough to 
collapse a description to a token 
description, or a token description to a 
single token. To question what the one did 
or said, the other has to choose to expand 
one of two token descriptions. Expanding 
one token, he will appear to have accepted 
the other token, unless he specifically 
denies accepting it. In questioning, and 
thus proposing a new beginning in an 
other's beginning, more appears to be 
acccepted than questioned. Let what thus 
appears to be accepted, where one questions 
another's beginning, be shown with dotted 
brakets, i. tr. 
for (39.1) 
? D--D'D- ;D 
for (39.2) 
D..... D^ D' . -D z `ý 
and for (39.3) 
D^p, ^D D_ p? 
Thus, the redundancy of descriptions 
allows for the apparent collapse of 
distinctions in the very act of questioning 
of what is said and done. Where such 
apparent acceptance is not explicitly 
questioned, it is treated as accepted. 
Alice's weary sigh shows that such apparent 
acceptance is assumed to be used 
co-operatively, to save, rather than to 
waste, time. To fail to question what 
appears to be accepted, but is not, is to 
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mislead, and hence to waste time. In turn, 
such apparent acceptance allows two to 
co-operate in the construction of worlds, 
as if they accepted them, and play games in 
which they accept to pretend. 
It is in the asynchronicity of a 
description where two remain distinct, that 
something can be said. Where time is 
wasted, this asynchronicity is increased. 
Thus, the wasting of time, the 
asynchronicity between one and an other 
where they are at odds in the directions of 
their intentions, can be taken as saying 
something., To accept time being wasted, is 
to take something as said, or implicated, 
in an apparent wasting of time. The need to 
accept, the need to co-operate, is such 
that time cannot be wasted. Where one 
appears to be wasting time, the other seeks 
the point of so doing. To co-operate, he 
seeks a beginning in the wasting of time. 
s: s 
RELATIONS 
The terms in which an exchange takes place 
are negotiated within that exchange. Such 
negotiation need not be either exhaustive 
or explicit. The terms in which an exchange 
takes place are negotiated implicitly, 
jMithin the exchange. The redundancy in the 
form of a description where two remain 
distinct, allows their negotiation to go 
unsaid; allows the terms in which the 
exchange takes place to be taken as 
accepted, unless they are explicitly 
questioned. 
To speak of things, and to use 
descriptions to indicate things, one and 
another need to relate descriptions. 
Descriptions are related in the form of a 
description where two remain distinct. It 
is in the asynchronicity of a description 
where two remain distinct, and possibly 
proceed at cross purposes, that they 
establish relations between descriptions. 
The form of a description where two 
remain distinct comprises three or four 
tokens, or token descriptions. The first 
remains unsaid in the description, as the 
`we" which accumulates ties in the event of 
communication. The second, constitutes the 
outermost D(DO), and together, the third 
and forth constitute the outermost DIBAY). 
Thus, 
-it 
is the second token 
(description) in a description where two 
remain distinct, in which descriptions are 
related. It relates what is assumed to what 
is said, relating descriptions which are no 
longer distinguished to a new description. 
It can be expanded to reveal any assumption 
made in the making of the description. It 
is thus a token for the act of acceptance. 
A token for an act of relating. 
Being relational, the form of a 
description where two remain distinct is 
indicative. It is indicative of the 
direction in which the one proposing a 
beginning intends to proceed, by virtue of 
the form, in which it is as if the second 
token (the outermost D(DO)) were expanded 
in the third and forth tokens (the 
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outermost D(SAY)). It is indicative in that 
the outermost D(SAY) is an explicit version 
of the outermost D(DO). It is thus, in 
raising a question about the second token, 
that the form of a description where two 
remain distinct is indicative. It is 
indicative of the direction in which the 
one proposing it intends to proceed. 
The form of a description where two 
remain distinct, is indicative of what the 
one proposing a beginning relates, or 
indicates, by virtue of the reversal of 
saying and doing between one and the other. 
The second token (the outermost D(DO)) is 
expanded to a D(SAY) in the reversal, while 
the third and fourth tokens are collapsed 
to a D(DO). What, in proposing a beginning 
is indicative for one, is but a token for 
the other, and what, in proposing a 
beginning is but a token for one, is 
indicative for the other. 
The indicativeness of the form of a 
description where two remain distinct, 
cannot be negotiated. It arises in the form 
where two remain distinct. It arises with 
the very distinction by which they 
distinguish themselves and each other. 
In thus combining a token, taken to be 
indicative, with a description, taken in 
the first instance as a token, the form of 
description where two remain distinct can 
be used to make indicative relations 
between descriptions. Where two remain 
distinct, one can take a description made 
by an other as indicative that the other 
made the description 
said that he made the description, 
made the description to say something 
said something about something 
by making the description 
and so on. 
Thus using the complementarity between 
saying and doing, one can proceed to 
explore a continuity of another's 
indications and intentions, eg. what in 
making his description the other intends to 
be considered, and what he intends to be 
accepted; what the other is saying, and 
what he is saying it about. 
Where two remain distinct, the 
indicativeness of a description lies in the 
form of a description, and hence it arises 
within every description made. Something 
can be taken as indicated in terms of the 
form of the a description, in which it is 
indicated. Where two remain distinct, a 
description thus carries it's own 
indicative structure. The possibility to 
make indications arises within the 
description, that Is locally, - with every 
beginning. 
$Rt 
RELATIONS NEGOTIATED 
If a description could not be taken as 
indicative in its own forty, it could not be 
interpreted at all, where the "1" of 
language is concerned. Where all 
distinctions merge in the event of 
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communication, a description cannot be 
interpreted in terms other than itself. 
The form of a description where two 
remain distinct, reflects the single depth 
of interpretation in the complement (covert 
description, intended to be accepted) of 
the overt description. This complementarity 
is reflected in the symmetry of (39.1), and 
renders the pursuit of (39.1) or (39.2) 
essentially symetrical. The description 
intended to be accepted, involves the "we" 
at a single depth, and thus what is 
accepted is the complement of what is 
questioned. As a consequence, no more than 
one thing can be questioned at any one 
time. 
All that can be said about the 
negotiation of relations thus concerns the 
possible relations between the beginning 
one proposes, and the extend to which an 
other co-operates in questioning his 
beginning, i. e the relations (39.1 to 3). 
While sequences of beginnings, and 
beginnings within beginnings, may indeed be 
of interest, the single depth of 
interpretation requires any beginning, 
accepted, to be considered on its own 
merit. 
All that can be said about the 
negotiation of relations, and indications, 
can be said in terms of what part of a 
description is negotiated (at any one time 
in the processes of pursuing a curiosity, 
questioning, testing and explaining). Where 
two remain distinct, anything taken to be 
indicated is taken to be indicative, with 
regard to the form of the description in 
which it is indicated. Due to the 
redundancy of descriptions, and the 
possibility of expanding any token to a 
token description, or collapsing any 
description to a token description or a 
single token, this is all that is necessary 
to establish and distinguish indications. 
Due to the form of interpretation, the 
single depth of interpretation must be 
sufficient to negotiate any indication. 
Where all that is not explicitly 
questioned is treated as accepted, one and 
an other use the single depth of 
interpretation to direct their attention, 
in one instance, to table manners, in 
another to how a thing is indicated, in 
another to what is said and how it is said, 
and so on. Such "levels", as may be 
perceived as distinguishing such concerns, 
are perceived with regard to the 
directionalities In which one and the other 
intend to proceed. Thus using the single 
depth of interpretation to direct their 
attention, one or another deem relevant 
what they negotiate in negotiating U. 
The possibilities of negotiating a 
description where two remain distinct, 
reflect the continuity between decriptions 
(24). To consider which part of a 
description is negotiated is to consider 
which description is negotiated. To 
negotiate a part of a description 
negotiated is to treat it as a whole 
description, using the continuity between 
descriptions (24). It is, in thus treating 
a part as a whole, that what is not 
questioned appears to be, and is, accepted. 
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In (39.1) the description the one 
ultimately intended to be accepted, i. e. 
(40.1) 
? D--D^D'ýD 
2`ý3 4 
the other questions the description 
involving the first and second D. To thus 
question the relation between what the one 
assumed, and what he said, the other needs 
to accept what the one said, or that he 
said it. Thus closing a small self-system 
over the description involving the third 
and forth D, this leads to a switch in the 
description ultimately intended to be 
accepted. Collapsing this into the 
description involving the first and second 
D, the other appears to'accept the relation 
between what the one said, and what the one 
assumed, i. e. 
D 
The questioning itself, in turn, expands 
this description i. e. 
a n, 
"D : D, 
a 
In (39.2) the description the one 
ultimately intends to be accepted, i. e. 
(40.2) 
D D^D=D 
1ýE- 22`ý3 4 
is questioned in the other's beginning. In 
the other's question, the description the 
one ultimately intends to be accepted is 
collapsed, i. e. its first and second D 
constitute one token, and its third and 
forth D constitute the other token in the 
question, 
D, 2--. D 
D 
giving rise to the appearance that the 
description involving the first and second 
D's, and the description involving the 
third and fourth D's, are indeed accepted. 
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The questioning itself in turn expands this 
description, i. e. 
I), U, 
4ýD, 
Similarly, for (39.3) the description 
questioned is that involving the third and 
forth D's, i. e. 
(40.3) -3 
Dý D D--D? 
123 .} 
In such questioning, the other accepts what 
the one assumed. This leads to a switch in 
the description ultimately intended to be 
accepted. In collapsing this description 
into the description involving the third 
and fourth D's, i. e. 
D12, -, D4 
Di 
the relation between what the one said, and 
what he assumed, appears to be accepted. 
The questioning itself, in turn, expands 
this description, i. e. 
D,! D. 
4 
In all three cases, the closure over the 
token description questioned (accepting 
that the question arises) emphasises the 
appearance that what is accepted, in such 
questioning, is actually accepted. As a 
consequence, it is impossible to 
distinguishing between the simple collapse 
in which the other accepts what the one 
did, from a process in which he further 
accepts that a question arises, and hence 
it is impossible to know what descriptions 
are considered left open by one or the 
other. The distinction between a process in 
which a description is left open, and one 
in which it is not, can only be maintained 
by one or the other in their own 
activities. Where anything which is not 
questioned is assumed to be accepted, one 
or the other needs to remake a description 
he wishes to return to. 
The negotiation of any relation of 
significance. between one and an other and 
the descriptions they make, thus proceed 
along the lines and possibilities discussed 
260 
on the way towards communication. (Jne and 
an other may, or may not, co-operate in the 
explcw ation of these possibilities. The 
extent to which they do co-operate is the 
extent to which they cu-operate in their 
beginnings. The extent to which they 
co-operate by returning to beginnings they 
separatly maintained open, and the extent 
to which what appears to have been accepted 
has been accepted, is manifest only in an 
event of communication. These cannot be 
spoken about before, or in, that event. 
Whatever, and however much, one or the 
other'embeds within a description or 
explanation, is collapsed in the event of 
communication. 
.. &. 
In oscillating between beginnings and 
events of communication, one and the other 
proceed as the observer does in the process 
of. construction. In the process of 
oscillating between beginnings and events 
of communication, the "we" accumulates the 
time generated in this process. The time 
accumulated by the "we" cannot be 
distinguished in this process, just as, in 
the process of construction, the observer 
cannot distinguish the time accumulated by 
his ever growing "I". Since any 
description, or relation of significance, 
accepted by one and the other, is thus 
accumulated in the ever-growing "we", the 
ever-growing "we" is the "I" of language. 
Is the "I" of language in that the form of 
a description where two remain distinct is 
all that is necessary for the description 
to be taken as indicative. 
In the "l" of language, the event of 
communication is thus a local event, 
explained in terms of the form of a 
description where two remain distinct, and 
the form of interpretation (with its 
consequent single depth). These simple 
forms are sufficient to account for the 
possibility of communication, and to 
account for'the generation of languages in 
the "I" of language, which one and an other 
may come to distinguish as ITS. 
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AKGUMENIATION 
The possibility of appearing to accept a 
conventionally accepted language such as 
English, in the covert first D, in the form 
of a description where two remain distinct, 
suggests that far from being local, the 
possibility of an event of communication 
relies on prior knowledge of such a 
language. Due to the single depth of 
interpretation, however, an event of 
communication which arises where a 
coventionally accepted language is 
accepted, cannot be distinct from an event 
of communication where no such language is 
accepted. Due to the form of 
interpretation, it is impossible to 
distinguish the construction and 
negotiation of a language, from its use. 
To, nevertheless, speak of using this or 
that language, is to distinguish it. To use 
a language, is to use the distinctions by 
which it is distinguished. The possibility 
of distinguishing a language arises in, and 
remains dependant on, the processes of 
construction and communication. A language 
is distinguished, constructed, and 
communicated. A language remains within the 
form of interpretation. Whatever may be 
said about how, given a language, this or 
that is interpreted, is said by drawing 
distictions which are obliterated in the 
form of interpretation. Just as the 
distinctions used to embed descriptions 
within descriptions collapse in the form of 
interpretation, the distinctions (or 
levels) used to embed languages (within 
languages) within the form of a description 
where two remain distinct, collapse in the 
form of interpretation (in any event of 
communication). It is not in, or with.,, 
regard to, explanations of how this or that 
was, or, is to be, interpreted, that it is 
interprted. 
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ABOUT THINGS 
The need to speak about and distii. guish, 
things, as things. -arises where one and the 
other need to accept, assume, or know, that 
they are speaking about one and the same 
thing. 
In constructing, the oberver and his 
construction are one, and cannot be 
distinguished. There can be no doubt about 
a thing being one and the same thing. The 
need to distinguish a thing as a thing 
cannot arise. In any event of 
communication, one and an other coincide in 
a "we", and no longer remain distinct. 
There can be no doubt about a thing being 
one and the same thing. The need to 
distinguish a thing cannot arise. 
The need to speak. about and distinguish 
things only arises where one and an other 
wish to argue, only where there can be a 
doubt about whether it is one thing, or 
another, they wish to argue about. 
Arguing is reflected in the relevance in 
saying something new about something old 
(kept the same in (28)). It is reflected in 
the form of a description where two remain 
distinct (38), in which the second D 
remains the same. It is reflected where, in 
co-operation, one minimally finds his 
beginning in the beginning proposed by an. 
other. 
It is thus only the possibility of a 
doubt, concerning such sameness, which 
distinguishes arguing from construction and 
communication. Only in a doubt concerning 
the sameness of descriptions, can the need 
to distinguish a thing, as a thing, arise. 
Such a doubt can arise only in a 
description concerning the sameness of 
descriptions. Thus, a thing can only be 
distinguished, as a thing, in a description 
concerning the sameness of descriptions. 
Where the observer discerns a pattern in 
random manifestations of his descriptive 
activities, he (implicitly) discerns a 
sameness between descriptions. However, the 
observer, one, and an other, cannot make 
(explicit) descriptions concerning the 
sameness of descriptions. To say that a 
thing is only distinguished, as a thing, 
where it needs to be known, accepted, or 
assumed, to be one and the same thing, is 
to say that a thing is only distinguished, 
as a thing, where this distinction is 
relevant. Where one accepts what the other 
says or does, the description proposed by 
the one, and the description accepted by 
the other, are accepted as being the same. 
Where, what is acceted is the complement of 
what is questioned, what is relevant is 
questioned (what is questioned is 
relevant), and what is accepted cannot be 
relevant. In being accepted, the sameness 
between descriptions is deemed irrelevant. 
The need to distinguish a thing, as a 
thing, cannot arise where this distinction 
cannot be relevant. 
To distinguish a thing as a thing, one, 
or an other, thus needs to question what he 
accepts. A description cannot at once be 
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accepted and questioned. In questioning the 
sameness of descriptions, this sameness can 
no longer be accepted. A thing is 
distinguished in the-sameness of 
descriptions. For such a distinction to be 
relevant, the descriptions, in the sameness 
of which the thing is distinguished, cannot 
be accepted as being the same. - 
Wherever one, or an other, encounters a 
difficulty in accepting what he accepted as 
being the same, he can question the 
sameness of two descriptions. In view of. 
such a difficulty, a distinction between 
two descriptions which he accpted as being 
the same, becomes relevant. -Thus a thing is 
distinguished where a doubt concerning the 
sameness, of what had boon accepted, is 
removed. 
Where a doubt arises concerning the 
sameness of what is accepted, the need to 
distinguish a thing arises in the need to 
accept acceptance. A thing is 
distinguished, as a thing, where acceptance 
is distinguished so as to be explicitly 
accepted, i. e. negotiated. A thing is 
accepted as a thing distinguished, where 
acceptance negotiated is accepted (in an 
agreement). In the process, the act of 
acceptance is embedded in a description. 
Where acceptance negotiated is accepted, 
-a thing distinguished is no longer 
questioned. Where, once distinguished, the 
distinction by which a thing was 
distinguished is no longer questioned, the 
form of interpretation is reflected in form 
of the acceptance of the thing. Thus, the 
event of interpretation appears similarly 
embedded in a description. 
In distinguishing and speaking about 
things, one and an other begin to 
distinguish a language as an IT. A language 
as an it is distinguished, by one and 
another, with regard to the particular 
things the distinction of which became 
relevant, to one and/or the other. A 
language as an it is distinguished where 
one or an other need to accept acceptance. 
Any language, distinguished as an it, is 
distinguished in a particular (set of) 
thing(s), and hence must be a particular 
language, the distinction of which is, or 
was, relevant to one or the other. 
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DISTINCTIONS AND DOUBTS 
(OR THE FORM OF SPEAKING) 
The coincidence of distinction% made, and 
questions raised, arises-in the 
complementarity, and determines the form of 
speaking. The need to accept acceptance, 
and distinguish things as things, arises in 
the form of speaking. Thus, what is spoken 
about is reified in the form of speaking. 
Where one begins in an other's 
beginning, the overt description accepted 
as being the same is, accepted in the form 
of the second D. Thus, the second D, in the 
form of a description where two remain 
distinct, appears to be a description in 
which a thing is distinguished. Where one 
and an other minimally co-operate, the 
second D is a description taken to remain 
the same, and can thus formally (and quite 
regardless of its content) be taken as a 
description concerning the sameness of 
descriptions. As such, it can be taken as a 
description concerning (and hence - 
questioning) such sameness, while at the 
same time accepting such sameness. 
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TIME EMBEDDED 
However, the second D does not arise in 
distinguishing a thing. The saneness 
'asserted', and accepted, in the form of 
the second D arises in a processl the 
pr tutrrº ºu woo ººto 4wiu tlrodr liºI. tirylniiIsoiJ I,, 
a bey t nn º mj l .r ul. uf. ed by wn ut her . 
LIMA I AF I Y. tilde fur a ul a drat. r Apt Soils 
wlsarw A. WOO VWMAIit ill lot lOIL l( iii), rrtrra. tiº r 
proLws. % In whtt. lº the settwºd D it. tentpur rl 1y 
giattnr_t from the third and forth-D. Wlthlt, 
thla prot wus the aecund D cannot "eaae, t'. 
ruLh t: rmene5s overtly. It itb temporally 
linked to the third and furtll D, in the 
closure uvwr the second D end its 
reopening, to make the descrlptioºº 
involving the third and fourth D. 
In the event of cowwunlcatiaº, t1. r 
raºneººess 'asserted' arisen in the form of 
interpretation. In treating the second, and 
the third and fourth. D's as comprising urºe 
description, the second D becomes` a 
deºicription take., to be the same as (tie 
description accepted in the previously 
proposed beginning. By embedding the 
process, in which the second D was 
temporally distinct from the third and 
fourth D, within one description (i. e. the 
form of a description where two remain 
distinct), the second D becomes overtly 
'Assertive' of such reweness between 
descriptions. thus, the event of 
lnterpretattun only appears to be embedded 
in a dascription. It appears to be embedded 
to a drscrlptiwl where, by distinguishing 
things, one crud the other remove thwasrlvrr 
fraß) what they accepte lhry accept things 
as-one or as-an-other. 
(The diat1m tion by witclº e thtny la 
distinguished as a thing, is just the 
distinction made 111 speaking about the furm 
of a description where two remain distinct. 
210 
The extent to which thu prutess involved in 
this form is suppressed, in speaking about 
it, shows the reification involved in 
speaking; shows the coincidence between 
this particular act of speaking, and what 
is spoken about in this act. ) 
To speak about the form of descriptions 
where two remain distinct, it is necessary 
to distinguish, and hence reify, the 
process in which this form is 
distinguished. In co-operating, one and an 
other need to treat the three or four D's 
as one description, assuming the second D 
to remain the same from one instance to the 
next. In the process of communication (in 
the "I" of language), they need not embed 
this process within # description of this 
form. Their ability to treat descriptions 
as being of this foray arises in the very 
process (the stages in (37)) in which they 
are involved. Generating the time embedded 
in a description where two remain distinct, 
they cannot overtly embed this time in such 
a description. The form of a description 
where two remain distinct thus reflects the 
process in which the "I" of language 
accumulates time. Where, a description, of 
the form of a description where two remain 
distinct, is made, this process is embedded 
in the description. 
In the process of communication, in the 
"I" of language, the sameness between 
descriptions arises in the act of 
interpretation separating the second from 
the third and forth D. Formally, the second 
D thus only 'asserts' the sameness between, 
descriptions, in the embedding where it is 
expanded in the third and forth D. 
lernpur al 1 y, the swctmid D thus only 
'asserts' the saneness between 
deucriptions, in the repetition, in which 
two tonypurally distinct descriptionns arise 
where one and the other, remaining 
distinct, participate in this process. the 
escond D thus 'asserts' that temporally 
distinct descriptions are instances of one 
and the same description. The sameness 
between descriptions, in which things are 
distinguished, is cxily 'asserted' where 
descriptions are thus isolated from the 
processes. in which they are generated, 
negotiated, and interpreted. It, and hence 
things, arise as a consequence of embedding 
time it% the fur' of speaking. 
""0 
As lf 11 WEHE AliK I Ntl UI IE9 T1 UN8 
lu eebedd the time separating the secu#od 
fruw the third and forth D within a 
description, one and an other need to step 
out of the time accumulated by their we. 
Just as the observer needs to distinguish 
himself as an other, to step out of the 
time accumulated by his "1", one and an 
other need to distinguish themselves from 
their "I" of language, distinguishing in 
language as an it, to stop out of the time 
accumulated by their rover. 
In rpoakinq about a thing, one and an 
otharr accept it as-one and as an-other. In 
the consecutive stapes of (37), they remove 
tho. s"Iv. +a from their d. scrlptluns by 
adopting roles in wh)Ch they wake, and 
accept, dslcriptions. Makin{a and accepting 
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descriptions as one or an other, they 
eventually make and accept them as doers 
(shown as -2), sayers (=3), or in the role 
of distinguishing themselves as an/the 
other (al? ). In the process, they explore 
different aspects of the speech act they 
perform; exploring either what is said and 
done, or the rules in which this is 
accepted (shown on"the line nearest the 
"I"). Thus, they can in turn consider the 
relation between the "I" and the role in 
which they try to accept a description. 
-Thus, the second D also indicates the 
role in which one, and/or an other, 
accepted the previous description. In the} 
process of communication, the relation - 
between the role (in which one or the other 
has accepted a previous description), and 
the aspect of the speech act (described in 
the second D), is indicative of the 
particular act performed. In terms of the 
description intended to be accepted, the 
act (eg. of relating 'old' to 'new' 
descriptions) is indicative of the actor. 
Where the time, in which the second D is 
distinct from the third and forth D. 1s 
embedded in a description of the form of a 
description'where two remain distinct, the 
second D Can no longer thus be indicative 
of the act, and its actor. An act can 
neither be timeless nor saperated from its 
actor. Deprived of the time in which it 
exists as an act indicative of the actor 
who performed it, it is reified. 
In the process in which the second D is 
an act, the difficulty of at once 
questioning and accepting does not arises 
an act asserts itself, as an act. It does 
not question or doubt. Only in taking an 
act to be indicative of this or that, can 
it give rise to a question or doubt. In the 
process of communication, doubts are raised 
by one or an other, where they choose to 
take anact as indicative. It is-in a 
process-that one finds his beginning in an 
other's beginning, and, in turn, expands on 
the other's beginning, - as if he were 
expanding the second D in the third and 
fourth D. 
Where the time, in which an act (the 
second D) is an act, is embedded In a 
description, the reified act becomes 
indicative of this thing or that. In the 
form of speaking. the second D is 
distinguished as a thing, and expanded 
upon, or spoken about, in the third and 
fourth D. Thus, in the form of speaking, 
the third and fourth D do expand the second 
D. Thus a doubt is raised in the very form 
of speaking. (This is reflected in the 
reversal of saying and doing between one 
and an other, in which-an act can be taken 
as indicative. It is reflected in the 
directionality, of the form of a 
description where two remain distinct, 
where it corresponds to what is intended to 
be questioned. ) 
The form of speaking corresponds to the 
form In which the observer raises-a 
question. Just as the observer needs to- 
accept that he has made a description in 
order to`question it, a thing distinguished 
needs to be accepted in order to speak 
about it. In the form of speaking a thing 
is accepted in boing spoken about 
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(linguistic ontology). 
(41) 1=2a3>=17)... 
1=3=1? )=2)... 
D= D"'-ý L= D 
D'D 
D 
l_3_1? )=2)... 
D=D 
D 
1ý2y3)_IT)... ` 
The reification involved in speaking about 
a thing thus arises in the form of 
speaking. It is as if the doubt, raised in 
the form of speaking, were raised by the 
thing distinguished. It is as if the thing 
begins to wonder about itself. Where, in 
the next description, the third or forth D 
is expanded, 
D 
1_3-M-2)... DAD ) 
['DD 
D= D 
D 
! _2=3)_1T)... 
it is as if it were asking questions. 
09a 
ONE THING AT A TIME 
The form of speaking about a thing reflects 
the form of interpretation. Where two 
remain distinct, the symmetry of the 
description, intended to be accepted, 
arises in that it is taken as a description 
in an act of interpretation. The asymmetry, 
of a description in the form of speaking. 
arises in that it is made in one instant of 
time. In the prior instant, all 
distinctions collapsed in the fore of 
interpretation. As i result the first D 
must remain covert. In the next instant, 
all distinctions collapse in the form of 
interpretation. A description is timeless. 
Without time the second D, in the form of 
speaking, cannot be indicative of the act 
or the actor. The need to repeat distinct 
instances, of the same description, arises 
in the timelessness of a description. In 
time, it will be interpreted and collapse 
with all distinctions in the form of 
interpretation. 
The need to distinguish a thing, as a 
thing, and the reification in speaking 
about a thing, arise in the a-temporality 
of descriptions. In the coaplswantarity 
between description and interpretation, the 
nssg to distinguish a thing arises in the 
nee to exclude time and the act of 
interpretation, - to make a descriptions to 
may soi. ethinUS to say one thing rather than 
another. 
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In the processes of construction and/or 
communication, the single depth of 
interpretation allows the second D to be 
taken as indicative of an act, and of the 
role in which the act was performed. One, 
and/or an other, distinguish, speak about, 
and embed, a thing in a description in this 
role. What can be said about a thing is 
bounded by the role adopted in 
distinguishing it. i. e. by the particular 
intentions with which it was distinguished. 
To change these intentions, one , and/or an 
other, need to move on in time to interpret 
their description of the thing, 'and thus 
obliterate its distinction. 
In distinguishing a thing, `one, and/or 
an other, can step out of their time, and 
take 'time' to consider a thing, to explore 
a role with one intention rather than an 
other. In embedding time in a description, 
one, and/or an other, can take 'time' to 
consider one thing, rather than another. In 
appearing to raise and ask questions, a 
thing distinguished thus simply reflects 
the intentionality with which they explore 
a construction; the intentionality with 
which they unfold the time accumulated by 
the "I" of language. In speaking about a 
thing, they expore their construction in 
terms of that particular intention or 
thing. 
The single depth of interpretation is 
reflected in the form of speaking, in that 
one, and/or an other, can only consider one 
thing at a time. Only by considering one 
thing at a time, exporing one intention, 
can they speak about a thing, and accept 
the distinction by which they distinguish 
it. In considering one thing at the time 
they can explore and compare their 
constructions in an argumentative manner. 
It is in accepting a distinction that a 
doubt is raised in the form of speaking. 
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WORLDS OF TIIINUS IN THEIR TIMES 
Where two distinguish a thing and embed 
time in a description, they distinguish 
themselves in a role. In turn, in making 
and accepting different distinctions, they 
embed their "I's" in such roles. Embedding 
their "I's" in roles, accepting a thing in 
this role or that, they remove themselves 
from their descriptions (37). 
Due to the single depth of 
interpretation, the role in which a thing 
is distinguished is prior to, and distinct 
from, the role in which it is accepted. In 
accepting a thing, the role in which it was 
distinguished merges with all prior roles. 
In distinguishing things, the "I" 
accumulates roles, distinct from the role 
in which what may be said about a thing is 
accepted. It is thus, in accepting what one 
says about a thing, that he can distinguish 
himself as an other. 
Every description where two remain 
distinct proposes a beginning. Every 
description made in the form of speaking 
distinguishes one thing. Where the role, in 
which a thing is distiguished, is distinct 
from the role in which it is accepted, the 
self-system closed in accepting it, does 
not merge with the "I". In the role of the 
"I", the single depth of interpretation 
thus allows one, and/or an other, to 
distinguish a number of things. 
Wherw thw role, in which one and/or an 
other distinguish one thing and an other, 
remains the same, the things thus 
distinguished are distinguished within one 
(aspect of the) speech act, and with one 
intention. One, and/or an other, can only 
speak about one thing at the time. Things 
distinguished within one speech act must 
thus in some sense be the same. To speak of 
things distinguished within one speech act 
is to speak of ens world of things in a 
time. 
A world of things in a time is a 
construction, constructed by one, and/or an 
other, in the role in which they accept 
what is said, about one thing or another. A 
world of things in a time is constructed in 
a process embedded within one speech act. 
From the point of view of a role, a world 
of things in a time accumulates the time in 
which it is constructed. It accumulates 
this time in the same way as, and in one 
instant of, the time accumulated by the 
"I", the "we", or the "I" of language, i. e. 
(42.1) 'I'DO, 
(-3-17) D 
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A world of things in a tim. is one 
world, just as the obs. rv. r's construction 
2ß0 
is one construction. It is a world of 
things distinguished in the distinction in 
which one, and/or an other's, "I" remains 
distinct from this world. It is one world, 
in being embedded within one instant. It is 
distinct, in being constructed within one 
distinction. In the form of interpretation, 
in which this distinction is obliterated, 
the one world collapses. Where one, and/or 
the other (in the role in which they 
distinguished it), interpret a world of 
things in a time, it collapses with all 
previous distinctions, i. e. 
(42.2) 
.. IN 
L M2 ~J) sI f) DZ, ý D, 
The oneness or coherence of a world of 
things in a time reflects the form of 
interpretation. The single distinction 
distinguishing a world of things in a time 
reflects the single depth of 
interpretation. Each thing in a world is 
distinguished, as a thing, in terms of this 
one distinction. However-many things are 
distinguished in a world, they are all 
distinguished within one speech act, from 
one point of view, and in terms of this one 
distinction. From the point of view of the 
role in which the a world of things is 
distinguished in a time, any one thing is 
as any other. Timeless, things cannot be 
structured. A world of things in a time 
cannot have a form, i. e. 
(42.3) 
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Things are structured in the process of 
constructing a world of things in a time. 
They are structured in the time generated 
in constructing that world. In the role in 
which what is said about things in a world 
is accepted, this time cannot be 
distinguished. The way in which things are 
structured in it, cannot be spoken about. To 
speak about the construction of a world of 
things in a time is to interpret it, and 
hence to obliterate the distinction by 
which the world of things in a time is 
distinguished. The absence of structure, in 
a world of things in a time, arises in the 
absence of an act of interpretation. It 
arises in the absence of the time in which 
a structure could be grasped. It reflects 
the bounds, within which a world of things 
is distinguished, and embedded in one act 
of descriptionp in one instant of time. 
282 
'u"h 
One, and/or an other, can in turn take 
the relation between a role distinguished, 
and the role accumulating a 
description. In so doing, they further 
remove themselves from their descriptions. 
They embed the roles, in which-they accept 
what is said about things in a world, 
within the role in which they distinguished 
this world, i. e. 
(42.4) 
=2 l"2=3)"I? )... 
s=3ýf? )"2)... 
D=D 
ll 
They embed the time, in which they would 
otherwise move on, to interpret and 
obliterate the distinction distinguishing 
the world of things. They can speak about a 
world of things in a time by treating it as 
a thing. They can speak about the role in 
which they accept what is said about things 
in a world by treating themselves as an 
other. , 
Thus embedding roles within a role, they 
appear to move on in time. In speaking 
about a world they appear to interpret this 
world. They appear to speak about the 
structure there may be between the things 
distinguished in a world. They appear to 
embed talk of such structure within, the 
descriptions in which they speak about 
things. Embedding roles within a role, they 
only appear to move on to interpret, as, 
there can be no time within a description. 
What structure they speak of can arise only 
in terms of an apparent interpretation. 
Such apparent interpretation arises 
where the doubt raised in the form of 
speaking appears to be addressed in 
embeding roles within a role. To address 
the doubt raised in speaking about a thing, 
one, and/or an other, need time. One, 
and/or an other, need to switch (=/-/s) in 
their treatment of the distinction in 
asking a question. Where all things 
distinguished within a world, are 
distinguished in terms of one distinction, 
such switching is excluded. In a world of 
things in a time, any switch in the 
treatment of a distinction, entails a 
corresponding switch in the treatment of 
the distinction by which the world is 
distinguished. It entails, a corresponding 
switch between the role in which one, ' 
and/or an other, distinguish a world,,, and 
the role in which they accept what is said 
about things in this world. It is, thus, in 
switching between roles, that one, and/or 
an other, distinguish and embed roles 
within a role. 
The complementarity between description 
and interpretation is thus reflected in a 
duality of embeddings. Where time is 
embedded within descriptions, one, and/or 
an other, need to embedd roles within 
roles, removing their "I's" further and 
further from what they speak about. 
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Proceeding thus they remove themselves 
further and further from the worlds they 
speak about. The time they embedded in such 
descriptions manifests itself as levels 
distinguishing things from what is said 
about them; distinguishing relations from 
things related; levels which separate a 
thing from what could in time be said about 
it; distinguishing a thing from what it 
appears to be indicative of. 
Levels thus arise in speaking about a 
thing. They arise in the distinction by 
which a thing is distinguished. They 
distinguish the roles one, and/or an other, 
adopt in speaking about a thing, or about a 
world of things in a time. They arise in 
that a world of things is maintained with 
one intention, within one act, in one time. 
Levels and the worlds they distinguish 
collapse in the act of interpretation. They 
arise in tha ability to switch between one 
role and another, and thus reflect the 
single depth of interpretation. One, and/or 
an other, move on in time, a world (of 
worlds) at a time, closing their 
self-system over a world of (worlds of) " 
things at a time. Opening another, they 
move on, from world to world, moving 
between worlds of things in their times. 
2sa 
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LANGUAGES AS ITS , 
Levels in a world of things reflect the 
form of speaking. Levels are related in 
speaking on one level abtut. a thing 
distinguished on another. Levels are 
distinguished in the form of speaking about 
a thing. Levels distinguishing the roles in 
which one, and/or an other, distinguish and 
accept the thing spoken about, reflect the 
complementarity between description and 
interpretation. Levels distinguishing the 
roles in which one, and/or an other, speak 
about a thing or a world of things, 
reflect the complementarity between saying 
and doing. 
In the form of speaking, what is said 
appears to expand what it is said aboutp 
the third and forth D appear to expand the 
second D. This appearance arises in the 
reversal of saying and doing between one 
role and an other (rather than between one 
observer and an other). What is said on one 
level thus appears to make explicit what is 
distinguished on the other. What is said 
one level, appears to make explicit how the 
thing distinguished on the other level is 
indicative. 
Thus, any one level in a world of things 
can be considered indicative of the things 
distinguished on an other level. A language 
is distinguished as a thing, where one, 
level in a world of things Is considered 
indicative of things distinguished on 
_ as wtlsasr 1uvr1. lip dtslrrnsju1 tºIny a 
l anyuaye, the une l rrvul is in turn 
co, sstºtercil as 1ºsdicatlvs of thlnys 
dl%. t 11ºyuºstied Lift another level. But. h Ievel 
may be i tlernt ttl ed as, the domain of the 
lanyuayie ii). sw level), the language (another 
level), and ltr lnterprrrtative structure 
tanuthmr level). (hay are timeless 
reflrctlun5 u1 the sprrclº act. and the "I" 
of Ianquaye. In apvaktrºy about a language 
a+. a t1ºlny, suclº cdrntificatlc. n, may in 
turn require another language, and so on 
and tie forth. 
Witlºlrº a world uf, -thlny%. and 
bounded by 
Ilse tlttitinctttxº dii. tingulshirºg this world, 
uric, and/or an uther, can choose to explore 
hlerachy of languages. buch a hlwrachy is 
bounded by the tntentltxº with which one, 
and/ur an uther. , distinguish, and 
drrttnysºteh thems. r+lveti from, this world of 
ttºlnys. In ex; ºluring such a h/earthy of 
l rrºyuages, env, and/ur an Lit her , remain 
within the inim Act, and the one instant of 
time, lei which they distinguished the world 
of things.; bounded by, and exploring, a 
single Act of speaking. 
What As explured An a Iºlerat. hy of 
languages rs the form of speaking. It is 
the form of speaking, which presses on to 
address the doubt raised in speaking about 
r thing. There it no distinction between a 
language and what is-said in it, except 
where and while such a distinction is made. 
Any level may be identified as either a 
language or a world of things irr a time, 
And all things /levels. and languages) 
tlit. tinguished, merge Indistinguishably an 
the art of interpretation. Beyond things, 
21U 
there is the process in which the "1" of 
language accumulates time. 
For there to be a distinction within a 
world, between a language and the things it 
is used to speak about, there must be time. 
There must be time to accomodate the use of 
a language. There must be time to 
construct, accept, and use, a language. 
One, and/or an other, may construct 
languages within one world. The may 
communicate and accept such languages, and 
in turn use them. In the process they 
embedd a "we" in a role, as another thing, 
within a world of things. 
(42.7) 
.ýI uD u °tiý uýu 
(I, IIý il°! II D 
From the point of view of the role 
accumulating "I", there can, at any level 
of such embedding, be no distinction 
between things (i. e. 42.3). Hence there can 
be no distinction between, a language as a 
thing, a "we" in a role, and the things 
spoken about using a language as a thing. 
(4 S) ý. ý 
Lz 
t i) 
Collll(s- 
/ CýIllýo- 
(ODIKr 
Where these things can in turn be spoken 
about, the doubts, raised in distinguishing 
then, can in turn be addressed, and give 
rise to further levels within the world of 
things, 
(42.9) 
r 
. r- `Do D" 
in which more languages can be identified, 
and so on and on. 
292, 
xr 
Agreement (261) 
Speaking of an agreement (Pask 1975a, be 
1976,1980) or a consensual domain 
(Mattirana, 19HO), and more generally any 
talk of a consensus, involves a twofold 
need to be explicits M 'To establish the 
concept two come to share in an agreement, 
they need to speak about this (in Pask's 
formalism. In terms of other, similarly" 
established, concepts) and (ii) To speak 
of an agreement (and more notobly to 
establish an agreement to disagree (Laing, 
Philipson and Lee, 1966)) they need to 
acknowledge such agreement. This applies 
to discourse in psychology (eg. Pack 
considers an agreement to be the only sharp 
valued measurement in psychology), where 
the psychologist identifies an agreement 
(ii), and in order to do so requires the 
participants to make explicit or 
operationally establish what they share 
(i). Similarly, it applies to discourse in 
linguistics, and in particular to semantic 
representation, "eg. the identification of 
meanings established by participants in a 
conversation (Pedretti, 1978/BO, 1979b). 
However, this does not (in general) 
apply to language or ordinary discourse, in 
which understanding is to be found In the 
complement to such explicitness; even where 
acceptance negotiated is accepted, the 
negotiation only concerns the acceptance 
(corresponding to (ii) above) and hence 
this does not, as a rule, involve a 
decomposition of the thing distinguished in 
terms of other things (but rather the 
distinction of that one thing). Where the 
descriptive predicament of having to be 
explicit is applied to language and the 
linguistic domain is identified as a domain 
of agreements or consensual descriptions. a 
language is identified as a thing, 
precluding a theory of communication (von 
Foerster, 1972), if not precluding 
communication itself (due to an intolerable 
wasting of time"). In this connection I 
would like to thank Heinz von Foerster for 
'requesting' the substitution of "do not" 
for "agree not to" in "The terms in which a 
thing is 'explained' are terms we agree not 
to question. " (Pedretti, 1980). - Perhaps, 
my perplexity when I found myself answering 
"I agree... " explains the mistakes I do! 
Alive 4105) 
Var. la, Maturana and Urib" (1974). 
Ambiguity (21,147) 
Ambiguity arises with regard to a 
description or descriptive framework (see 
'ambiguous'). In this connection it is 
important to distinguish indeterminacy 
(where there is no way of knowing) from 
ambiguity (where we don't know which of a 
known set of options). Similarly, wo may, 
SPEAK of an ambiguity with regard to the 
continuity in form between descriptions. 
But, such an ambiguity only arises where we 
consider (in another description) how a 
description is or could be treated. Hence 
an ambiguity arises only where such another 
description becomes relevant to someone or 
other. However, since a description must be 
relevant to be made (and treated as such 
(is Irelevant)), such 'another d. icription is 
(in most cases) not relevant (to the one 
making a description or the one treating it 
2 
, as such). 
Ambiguous (BO) 
A description can only be deemed 
ambiguous with regard to the descriptive 
framework, in which its possible 
interpretations are specified; it is thus 
considered to be ambiguous by analogy to 
other descriptions, which it may resemble, 
but from which it is distinct. Hence the 
"ambiguity" does not arise in the 
description, but in the analogy, mg. in the 
descriptive framework in which certain 
descriptions are considered to be the some. 
(see also 'ambiguity'). But while ambiguity 
arises in a descriptive framework leg. a 
grammar, or a semantic representation),, 
such descriptive frameworks are often 
justified in terms of the need to account 
for ambiguity! tog. . the explanation of 
ambiguity is an essential task of a 
semantic theory ... " (Kempson, 1977); or 
.. the listener will interpret it 
immediately in a unique way, and will fail 
to detect the ambiguity. ... Nevertheless, 
his intuitive knowledge of the language is 
clearly such that both interpretations 
(... ) are assigned to the sentence by the 
grammar he has internalized in some form. " 
(Chomsky, 1963). ) 
Analytic (63) 
I do not wish to distinguish a 
complementarity between analytic and 
synthetic descriptions from the 
complementarity between description and 
interpretation{ the intricacies of speaking 
about analysis, analytic, analytic truth 
and the like, being, I hope, illuminated, 
rather than obscured by the removal of this 
excessive distinction. I use the terms 
relativiely, and in conection with the 
complementarity between description and 
interpretation, - in that 'descriptions' 
support the analytic by excluding 
interpretation. (to quote but the bones of 
a passage (I have quoted before (1976/80)). 
".. to ask, 'Is the judgement "x is y" 
analytic or synthetic? ' .. WOULD be the 
merest common sense IF 'meanings' were 
things in some ordinary sense which 
contained parts in some. ordinary sense. But 
they are NOT. " Austin (1970)). 
Any (143) 
The observer's ability to grasp himself 
in a, and any, pair of P's, i. e. In the 
form in which he grasps himself, coincides 
with what we can speak about, i. e. the form 
a, and any, description has, by virtue of 
which it is a description (and thus the 
difficulty lies in distinguishing himself, 
- as a particular and distinct observer). 
The exclusion of unfolding, of a, and any, 
distinction (compare Pask (1977/81), 
suggests that the form of grasping (the 
form of interpretation), complementary to 
the form of distinction (Spencer-Brown, 
1969), is, to say the least, similarly 
fundamental. 
This suggests that, an a-any 
(instantenous) grasping of a form and an 
a-(sows)-all 'process of grasping' a form. 
. can 
be considered as complimentary. The two 
may in some respects come to one, and (one 
involving distinctions) may be difficult to 
distinguish, but, they, j%t surely differ 
in attitud. i what is grasped in an a-any 
manner, is grasped in the form of 
acceptance (i. e. the ontological aspect of 
the complementarity (von ßlasersfeld, 
1980)), while what may be grasped in an 
a-(some)-all process, is - or would be - 
grasped-in the form of an agreement between 
descriptions distinguished (i. e. the 
epistemological aspect of the 
complementarity). The difference In 
attitute may be more or less successfully 
described in terms of (more or less) 
open-mindedness about what is grasped 
(being accepted or known) (given the same 
degree of 'ontological security'). The 
reification in generalising, however, would 
appear to arise only in to the latter case, 
- at least as long as what is grasped in 
the former is not in turn spoken about.. 
Applying (21) 
the notion of application implies a 
distinction between what is applied and 
that to which it is applied. Such 
distinctness characterises artefacts and 
tools: just as a hammar Is distinguished 
from the nail to which it is 'applied', 
description(building abilities are 
distinguished from the description- 
(building rbilitie)4 to which they are 
applied (using one to describe the other). 
Where thus a tool, method, intruction, or 
rule is distinguished from that to which it 
IS applied, this distinction remains 
dependendent on the particular intention 
with which it is distinguished. Beyond the 
particular intentions for distinguishing 
them, the two remain complementary (see 
also "On the function and existence of 
language"). This is often overlooked or 
forgotten, giving rise to the excessive 
distinctions which permiate our conceptions 
of language (eg. Bergstein's (1974) 
application (! ). of the discussion of 
complementarity in physics to ordinary 
language). Beyond particular constructions, 
the coincidence and continuity between 
descriptions of our description(building 
abilities (von Foerster, 1973a) way thus 
be sought under the motto "Against 
Application"r for the "reality" In the 
coincidence of the described and describing 
(the Instructions and the instructed, the 
rules and the ruled, the saying and the 
doing)! (A motto, intended to put off the 
sales-wen of opportunist instrumentalism 
and false promises. ) 
Artofacts (145) 
I include 'artefacts' in an attempt to 
counteract the restriction of our 
description building activities to such 
things as 'propositions' and 'senstences' 
which arises with the pre-occupation with 
truth and reference and the thereby assumed 
distinction between language and 'the 
world'; -a pre-occupation which might be 
considered obsessive, In having rendered-it 
necessary to point out that we do, for 
instance, make statements (rather than 
'senstences') (Strawson, 1930), or give 
commands (Rascher, 19661 more often than 
'propositions' (see also 'say/do' and 
'speech act'); what 'meaning' I still 
associate with the notion of 'meaning', t 
owe to Peter Mar. nghi, a bricklayer, who 
warned we "It wasn', t meant for that! " 
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observing the limitations in a ladder (I 
had made...? )! (see also 'design' and 
'artificial') 
Artificial (71,106) 
Like 'artefact', I use 'artificial' in 
the general sense of made (or created (and 
hence 'art')) drawing attention to the 
making. In our endeavour to construct, 
making is, of course a. if not the, natural 
activity, and hence possible negative 
connotations of 'artificial' arise in 
mistaking as opposite what is 
complementary. In this, as in so many other 
connections (if indeed they are distinct), 
I am indebted to Lars Loefgren, for pointing 
out my carelessness in drawing (artificial) 
distinctions for the sake of deliniatinq 
what I wanted to speak about; what, from 
his comments I learned that I could not. 
Attention (83) 
Kallikourdis (1981) discusses "a process 
which creates the Identity of the object of 
attention". 
Black box (27) 
In terms of a distinction between first 
and second-order cybernetics, Glanville 
(eq. 1979b, 1960) provides the grounds for 
distinguishing an explicidly second order 
discussion of the black box. But the 
distinction between first and second order 
discussions of the black box is difficult 
to draw, and such labelling may amount to 
no more than saying 'more explicit' or 
more recent', eq. von Glasersfeld (1980), 
can be considered as a second order 
discussion of the black box, as much as, it 
is a second, order discussion of feed back; 
and the notion of the black box in, eq. 
Jones (1970/81) corresponds to that of a 
second-order discussion. The difficulty is 
twofold. Firstly, the second-order 
discussion of black boxes can be considered 
as the (a more silent) complement of the 
second-order discussion of distinctions 
(see 'distinctions'). Secondly, (see 
"Paradigm and the Black Box") such 
second-order observations, are by no means 
absent in early Introductory texts (eg. 
Asby, 1936, Pask, 1961). They are implicit, 
and made explicit, in the very notion of 
the black box. (In this context, it may or 
may not be necessary to point out that I 
use and discuss the black box in a 
linguistic (description buiding) context. ) 
.. and what about the Little Prince, then? 
(eq. St. Exupery, 1943). 
Change (B3) 
eq. phenomena discussed in Lakatos and 
Musgrave (1970), fall within the 010 of 
language and arise in the forms I discuss 
with regard to the use of complewentarity 
between saying and doing in such 
developeiaent, see de Zeeuw (1979b, c, and 
1980). 
Closure (20) 
(see also 'self -reference') Recent 
*cybernetic* discussion on closure can be 
see as eq. beginning with the autopoletic 
characterization of the living organisation 
(Varela, haturana and Uribe, 1974), arising 
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in the context ut the work carried out the,. 
6CL (von Foerster, Ashby, Maturana, 
Guenther, Pask, Loefgren and many more, see 
BCL Fiches); task's (1968,73a, b, 76) 
notion of 'organisational closure' of a 
coherent domain (as a whole), and the local 
closure ('local cyclicity') over the 
production and reprocuctiun of concepts 
(and topics) in this domains Varela's 
(1975) extension of Spencer Brown's 11969) 
calculus, with the form of self-indication 
(self-reference), developed tp an 
arithaatic of closure (Varela 119761, 
Bougen and Varela 419/8)) and to the 
one-sidedness of distinctions (Glanville 
and Varela (1980)); and the complement 
'openness' (eq. Pask's (&g. 1977/81) 
'informational openeness', and Bratsn's, 
'dualities' or 'multiple views' 
complementing 'meaning tightness',. (ep. 
Braten (1980). and Braten, Jahren and Jansen 
(1978)). In this connection. I use gone' or 
'oneness' for the whole, in the severance 
of which (distinction), complementary 
aspects are percieved, and which itself, 
percieved as one, is (has an existence) 
complementary to thus being severed. 
Cohvr ince (136) 
Coherence, as a cusnplewnt to 
distinctness, aris& in grasping (i. e. the 
form of interpretation) and may be 
paraphrased as the wie and the sameness In 
which a pattern is grasped. See 'closure', 
and in particular f'ask for the treats. net 
of coherence in terms of organisational 
closure. 
Coincidence 463,66,70,89) 
Perhaps the difficulty with the notion 
of 'coincidence' only arises in the need to 
distinguish what coincides (Glanville, 
1977/81). and as such is a difficulty only 
in being spoken about (eg. rather than 
being different, the same needs to be 
treated as different in speaking). 
This is reflected in the circumstance 
that the coincidence of 'the language' with 
'the meta-language' presents no difficulty, 
but for our 'descriptive' activities (eg. 
Pack (1968). Loefgren (loW 549) Pack (IoM 
550)), to which. In continuity between 
descriptions (von Foerster (1976), lt is 
rather essential (Pedretti, 1980). The 
difficulty similarly arises where in 
speaking (eg. the notion of 'description') 
a distinction (or "sharp separation, Bohr 
(1949)) between the described and the 
describing (the measuring instruments and 
what is measured) is required, but not 
possible. 
As such, the notion of coincidence 
becomes central to 'methodological' (see 
also 'applying') considerations in the 
description of our deucriptive activities,, 
and needs, allas, to be spoken about, 
despite the initial difficulty (the only 
alternative being to adapt our curiosities 
to what can be spoken about, - in which 
case, of course, we adopt an ontology in 
which 'the same' 19 'different'). 
Here it is necessary to underline that a 
'methodological' criterion of coincidence 
ti (eg. de Zeeuw, 1980), coincides with the 
criterion of Coincidence used in the 
processes, the description of which 
requires me to speak of such 'method's 
to 
what I say, concerns my 'method' as much as 
it concerns these processes. 
For instance, beyond "shoulds", my 
integrity is judged in terms of the 
coincidence between what I may and what I 
do, be it in what I say in doing (or do in 
saying), be it in what I say here and do 
there, or be it in what I do and may on one 
occasion and on any other. 
Thus, a 'methodological' criterion of 
coincidence (for the description of our 
descriptive activities) has a, 'pragmatic' 
plausability, where it is unavoidable, 
being a basic (not to say 'the natural') 
criterion in our judgements and attempts to 
make sense. 
It may have a 'psychological' 
plausabiltiy (which under the requirements 
of 'description' might have been deemed a 
weakness) both in the coincidence of 
'man-as-scientist' (Kelly, 1933/63) and In 
the resemblance of this criterion with an 
apparent psychological requirement (the 
endeavour to construct a coherent picture) 
which lead to phenomenon of "dissonance' 
(Festinger, 1972) and the need for 
assimilations' and "accoaodatians' 
(Piaget, 1972). 
Similarly, it may have an 
'epistemological' plausability 4. Rut), 
where in each of 'these' plausabillties, we 
distinguish a particular aspect of our 
description building abilities, we use our 
description building abilities. In the 
inevitability of so doing (van Foerster, 
1972,1973a) it formally imposes itself las 
an epistemology, perhaps)s bound to 
describe, it is only in describing 
description. that there can be some 
confidence about what form we discern. i 
Consider for example 
... 4. Determine 
if the components that 
constitute the boundaries of the unity 
constitute these boundaries through 
preferential neighborhood relations and 
interactions between themselves, as ' 
determined by their properties in the space 
of their interactions. If this is not the 
case, you do not have an autopoietlc unity 
because you are determining its boundaries, 
not the unity itself. ... " (Varela, 
Maturana and Urlbe, 1974) 
I an not here concerned with the 
resolution of the doubt, but only with the 
possibility that it can arises The piece of 
confidence I have in mind arises in the 
circumastance that no such doubt can arise 
where the form I give rise to in describing 
and the form I describe (i. e. the fore I 
give rise to in describing), coincide. 
Beyond the suggestion, that it is 
(anchored) in this piece of confidence that 
the construction of a language can coincide 
with the construction of the world 
described (as it does in design (Jones, 
1970/81)), that the communication of the 
language can coincide with (the perception 
of) what is communicated leg. compare Bohm, 
1969). and that we can have confidence in 
the distinctness of things we distinguish, 
(imposing itself as an ontology, perhaps), 
I can only underline (Pedretti, 1990) that, 
however this may be, these processes do 
Coincide where the language is the 
seta-language. 
A final point concerns the locus of such 
coinidence in grasping a one and any) 
speech acts obtruse as the special concern 
1 
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with the coincidence of 'the form I give 
rise to in describing and the form I 
describe (i. e. the form I give rase to in 
describing)' may be, it is but a special 
case of the possibility of a coincidence 
between what I do (eq. describe) and what I 
say or address (eg. description)l a special 
case of the possibility of the 
"self-indicativeness" of the speech act 
(compare eg. Varela (1973) who describes 
this as ".. being self-indicative in a 
given domain, in standing out , of a 
background by their own means, in being 
AUTONOMOUS... "). In this sense, the 
coincidence between aspects 
(distinguished! ) of any speech act implies 
closure, and in such closure, 
indicativeness within any one act. 
Where it is absent, it is in terms of 
the possibility of such coincidence, that 
doubts or questions can be raised (in an 
endeavour to establish coincidence). Where 
indicativeness is thus established within, 
(what in so doing is treated as) one speech 
act, (resulting in more or less confidence 
in anything from the form of descriptions 
to, eg., a politicians promises), my 
curiosity has been one in which the 
coincidence between what I say and what I 
do should be apparent 'throughout, -I hope 
not too repetitiously so. 
Cowpl. m. ntarity (U7,144) 
The notion of the complewentarity 
between description and interpretation, as 
well as the developement from Bohr's (eq. 
1949) view of coopleeentarity as exclusive 
to a productive and generative notion of 
complementarity I owe to Loefgren (eg. 
1978,1980). (see also 'closure' 
'coincidence' and 'time'). I am indebted to 
Stefan Rozental for his attempt to 
introduce we to the intricacies of the 
notion of cooplenentarlty in physics, and I 
would like to thank Lars Loefgren for the 
many inspiring discussions on this topic, 
and the many challenging questions, about 
most of which I will long remain wondering. 
Amongst these, a question, whether there 1s 
or can be more than one cowplesentarity, 
stands out in my mind. While I fail to 
grasp it, I suspect much of what I wrote 
must have been in an attempt to do so... 
However, this is not to suggest that they 
agree with what I have done with what they 
tried to convey (when, at a stage In Its 
developement, this threatened to become a 
thesis on cowple entarity, I decided that 
this was beyond the scope of this thesis). 
Construction (131) 
*we 'coincidence' and "splstswology' 
Cybernetics of Cybernetics (19) 
was von Foerster ! Ed) 41974) 4s. also 
, 'second order cybornotics', 'c osur. ', 'self-r. forence' 
Cyclic Relations (141) 
The form of *local Cyclicity' in the 
stable production and reproduction of 
concepts. It due to Past. (ep. 19613/73, 
1975a, b, 1976), and corresponds In form to 
the schemes developed by Locker fog. In 
(1970a) viz the 'overall triadic relations 
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between the dyadic relations amongst 
domains" of cognition, conversation and 
self-reference{ either of which domain Is 
, in turn seen as such a cyclic relations, 
between system, observer and designer) 
speaker, hearer and theme; respectively 
between "'self 11 looking on 'self 2', 
looking on 'self 3'" fay translation) and 
similarly In Locker (1979) viz. designer, 
system and observer, viz. syrte., observer 
and model= and viz. system, model and 
'simulation). Similar forms arise in the 
"Diagramatic Evocation of a Hierachy of 
System Levels" in Saugen L Varela 11978), 
(sew also 'ideograms' and 'examples'). 
'Descriptions' (84) 
In the first instance, the quotas are an 
arbitrary notational device for 
distinguishing 'descriptions' the 
'interpretation' of which is determined, 
from descriptions which may in time be 
interpreted. (Similarly arbitrary quotes 
are used to distinguish 'descriptions' in 
which indeterminacy is removed in 
coincidence. ) (In the sense that 
indeterminacy in 'interpretations' is 
removed in descriptions (prescribing), this 
bears on the use/action distinction, - 
which, in the continuity between 
descriptions, remains indeterminate (but 
with regard to actual 'uses'... ). 
'Descriptions" (97) 
i. e. descriptions, see 'descriptions' 
nd 'coincidence' 
DvsJpn (INA 
I as greatly wndebtc+d to the 
Architectural Association, and in 
particular to Graham Shane, Ranulph 
Glanville and Leon van Schalk (amongst many 
others). for teaching us design as, and in, 
an open. and undelpre)scrlbable, process. 
In this sense, most of what I say about 
language, I say equally about design (eg. 
where the designing of (a) language is the 
language of designing). The difficulties in 
speaking about design are (at least akin 
to) the difficulties in speaking about 
language. Thus, the near emptiness of most 
uses of 'design' can be seen as arising, 
for instance, in mistaking the product for 
the process (the reification involved In 
speaking), and overlooking the 
particularity of correlations between 
intentions and designs the mutual 
interdependence between the function and, 
existence of a language). 
In the emphasis on doing (i. e. on 
designing) rather than saying what 1s Ito 
be) done, architects, for instance, are apt 
to (recognise the need to) pass things over 
in silence, and there as a healthy tendency 
to consider the rationalisation of what one 
to doing as no more than a helpfull 
'ladder' (in Wittgenstein's sense (1V21) 
6.54) in developing and exploring a 
particular design Ing. In processes shown 
in (14), (330), (341)). Similarly, teaching 
architecture can, and In my experience did, 
proceed- much as Wlttgenstaln proposed in 
6.33. ('see also artefacts'l. 
Where I suggest that the difficulties In 
speaking about design are (at least akin 
to) those of speaking . buut language, they 
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seem to be those of cybw netics (eti. nce 
bound from the outse)ti the virtual 
emptiness of the notion of 'design') the 
proliferation of solutluns and 
applicationsi the switch to 'designing 
designing" (eq. Jones. 1979)1 an 
Invisibility (silence) in what is said 
about design (eg. Russell and Powell, 1981, 
suggest that the significance design models 
have for their designers differs 
substantially from the significance they 
have for other users)$ and thi coincidence 
(corresponding to that) between 'first 
order instructions' and 'second order 
observations' (eg. In Jones 1970/e1); - all 
go to suggest a coincidence... 
.. between what I have distinguished, and 
treated as distinct in thus speaking about 
'design' 'language' and 'cybernetics' 
(an autobiographical coincidence 
they coincide in the form of Interpretation 
. my interpretation .I negat. (d) their 
coincidence in distinguishing theme .I 
negate their distinctness in asserting the 
coincidence . 
(a coincidentical autobiography 
coincide in the fore of interpretation 
my interpretation . my coincidence 
coincidentially 1 as we. 
(a coincidentical autograph. ))) 
In this connection, compare de Zeeuw 
(1980), - for the possibile distinctions. 
Distinctions (49.131) 
Spencer Brown (1969) tog so-angst many 
others leg. Pask lop. 1977/81). Oougen and 
Varela (1978), braten leg. 1900)), 
discussed and developed in Varela (1973, 
1976,1979) who augments the calculus with 
the form of self-indication (see also 
'closure')! Nowo and von Fuerster (1973) 
who Illuminate the reasons for doing sol 
Kalllkourdis (1976) who raised the question 
of the distinction of the space in which a 
distinction is drawn; Glanville leg. 1979a) 
who extends this question to include the 
distinction of the agent and the 
distinction between mark and value and 
suggests the one-sidedness of distinctions) 
and in 13lanvllle and Varsls (19001, who 
show such one-sidedness concerning the 
distinction of the elementary and universal 
(and hence 'closure'$. 
Informally (and this may be taken as It 
say), Spencer Brown's construction ! `draw a 
distinction") is often interpreted as an 
epistemological Initial (the fare, ewe 
cannot make an indication without drawing a 
distinction"). Such Informal 
interpretations differ, in(volving) time, 
from a formal treatment of the calculus. In 
taking this difference into account, I hope 
to explore this form. as a form In time. 
Distinguish 4131) 
see 'distinctions' 
Do (69). Doing (139) 
now 'Say/Do' 
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! Ego-centrically (133) 
see ep. Piaget (1972). Note, however, 
, that in the Interaction between the 
processes of construction, communication 
, and argumentation, 
between which I (need 
, to) distinguish (as a matter of exposition) this is not to suggest a direct correlation 
between these processes and developmental 
stages. 
, Epistemologically (43) 
In the first instance, I adopt a 
relativistic - constructivist view (p. 
Wittgenstein (1921), Kelly 11963), 
Festinger (1972), Laing (1966), Plaget 
(1972), von Foerster (1972,1973., 1976) 
von Olasersfeld (1974b, 1977,1980), 
Glanville (1973), Pask (1975a, b, 19761), 
compare also p. 131. However. the 
interaction between language and 
epistemology (if the two are indeed 
distinct) leaves no little for any, see 
"Language is.. ") space for such a choice 
(Pedretti (1970/60). 1 explore their 
coincidence. 
Even if the choice of an epistemology 
were to be determined an purely descriptive 
grounds, only a constructivist position 
can, beyond the prescriptive, lead to a 
theory of language (se. von Foerster, 
1972). Moreover, if a criteria of 
simplicity (Okkhaw) could be distinct from 
a constructivist theory of language (and 
were distinct from (the criteria of) 
coincidence), such a criteria would 
strongly support the continuity between 
descriptions... 
Ever-growing (1) 
von Foerster (1973b), 131anvllle (1973), 
compare also Loefgrwn (1976)1 see also 
p. 152., i. e. I try to capture this notion 
with the notion of accumulating time. 
Ever-changing (10,00) 
I as Indebted to Lars Loefgren for 
pointing out the possibility of describing 
natural language in terms of the process of 
developing a hierachy of artificial 
languages (see. eq. Loefgren (1980), and 
eq. Kripke (1975)). If there is a 
difference, it lies in the curiosities 
pursued In the process of language, 
respectivily the curiosities, the pursuit 
of which gives rise to an ever-changing 
hierachy of languages. (8e, also 'hlerachy 
of languages' and 'Logician and Linguist' 
for the difficulty in speaking about (and a 
possible) difference In curiosity). 
Exclusive (8) 
see 'Coepleewntarlty' and for the 
connection with time, eq. Guenther (1967) 
and Braten (1900). 
Example (62,90,237) 
In the coincidence of the described and 
the describing, a thing for description) is 
an instance of itself. In the continuity 
between descriptions examples arise in 
connection with a distinction (or level, 
embedding time). Thus, helpful as examples 
can be in illustrating what can be spoken 
about, they are, in the first Instance, 
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bound to be wisslwadinq. in what can be 
said; and thus in the text I give but the 
text itself as an example (simply to avoid 
such limitations). 
More than an example, tewis Carroll's 
, (1065) Mad-lea-Party, is what I set out to 
'accouwrt' for. and what provided the 
guidance 1 often needed to resist the 
temptations of descriptive ideallsatlons 
and reificationst contrived as it might be. 
I tale the stance that it provides a 
minimal instance against which to assess 
the adaquacy of linguistic theorising (of 
so-such concern to recent linguists (e9. 
Chumsky 1965)). 
In the next instance, however, there is 
an abundancy of instances which could be 
pointed to, - were it not that such 
instances speak for themselves (and In so 
doing, perhaps belaugh being pointed to). 
Where in these notes I try to give 
examples. I doubt that there is any point 
in doing so (see also 'design'); and I 
suspect, that '. y^ only examples are those, 
mostly ! literary, in which others have 
managed to ray what I have tried to says 
far clearer than I could. 
Existence (lO9) 
Epistemologically speaking, the 
existence of a thing arises in a 
description an observer (eg. Glanville, 
1975) makes of it. In the continuity 
betwewt descriptions (von Foerster, 1973a) 
there can be no given distinction (another 
description) between descriptions (eq. 
explicitly made or presupposed. sei 
'relevance' and 'ontolugy'). euch a 
distinction arises in the act of speaking 
about one thing and passing other things 
over in silence, and hence depends an our 
curiusity and what we choose to speak 
about, respectively pass over in silence. 
The notion of a 'linguistic ontology' 
tPedrettl, 1980) imposes Itself, where lt 
is just such an act of distinction which 
dsstinguishlsheb what is said to exist, 
epitemolugically from what is said to exist 
ontologically speaking! 
Extssnsl UbswvK (92) 
cf. Pa k ivy. IV610 11075*, b) 
I i. i11ar forms 519) 
ay. Lwtaphurs and "r)aloplss (snip "g. 
F1sk. 197Ub) (see also *fww') 
Furq. ttlny 4401, ,,, 
I use 'foºpettinV' In an attewpt to 
point to a difficulty In speaking about 
memory (especially In analogies cede to the 
stumpo of data In wathines). The notion of 
tschunklnp', and Packs notion of 
condensation' leg. Pask, 1960, see also 
Pedretti, 1970/E10) come some way in 
ovrrco. eing the difficulty of assuming the 
presence of sumo representation In speaking 
about what Is remembered. The difficulty 
ies in allowing for the possibility of an 
absence of any repres. titatlon (Cospar" the 
playetlan notion of "occultation' (ep. 
wereus, 1981) In 'memory ,- prior to a 
re-caistructlon of a representation In 
re-memberings In speaking about what is 
r. c. inbered for In wondering what I as 
remembering) Just such a re-presentation is 
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involved. (b. ycx. d this simple point, I do 
not here wish to consider the extensive 
littsrature on memory$ relevant papers by 
von Foerster and Glanville are refered to 
in other papers of theirs I quote. ) 
For. (70) 
Fur wa11y (1301 
I speak of the form of speaking' ('the 
farm of Interpretation', etc. ) in the sense 
I attribute to Wittgenstein's notion of 
"structure of language" 41... to avoid lust 
the difficulties I discuss as arising in 
the different notions of 'structure' (sew 
p. 10/11). I try to show (throw somo light 
on) the nature of this form (see also 
'ideograms'). (Except In the specific 
context of calculet, eq. Spencer-Brown's 
calculus) I use 'formal' or 'formally' as a 
shorthand for sayinq 'in terms of this 
fora'. i. e. In terms of the forms I 
discuss. 
(It may be necessary to raphasis, that 
these forms are forms of ACTS and as such 
arise only in events (ey. of speaking, 
interpreting, communicating). Where, 
abstracting these farms. I suggest the 
possibility of &g. 'saying something in the 
form of interpretation', what I have in 
mind might be clumsily circumscribed as the 
arrangement of descriptions (or things) in 
some configuration which, corresponding to 
(or fitting) the form of an actual act of 
interpretation, may facilitate the event of 
such an act. Clearly such an arrangement is 
made in an act of its own form (i. e. the 
form of a description). However, where It 
succded&s, it 'transcends' this form, - in 
the sense that the act of arranging becomes 
Irrelevant for invisible). Examples of such 
'arrangements' range from poetry (to the 
understanding of which the 'interpretation' 
of its component parts Is irrelevant and at 
best a 'ladder') to social Institutions (in 
which the source of a sense of 
'institutional identity' is often 
invisible, eq. the "AA"i 'Fleet 8tre. t") to 
folklore and what Rappaport (1968) has 
described as 'ritual regulation'. ) 
see also 'any' 'coincidence' and 
'prescriptive'. 
Fragmentation 487) 
By fragmentation 1 mean no more than the 
. pist. woloplcal proliferation of 
distinctions (compare Bohm (198O). 
Function 4109) 
(compare, also Locker (1978*) 
Consider, for Instance, the most commonly 
assumed 'function of language'. I. e. the 
conception that language Is a means for 
communication. The 'pump priming' problem 
is illustrated In the use of secret codes, 
.. here «a cannot know what is communicated 
unless aa know the codes A code (sq. how up 
y and t are to be Interpreted) needs to be 
communicated (using an already kno. n cods), 
before it can itself be used to 
communicate. The some problem erlas where 
w" assume that 'function of language' to 
be 
that of . n. b"ling us to CowmuniCate. 
Moreover, under this assumption. language 
cannot be considered to be anything more 
than a known cod., I. e. the " sh. rCd 
knowledge which enables us to transit! 
further knowledge. But, Just as we Co.. to 
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Thar.. knuwlydp. + In a process of 
co.. unication, wo 1.. rn a language in a 
process ui ccjwunicatlcx,. What, then, Is to 
enable us to coiMDurllcaty before ws have 
learned the lanquag. ' 
Similarly, if caºslder language to be 
the result of a process of communication 
(learning) by which wo come to share the 
knowledge or language whirls then allows us 
to communicate more efficiently, this 
relies orº some prior shared knowledge (in 
terms of which we can 'begin' to 
communicate). The interaction between 
language (concieved as enabling us to 
commurºicate) and communication Is mutual$ 
in order for there to be a language (shared 
knowlwdge) between communicators, they must 
have communicated this language. In order 
to communicate the language, they must 
already have had a language. 
Put, since whatever we would thus came 
to share, we would come to share IN TERPI9 
OF whatever we shared before, this has the 
consequence that. however rudimatery the 
'initial' shared knowledge (or 'innate 
language ability' Choesky (rp. 1963)) may 
be, -it would have all the features of the 
language we eventually would come to share. 
(compare also Glanville's epilog to 
Pedretti and Glanville (1960)). 
The discubsiurº of the difficulties which 
arise with regard to other 'functions of 
language' follows much the seam pattern 
{some of which I have explored in Pedrstti 
and Olarºville, 19tu), and reveals a simple 
choice in the place allocated to the 
paradox (i. e. either at the 'bottom' of 
this or that otherwise infinite regress, or 
locally, within any one 'usw' of language). 
Urey box 493) 
I use this as an (in the sense of the 
black box and Its being whitened strickt, 
(Pask, l973a, b, 19769)) analogy. The 'pray 
box' phenomenon might, somewhat poignantly 
be described as the circumstance whereby 
linguistics, in describing a portion of 
natural language thereby treats It as an 
artificial language. It is however a 
predicament which manifests Itself In the 
Interaction between . g. language and 
epistemology (see Psdrstti, 1970/00), 
language and ontology, linguistics and 
psychology, and, in general, any two (or 
mors) aspects of, uur description building 
activities we care to distinguish, whereby 
one is determined in the description of the 
other. 
Hi. rachy of Languages 479) 
while the work on hierachies of 
languages, and particularly the notion of 
an ever-changing hierachy Isle there), in 
many ways parallss the processes I discuss, 
it differs - at least in curiosity - in the 
notion that Interpretations are to be 
rendered explicit, -a difference which, 
although small by comparison to the 
similarities, lies at the very center of my 
curiosity. Due to this difference and in 
view of the fruitlessness of semantic 
sndsavours within linguistics tend 
particularly the lack of any sensw of 
relevance in truth conditional semantics), 
I have not attempted to discuss this work, 
nor I. arnod as much as I might have, from 
its car. full study ithoupt, the little I 
have learned of lt has often helped as a 
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great deal). (in view of those similarities 
it is perhaps helpfull to recall the 
'differences' see 'Logician and Linguist'). 
Ideograms (33,113) 
. 'arid what is the use of a book', 
thought Alice, 'without pictures or 
conversation? '... " 
My ideograms are pictures in which I try 
to show (Wittgenstein, 1921, see also 
'said') what I am doing and saying. In some 
cases (erg. black boxes and distinctionsl 
but see also 'cyclic relations') they may 
bear some resemblance to pictures or 
'notations' developed by other as I try to 
find my beginnings in their beginnings, 
(and in that sense, Alice, there may be a 
conversation). 
In developing a sequence of ideograms 
(eg. 1-24 (black boxes), 1-17 
(distinctions), 1-21 (origin), and 
particularly in the "I" of language 1-43) 1 
construct a language. As such, what I may 
say or show in developing these ideograms, 
I say or show within this process feg. In 
the terms I hope to establish In so doing). 
The languages I thus construct are not 
in the ordinary sense formalisatlons or 
formal languages. They may, in their 
shortcowmings show the way for such a 
formalisation, - or It may go to indicate 
why these processes cannot be formalised In 
the ordinary sense. but, more than a simple 
mnemonic. such languages are a way of 
checking the coherence of what in 
constructed (as a wholel$ and their 
construction in our day to day attempts to 
make sense (see also design), coincides In 
form with the languages sought in the 
concern with wholistic representation 
(compare eg. haturana (1970). 
Implicated 4231) 
see Grieco (eg. 1967). Me difficulty 
which arises in speaking about what is 
conveyed in silence (Pedretti, 1980), may 
go some way to show the relation between 
the specific notion of a 'conversational 
implicature' Grieco describes, and the 
general phenomena 1 outline. In the general 
framework, the distinction between what is 
implicitly conveyed and what is 
conversationally Implicated Is, however 
usefull for sow? particular purpose, 
accadestc. 
Imprecise (BO) 
eg. Zadeh (1973) (see also 'aabigaus'). 
The imprecision or fuzzyness arises with 
regard to the descriptive framework In 
which we attempt to remove the 
indeterminacy of Interpretation. (As with 
most descriptive frameworks, the basis of 
which I object to, lt is the virtue of such 
frameworks to sharpen our perceptions about 
languages my difficulty 1s In acknowledging 
the help such perceptions have provided In 
pointing to the 'phenomena' for which I try 
to account here. ) 
Independence (243) 
The interaction between independence and 
co-operation should be apparent as such 
within my discussion, - which reflects what 
I learned from th" "MChange between 
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Glanville, Pask, f'ask (E), Loefgren, 
Glanville, Pask, Gaines (loW 478-492)1 
compare also Pack, eq. 1977/81). 
Indeterminacy (43) 
(see also *forgetting') My use of the 
notion of 'indeterminacy' is based on the 
notion of the "truely black box' with which 
we are confounded in trying to understand 
each other (Pack, 1961)# I. e. what Pack 
calls 'conversational indeterminacy' 
(19731, b, 1976). Where the very notion of 
the black box, and the cybernetic 
enterprise as a whole, has its roots in the 
foundational discussions of the early 
century, the light my use of this notion 
may throw on broader senses of the notion, 
is presupposed rather than shown. 
Instructing (90) 
Cave also 'applying'). In discussions of 
the black box, the difficulty of 
distinguishing between general observations, 
on the nature of cognition and perception, 
and apparent 'instructions' an the use of 
the 'device' is 'recognised' by, for 
instance, Ashby (1956) and Pack (1961), - 
in introductory texts. (Such Insight seems 
to have been overlooked In applications of 
"the device" (eq. reification! )). While one 
may or may not be suprised by this 
circumstance, it does been indicative of 
the difficulties of 'cybernetic 
description'. 
*Language in ... " {110) 
Chomskylan linguistics offers a number 
of illustrative examples, "q. (compare 
Chomaky log. 1963) with) the notion that 
"Language 1s a set of sentences", should be 
mudifindi "For the purpose of writing a 
grammar, let language be a set of 
sentences, (and let and the child have an 
innate linguistic ability)". 
Littoratur" in the recent developawants 
of this technology I. riddsled with 
deliniations of "language communities" 
Iwhvr. by, a speaker in excluded from a 
language comity, if his intuitions do 
not support a particular rule of the 
grammar (the lin6uist has managed, sofar, 
to 'abstract') for the 'lanquags- 
cnmunity-(said-to-b. )-'using'-this-rule'). 
Use circularity is "ngrained in the 
circularities between practically all the 
basic 'methological' notions of this 
technology, mg. univ. rsalsl the distinction 
between a speakers competence and his 
perforwancel the distinction between the 
acceptability and the Vrammaticallity of a 
sentence ! which leads to the need to 
'prim. ' a subject (native speaker) in how 
he is to describe his intuitions ! with 
regard to highly unlikely 
sentence-constructions, presented out of 
content), - and should such a subject 
invent a context In which a 'bad' sentence 
seems nevertheless acceptable, he Is asked 
to try not to be clever... ) etc. etc. 
This circularity which is beginning to 
be explored in terms of the technology'. 
"long march" from syntax, via semantics to 
pragmatics and predictably back to syntax, 
in which what was accounted for in 'the 
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syntactic 
ccmporuviit'. is unwritten lop. 
most transformations lind hence most of the 
all too easily appealing distinction 
between 'surface- and deep-structure' 
(Cho sky, 1976)), and accounted for in *the 
semantic compailrnt'. &nd eventually in a 
deplorably limited 'prayeatic component'. 
and so on acid on. 
Logician and L isjuist (23) 
Beyond a simple caricature, made for a 
specific purpose, the logician and the 
linguist coincide in their description 
building activities (however much they may 
differ in what they describe), and as a 
consquence. ANY distinction between the. 1s 
a distinction made with a particular 
curiosity and by a particular person. This 
means that it Is not possible to 
distinguish between them In terms of their 
work, eq. what either speak about, for it 
is necessary to consider the curiosities 
they have in doing so. 
The differences arir* In terms of the 
relevance we attribute (in terms of what wo 
wish to do) to what we do do, and it is in 
terms of such relevance criteria, that 
other-than-caricature distinctions arise 
locally, and with regard to very specific 
intentions (compare the differences even in 
apparently very similar intentions, ep. 
between M. ewpscln ! 19771 and Allwood, 
Anderson and Dahl tl977)). 
The difficulties arise in that we cannot 
use the results obtained with the Intention 
x, in undertaking work with the intention z 
unless z is x or contained in x. It is 
precisely such an observation which 
prohibits a 'natural language semantics', 
where the significance of a word or 
construction arises in and with the 
intentions with which it is 'used*. 
Similarly, this observation must render 
what is pursued with a concern for the 
explicit, Inapplicable, even if 
complementary, to what is pursued with the 
concern for the implicit. 
Thus, for instance, an explicit 
framework leads (via the "likelyhood" that 
what is described, IS what needs to be 
learned) to an 'epiatwool ogical 
double-bind" fin which an eplste olopy 
needs to be Invoked to 'account' for the 
'miraculous' acquisition of a given 
language ! see also 'function' and Pedrettl, 
1978/80)). 
Similarly, the use of frameworks 
initially developed with a curiosity in 
truth, to consider processes which are 
essentially not concerned with truth is, at 
best, puizelling. More often than not it 
leads to the exclusion (what we cannot 
'describe' does nut exist) of Just those 
aspects of the speech ACT which can account 
for why there Is no rived for, and indeed no 
such a thing as 'semantics' (in the sense 
of the -psychological reality- attributed 
to representations created In this 
confusion of fntentlonalitiss)! 
Notes (O 293) 
In nature, notes are irrelevant. If they 
wore relevant@ the observations w&do In 
thew would be Made In the text. The notes I 
a-eks. are also, I"m afraid, often all but 
h. lpfull to the understanding of the text 
case 'eiamplrs'1I - or, again, I would have 
included thew to the text. In writing the 
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nutrs from A-N (i. v. tiers and rºow), I 
have strugyelyd its wach caw. knowing that 
what I can say in a note is bound to lead 
to wissundvrstandirºgs; and would better be 
loft in silence. 
Wittgenstein's 1191U1 11rufacr to the 
fractatus has been on my mind, and I have 
perhaps in writing these notes begun to 
understand a little .. we of the window in 
it. It is a stranyv insºyht, which slips 
out of react as soon as it is not attended 
to, - and I suspect it cannot be attended 
to, but to the painfull process of being 
thus torn in tearing oneself from one's 
writing. It is as such, that reference to 
others is difficult; and, perhaps 
irrelevant, perhaps presumptious. 
I know that what I can say in these 
notes lags behind what I hope to have said 
in the text, - by virtue of being distinct 
from, and looking upon, the process of 
exploration in which it could be 
experienced, in which it was relevant, and 
of the relevance of which these notes are 
but faint memories. Nevertheless, they are 
important to me; important, precisely in 
their limitations. For, I hope, that the 
comparison between the text and these notes 
will reveal the difference betwaan what we 
can say and what we can speak about, and 
thus the limitations of speaking. I hope 
this difference will show why, where like 
Wittgenstein's "Dageyvn scheint "Ir die 
WAHRHEIT der hier mitgeteilten tiedanken 
unantastbar und definitiv. " I feel that 
what I could say in the text imposed itself 
with the coincidence between descriptions 
and made am feel confidend beyond the 
explicit reasonu and arguments which lead 
me to write it. 
One (21,75.07, Bd. 133.1551 
see 'closure' for why I prefer to speak 
of 'one'; sew 'coincidence' for the notion 
of one and the same, and 'coherence' in 
connection with 'one observer's if the 'one 
observer' (133) nevertheless appears to be 
an assumption, I trust that in the 
coher%nce of the construction as a whole, 
such an assumption is necessary only as a 
matter of exposition (- but see also 
'ontology'). 
Ontology 4371 
I wake a, per1aps excesslv., distinction 
between ontology and '1ingulstlc ontology' 
(Podr. tti, 19134)) and discuss the latter in 
the text, where I prefer, In general to 
speak of 'acceptance'. Whore the need to 
accept arises in the fore of speaking 
(about one thing rather than another) and 
In any beginning, linguistic ontology would 
appear to relatlvlsv what other things may 
be subjected to ontological considerations 
in the eure usual sense) which may explain 
my dlffitulty in properly grasping that 
notion. 
In such relativity, I may, for the 
purpose of such argument, accept that there 
may be a reality-out-there, and that It is 
In such a reality that we have bodies and 
minds which are Capable of feelings and 
compassion... In other words, I attribute 
no relevance to the assertion of such 
existence or its denial, since there appear 
too many worlds of intw est to be 
constructed and explored; and since the 
pressing problbss and issues in our affairs 
seem to me to arise in our constructional 
34 
and very often conbtructiuns we have been 
taught not to question for the b. nifit of a 
little piece of 'power' hold by one man or 
woman over irºuther. and depriving either of 
his or her peace of wind. Ile ever, in 
underlining the importance of acceptance 
throughout our description building 
activities, and in distinguishing ourselves 
from cxie another, I hope to relate the need 
for an 'ontological security' to the 
distinction of worlds and worlds of things, 
and the reluctance to question (the 
intention embedded in the construction of) 
these. (see also 'coa. plementarlty'. 
'coincidence', 'existence', epistemology', 
perhaps 'design' and eg. von 0laser sfeld, 
1980). 
Open (144) 
%we 'closure' and 'cowpl. rvntar1ty' 
Ordaining (108) 
- to say we 'prosuppore' a things 
existence, does not, it seems, prevent the 
removal of construction into co.. remote 
domain. 
Origin (10W 
compare Locker (1978a, 1979b, C). 
Paradox (18,21,1U8) 
(see How& and von Foer ster (1973) for 
the spade-work an vicious and unvicious 
occurances of self-reference. ) 
I use paradox in the sense of 
paradoxical predicaments In the domain of 
actions. Thus. for Instance, I do not spe.. k 
of paradoxes in the sense in which 
Hofstaedter (Scientific American. Jan. 
1981) asserts that all paradoxes are 11arse 
if a paradox requires a contradiction, Mr. 
Hofstaedter's 'prediction' seems 
self-fullfllling, and of relatively little 
interest beyond "wetawagical themas"1 - and 
paradoxes (or their predicament) would not 
have the disquieting effect they have. 
Thus, for instance the paradox of weans 
may be captured in some sort of 'liar' 
sunstence, - but to interpret the 
difficulty as orp of asserting and denying 
the existence of language would be to 
consider a description of the predicament, 
rather than the predicament Itself) - and 
preclude the obvious resolution it has in 
our particular activities. 
but beyond semantics, the difference 
concerns a distinction between 'logical-' 
aid 'psycliolugical self -reference' (IoW); 
eq. the question of whether or not 
"self-reference lives in sentences"; and 
using paradox in the sense of a 
predicament, I content that lt does not, 
but that rather, the possibility of 
self-referential sentences arises only In 
our activities tin connection with such 
sentences, In the circular activity of 
reasoning (to avoid saying 'Interpreting'), 
-- which seems to be why we mostly need to 
be taught to percieve such paradoxes 
(perceive thy two warring within the anal. 
More generally, such possibilities arise 
in activities, which, in their tconcleved) 
nature prevent thewr. lves from getting off 
the groundi eq. such paradoxes as arise 
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where, in trying tu du x, z is required to 
do so. while in order to get z, x is 
required ! compare also Varela, Maturana and 
Uribe, 1974); or, in terms of levels, the 
paradox, where in order to get from A to 8, 
we need already to be at 61 i. e. the old 
problem of priming the pump. Where just 
such a predicament arises with regard to 
the assumed existence of language, - this 
may throw some light on the source of liar 
sentences. 
Participating (239) 
see Pask 11961,1Vbe, 19/3a, b. 1976) 
for the requirement that an (external) 
observer must participate in a conversation 
to be able to make observations about it. 
Particular (109) 
soo Austin (1970). 
Perceptual 4281 
For the 'lntentloiility' In our 
perceptual mechanisms. as selecting on the 
bass% of *hypotheses' rbout the 
environment, see eq. Gregory. (1970), 
'What the Frog's Eye tells the Frog's 
brain' in Arbib (1972), von Forrst. r 
(1973a)i (and compare also, Lovfqºen 
(1977)). 
Fersest (44) 
eq. walntalnlnq cargnltly cunsonnrnc" 
(Festfnq. r 11972)). 
Prescriptive 1111) 
A great deal of ewthudoloplcal arguments 
in linguistics claim to provide a 
descriptive rather than prescriptive 
approach to lianguayel but it  ee. c the 
prescriptive element con only be overcome 
by taking seriously the predicament of 
using language to dercribe language' (i. e. 
the coincidence between the described and 
the describing) and accordingly restricting 
what can be spoken about (rather than 
prescribed). 
Presuppose (il)l) 
lt is p. rhaps'ur, fortunate that the term 
is often, taken tu %ugqest an absolute 
ordering. and hence a given ontology) 
rather than one relative to the particular 
act of speal. lr. y. an winch something needs 
to by passed over iii sllvncel see 
(kitulcxjy', 'twdalning', 'existence', and 
clo%ure'. 
keallty (146) 
see von Fourrter (l9FSa)i re. an 
lnterpresnnal reality see (winding 
explicitness) . g. fask-(1Y75a, b, 76) 
Using. Phllipson acid Lee (1966)). 
(ieference(s) (0) 
Where the construction of a language 
coincides with the curistruction of the 
world described, and the distinction of a 
language coincides with the dtstinctldrl of 
" thing for worlds of things), - there can 
be no given distinction between ep. 
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reference, predication or construction; - 
any act may, where relevant at a particular 
time, be taken in one sense rather than an 
other. 
In line with thus treating 
indicativeness as arising within a speech 
act, I have tried not to treat what others 
have said or written as were things refered 
to, - trying Instead to let them speak for 
themselves, to the limited extend to which 
this is possible by tearing a passage from 
its context. 
If there is a practical reason to try to 
do so, it is in the nature of 
interdisciplinary work, which by its nature 
does not share its beginnings, and as such 
has a tendency to got traped In stating 
these. If such contexts can help here, this 
is only a very notional attempt to do so. 
I have made a personal anthology of 
passages I found relevant to thinking about 
languages some of the passages, on first 
reading, some a long time ago, stood out 
from their context and, often without my 
grasping their meaning, returned again and 
again; others, I must have read, but on 
re-reading, they suddenly stood out as 
completly fresh; making me wonder how I 
could have been blind to them$ and often 
the coincidence with what I'd been doing 
since reading thew, made as wonder just how 
blind I had been... (others I quote for 
more apparent reasons, but) it I. in terms 
of these experiences that I tried to lit 
these passages speak fur thvwsalv. st as 
seeds which have and continue to provoke 
thought. As such, they should be treated 
kindly, - as gifts from their writers, and 
not as things to be used. 
R. ilation" (134) 
so* Glanville (1975)t 41 discuss and use 
his temporal computations of relations in 
Pedretti (1978/90)). 
Relevance (173) 
Were construction is not considered, 
discussions of the notion of relevance run 
Into difficulties in trying to account for 
relevance in (often static) terms external 
to the processes at hand (compare also 
'presuppose'). Further difficulties arise 
in overlooking the Interaction between the 
relevance of des 1rlbing and that described. 
If thus, for ex" ple, one part of an 
overall model 1s concerned with truth (ep. 
a 'semantics') or sentence structure (ep. a 
'syntax') and another part (ep. a 
'pragmatics') is to account for relevance 
(and interact with such a 'semantics' or 
'syntax'), then the relevance attributed to 
'truth' or 'sentence structure' Is - at 
some level or other -- presupposed In the 
descrlptlonl as Is the relevance of making 
(explicit) such a descriptions the 
difficulty of accounting for 'relevance' 
appears to arise relative to such 
presupposed relevances. In the coincidence 
between the described and the describing. 
Instead, no such difficulty arises, In at 
we can speak about# the 'two relevances' 
coincide In the relevance of a particular 
act. 
Rules 490) 
see 'Coinci dence'a 'apply' and 
'structure' 
40 
Russel1 (S) 
) 
Encapsulating the difficulties of my 
curiosity, I use Russell's Introduction to 
the Tractatus (1#22) as providing a 
convenient beginning. Its so doing I trat 
this as a self-contained discussion, and 
perhaps as an example. and do not attempt 
to consider Russell's other work (or the 
work which followed on from this 
introduction (see also 'htrrachy')). 
Said (68,69) 
Here I use 'said', in what I take to be 
the sense in which Wittpenstsin (1921) uses 
'show'; i. e. distinguishing what can be 
spoken about frow what can be shown or, as 
I prefer, raid. I try to establish a 
criterion (sew 'coincidence') for removing 
the Indeterminacy in such 'sayinq'i a 
criterion which, I hope to show, coincides 
with our day to day judoqueents and 
attempts to make sense. As such It is 
perhaps necessary to point out that 
'saying' is not 'utterring', but rather 
'making a point' (and as such does not 
necessarily involve making an utterance 
(see also 'say/do'). 'Saying' rather 
involves an act of interpretation, in that 
what is said. Is. what is. taken to be said. 
(In cunnectloi, with showing/saying and the 
criterion of coincidence I propose, It is 
perhaps usefull to point out that I have 
elrewhere (eq. f'. dratti, 1978/80) discussed 
the notion of 'making a point' as the 
"nvulving the possibility of saying 
different things . bout the same thing, and 
hence the notion of 'making a point' 
appears to coirºcidw with at least sow 
., spects of the notion of falsifiabllity. 
ti. My/Do 169.139) 
I u%e this pair of term* with reference 
to Austin 11962) and the notion of a speech 
&.: t developed in the work of, amongst many 
others, sQ. Bear).; however, unlike these I 
do not use these notions exclusively in 
cc. inection with the making of utterances 
(and similarly for my - and I trust 
wittponst. in's - use of 'speak about'). 
Etather, I use thew, in the first instance, 
in the sense of any act of making and what 
so made (see also 'artefact')i in the sense 
cif any act of d., cription and the 
tIescription mades in the continuity between 
descriptions (von Forstar, 1973a), this 
act may be distinguished as one of eg. 
perceiving, observing, thinking, speaking, 
writing, drawing, building ... or what not. 
In the next instance, in that what Is 
said, is what is taken tu be said Isww also 
'said'), there is an essential 
indeterminacy about what is said, 
respectively donee and hence the act need 
not be an act of expression (as the above 
suggests), but can rather be any act taken 
as indicative, and hence the my use of 
saying and doing includes any action taken 
as significant (do) and the significance 
attributed to it tsay). (cownpar" "y. Jung, 
1977,1970,1979). 
Second Order Cybnrnstics 420,27) 
u. "closure*, 'Cybernetic* o1 
cybernetics'. "s"lf-ref f cco'. ds" 'apply' 
for why lt might be psrsdoslcsl to call lt 
o. º1n... v. r. It 1" us. full to be able to 
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Ii 
MISSING 
PRINT 
distinguish betwerrn first and second order 
cybernetics "vvis b4iere such a distinction 
may turn out to be an excessive distinction 
(see eq. 'black box'), It distinguishes 
what are, at present, two substantially 
different cmcvrns. Muritover, in being 
somewhat paradoxical this label  ay help to 
remember that we DO speak about these 
things, and remind of the difficulties 
involved. 
.' 
Se1f-Refor, ice 920) 
see also 'closure' 'cybernetics of 
cybernetics' and 'coincidence' 
If I began to list what authors and papers 
I think constitute the recent cybernetic 
discussion on self-reference, I would quote 
practically all the texts I list (the texts 
to be exempted are, I think, obvious enough 
not to need to do so), for it to In the 
context of this discussion that I say what 
I say. Here I would like to thank all those 
who took part in the esetings an self- 
reference over the last two years; Stein 
Braten, briarr Baines, Ranulph Glanville, 
Ernst van Olaserfeld, Richard Jung, Alfred 
Locker, Lars Loefgren, Gordon Pack, Mike 
Robinson, and Gerard de Zeeuw, for it was 
in listening to thwir discussions, that I 
learned Bost, and lt 1s due to the., that 
this, was written; - however this is not to 
suggest that they would agree with this. 
Though I would have liked to Include 
(excerpts from) the transcipts, I have only 
managed to transcribe the Isle of Might 
discussions (low), and feel that the spirit 
of these discussions would be spoiled if I 
started to quote thew. 
Allthough in the context of those 
ascussions I would, as indeed I did In the 
w-ic l ler drafts, use a title such as 
"s. nyuage and Solf-Reference', I have 
... - tly refrained from speaking here of 
. ult-reference' for a number of reasonsi 
Firstly, I found myself in danger of 
" "tfyfnq self-referencel and when 
" s. 'l f-reference' started occuring In almost 
"", vey sentence, I became suspicious of my 
a CO the notion, and challendged myself 
try and pet along without the word. 
11su second reason has to do with the 
ýnnbination of language and self-reference, 
t% connection with the possible distinction 
t. ". tween 'logical-' and (for lack of a 
+, &tter word) 'psychological' self-reference 
'cvo 'paradox')) where such a distinction 
., < ... de, 
the discussion of sel f -reference 
i, ronnecticxn with language is bound to 
%, tyywrt the former, where instead, I would 
tip concerned with the latter. 
tiara 1 hope that refraining my use of 
+rov word 'self-reference', may have helped 
tc, uv. arcowe this difficulty (though I find 
. 4y+. olf in the converse difficulty of 
"ci)sing sight of the dlstlnctionl where I 
+. ee 'linguistic' or 'logical' In terms of 
the processes and activities I discuss, I 
could not deny that self-reference Is 
'l inqutstic'... )l 
11r I saw it, the distinction between 
'logical' and 'psychological' self- 
roferwnce, places the latter in the 
grasping and closure of the self-system 
(uhown In (9 - 10), Pp 141/2), and, in the 
Vxterm, places the former within ssntlnCes 
of languages distinguished as its, and thus' 
wt tº, fn a world of things In a ti" 499. 
whown in 42). However, the differsnCss such 
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a distinction ails to point out, are 
somewhat resolved where the two are not 
seen only in the extremes, l. e, where 
'pychological' self-refrrence has its place 
in any closure of the self-cysts., and 
hence In any act of Interpretation{ and 
'logical' self-reference has its place 
within any description log. the description 
In which a world of things in a time is 
distinguished). the relation between the 
two can thus be seen as shown in mg. (13) 
(p 148)1 i. e. sowing 'logical' 
self-reference as the reflection, within a 
description, of 'psychological' 
self-reference, and in turn allows for (the 
self-system to be closed I. e. ) 
'psychological' self-reference... 
Where the wain difference between 
'logical' and 'psychological' 
self-reference is manifest in the 
difference between allowing for partial 
self-reference or complete self-reference, 
this again places the notion of 'logical' 
self-reference within a world of things, 
which would collapse In an act of 
interpretation log. 431; i. e. where the 
s. lf-syste. is closed. Within a world of 
things self-reference must be partial in 
the sense that the "i" who distinguishes 
this world remains outside the world (mg. 
42.31 42.8). It rust further remain 
partial, where such self-reference 1s 
spoken about (it's interpretation 1s made 
explicit)) - the partiality, or 
distinctness, then is none other than that 
of descriptions, I. o. the distinction by 
which the self-system is opened, mg. 412) 
(p. 144)1. and hence these differences find 
their resolution In our particular 
activities. 
i ". yete* 4142) 
''« 'cyclic relations' 
r, ., tire (/Vl 
.. r ' aqr vvwrnt' and ' Lop 1ci an and 
. "#nl st' 
rN ti act 476) 
. If.. Mmes h act In the general sense of 
^i t of drawing a dlst$nctlonl see 
i. t. ý' . 
.. 1 agalr. st (147) 
" c+.. parr Varsla (1973) ! particularly the 
. +)r I quote towards the end of the note 
" sacicldence'). 
tl. rv 111) 
.. we I du nut have In wind the notion, 
ý.. v rw(sited, that the structure of a 
#, u4gW (in Russell's sense) cannot be 
"1. vn al, out 1n that language. Wust 1 have 
"+ .. $nd is far simpler, I. e. that the 
+". 'tcatlcxn of language in describing sp. 
"+a structure' in Itself distinguishes 
lasiquage from the process in which we 
a,. clh. unge our curiosities, and hence, now 
asru, uages will be necessary to acco. odate 
:. s I. c hanyus. 1lowever, by assuming a 
, +r""'ure and hence rules a distinction is 
. %. 4. A-wdr - use 'apply'. 
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Time (37,60) 
See later for how I concisive of time, 
1. e. not as an externally given clock-times 
see, for instance, Carroll (1865), Guenther 
(1967); van Foster (1972), Atkin (1977, 
1981), Glanville (1975), Kripke (1975) de 
Zeeuw (1979a) Braten (1980), Jones (1980a) 
Loefgren (1980). 
Truely black (93) 
eq. Pask (1961) describes converstional 
indeterminacy in contrast to situations 
where an external observer can. know, 
omnisciently - and describes in his 
meta-language - what is inside a subjects 
black box. 
Unfolded (118) 
sse Loafgren (1979) 
we (1) 
I use 'we' since I can-only speak about 
these Issues being myself a speaker, i. e. 
by participating in what I speak about I 
cannot remain external; and since to do 
otherwise, eq. in an attempt to avoid undue 
familiarity, would lead to just the 
reifications I address (see also 
'coincidence'). 
Within (100,251) 
cee 'coincidence' and ep. Maturana 
(1970a). 
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Aichingvr, I. (1973). MEINE SPRACHE UND 
ICH. Frankfurts S. Fischur Vorlag. 
-Meine Sprache ist eine, dae zu, 
Fremdwoertern neigt. Ich suche sie mir aus, 
ich hole sie von weit her. Es ist aber eine 
kleine Sprache. Sie reicht nicht weit. Rund 
um, rund um mich herum, immer rund um und 
so fort. Wir kommen gegen unseren Willen 
weiter. Zur Hoelle mit uns, sage ich ihr 
manchmal. Sie dreht sich, sie antworted 
nicht, sie laesst uns geschehen. ... ' 
Allwood, J., Andersson, L. Dahl, O. 
(1977). LOGIC IN LINGUISTICS. Cambridge 
Textbooks in Linguistics. Cambridges 
Cambridge University Press. 
.. in what way can the formal languages of 
logic be used when we try to describe the 
meanings of expressions in natural 
language?... In our opinion, the most 
reasonable way of defending the usw of a 
disambiguated language is to say that we 
need some way of referring to the semantic 
interpretations in any case, so we have to 
construct a disambiguated language to do 
that. ... the formal systems constructed by 
logicians have the great advantage of being 
EXPLICIT. The deveopement of generative 
grammar has made linguists understand that 
an explicit model - even one which is wrong 
- may help us gain insight into problems by 
making clear exactly what we know and what 
we do not know. ... ', 
Annonymouc. (1991) indirect personal 
communication. 
.. you mean that language without words! " 
Arbib, M. (1972). THE METAPHORICAL 
BRAIN. Now Yorl, 3 Wiley lnterscience. 
Ashby. W. R. (1936). AN INTRODUCTION TO 
CYhEkNETIC3. Chapman & Nall. 41976) 
Reprinted as a Lnniversity Paperback. 
Londons Methuen. 
... It will be noticed that nothing has 
been said about the skill of the 
experimenter in manipulating the input ! of 
a black box). The omission was deliberati, 
for no skill is tailed for! We are 
assuming. remember, that NOTHING is known 
about the Box, and when this is so the 
method of making merely random variations 
(e. g. guided by the throw of a die) on the 
input-... itches is as defensible as any 
other methods for no facts as yet exist 
that could be appealed to as justification 
for preferring any particular method. ... " 
Atkin, R. H. (1977). COMINATORIAL 
CONNECTIVITIES IN SOCIAL SYSTEMS. Basel& 
birhhaeuser Verlag. 
Atkin, R. H. (1981). MULTIDIMENSIONAL 
MAN. Hirmondßworths P. guin Books. 
Austin, J. L. {1962). HOW TO DO THINGS 
WITH WORDS. Oxfords Oxford Unlverslty 
Prosa. 
"I2 
Austin, J. L. (1970). PHILOSOPHICAL 
PAPERS. Londons Oxford University Press. 
M, . This supposed GENERAL question is 
really lust a spurious question of a type 
which commonly arises in philosophy. Ne may 
call it the fallacy of asking about 
'Nothing-in-particular' which is a practice 
decried by the plain man, but by the 
philosoher called 'generalizing' regarded 
with some complacency. ... 
Hackett. S. (195S). ENDGAME. Londons , 
Faber and Faber. 
"The end is in the beginning and yet you go 
on. " 
Beckett, S. (1965). CONVERSATIONS WITH 
GEORGE DUTHUIT No. 3. Londons Calder and 
Boyars. 
"There are many ways of trying in vain to 
say the thing that I am trying in vain to 
say. " 
Bergstein, T. (1974). QUANTUM PHYSICS 
AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE. Londons The 
Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Bohm, D. (1969). "Science as Perception 
- Communication". Talk for the lllimois 
Symposium on Philosophy of Science. 
ff... Rather, the very act of perception is 
shaped and formed by the intention to 
communicate, as well as by a general 
awareness of what has been communicated in 
the past, by oneself and by others. Even 
more, it is generally only in communication 
that we deeply understand, i. e. perceive 
the whole meaning of, what has been 
t, USer ved. ... " 
buhm, D. (19M)). WHOLNESS AND THE 
IMPLICATE ORDER. Londons Routledge & Kagan 
Faul. 
... If the thing and the thought about it 
have their ground in the one undefinable 
and unknown totality of flux, then the 
attempt to explain their relationship by 
supposing that t1. thought is in reflective 
correspondence with the thing has no 
meaning. for both thought and thing are 
forms abstracted from the total process. 
the reasolI why these forms are related 
could only be in the ground from which they 
arise, but there can be no way of 
discussing reflective correspondence in 
this ground, because reflective 
t. orrespondence implies knowledge, while this 
ground is beyond what can be assimilated in 
the content of knowledge. ... ' 
Buhr, N. (1949). "Discussion with 
Einstein on Epistemological Probl ss in 
Atonic Physics", in Schilpp, P. A. (Ed), 
ALBERT EINS1EINi PHILOSOPHER-SCIENTIST. The 
Library of Living Philosophers, Volume VII. 
... the impussibillty of any sharp . 
seperattan between the behaviour of atomic 
vbJects and the interaction with the 
a@asurinq Instruments which serve to define 
the conditions under which the phenomena 
appear. .. Consequently, evidence obtained 
under different experimental conditions 
cannot be comprehended within a single 
picture, but must be regarded as 
complementary in the sense that only the 
totality of phenomena exhausts the possible 
information about the objects. ... 
. Borges, 
J. L. (1941) FICTIONS. Jupiter 
Books (1962). London: John Calder. 
ý Nouns are formed by an accumulation of . 
of adjectives. One does not say moony one 
says airy-clear over dark-round or 
orange-faint-of-sky or some other 
accumulation. In the chosen example, the 
mass of adjectives corresponds to a real 
object. The happening is completely 
fortuitous. In the literature of this 
hemisphere (as in the lesser world of 
Meinong), ideal objects abound, invoked and 
dissolved momentarily, according to poetic 
necessity. ... 
Braten, S. 41980). "Time and Dualities 
in Self-Reflective Dialogical Systems", to 
appear in Lanker, 0. E. (Ed. ), Proceedings 
of the International Congress on Applied 
Systems Reseach and Cybernetics* Pergawon. 
... When problems connected with 
temporality arise in connection with some 
approach, we tend to "solve' them in an 
either-or manners either time im being 
allowed for, or excluded from the domain, 
made time-less. ... 
braten, S.. Jahren, E., and Janson, A. 
(1978) "Social Networks and Multilevel 
Structures System% Description and 
Simulation", in Cavallo, R. (Ed) RECENT 
DEVELOPEMENTS IN SYSTEMS METHODOLOGY FOR 
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES. Leidens Martinus 
Nijhoff. 
". . Any concrete phenomena of cognitive, 
symbolic, and social processes in an and 
in the context of his group activities, 
contains programs of PARALLEL, DUAL OR 
MULTIPLE PATTERNS, competing for dominance 
or for being active, and should thus be 
explained in terms of complementary models. 
Carroll. L. (1865/1973) ALICE'S 
ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND and THROUON"THE 
LOOKING GLASS. Penguin. 
"'Then you should say what you mean ' the 
March Hare went on. 
'I do. ' Alice hastily repliedI 'at least I 
mean what I say - that's the same thing, 
you know. ' 
'Not the same thing a bit! ' said the 
Hatter. *You might just as well say that "I 
see what I eat" is the sane thing as "I eat 
what I Gee"! '. .... 
Chomsky, N. (1965) ASPECTS OF A THEORY 
OF SYNTAX. Cambridges The MIT Press. 
... Let us cons/dar with somewhat greater 
care just what is involved in the 
construction of an "acquisition model" for 
b 
language. A child who is capable of 
language learning must have 
(i) a'technique ... (v)... 
Correspondingly, a theory of linguistic 
structure that aims for explanatory 
adequacy must contain 
(i) a universal ... (v)... 
Putting the same requirements in somewhat 
different terns, we must require of such 
linguistic theory that it provide for 
(i) an emuneration of the class ei, 
sir.. of possible sentences, 
Chomsky, N. (1976), REFLECTIONS ON' 
LANGUAGE. Glasgow: Fontana/Collins. 
Festinger, "L. (1972) A THEORY OF 
COGNITIVE DISSONANCE. Stanfords Stanford 
University Press. 
von'Foerster, H. (1972). "Notes on the 
Epistemology of living things". BCL Report 
9.3. BCL Micro Fiches. 821 Bond, Peorlai 
Illinois Blueprint Corporation. (French 
version in E. Morin Ii M. Piatelli-Palwarini 
(Eds). L'UNITE DE L'HOPVIE, Editions du 
Scull, Paris 1972) 
" S. A formalism necessary and 
sufficient for a theory of communication 
must not contain primary symbols 
representing "communicabilia" (e. g, 
symbols, words, messages, etc. ). B. S. This 
is so, for if a theory of communication 
were to contain primary coemunicabllia, it 
would not be a theory but a technology of 
communication, taking communication for 
granted. 0.2. The nervous activity of one 
organism cannot be shared by another 
organism. .. 8.43. This shows that "communication" is an (internal) 
representation of a relation between (an 
internal representation of) oneself wih 
somebody else. .. 0.43. In this formalism 
the reflexive pronoun "I" appears as the 
(indefinitly applied) recursive operator... 
or in wordso "I am the observed relation 
between myself and observing myself. " 8.46. 
"I" is a relator (AND representor) of 
Infinite order. 9. Terminal representations 
(descriptions) made by an organism are 
manifest in its movementsl consequently, 
the logical structure of descriptions 
arises from the logical structure of 
movements. ... " 
von Foerster, H. (1973a). On 
constructing a reality. In W. F. E. Praiser 
(Ed), ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN RESEARCH Vol. 2, 
Stroudsburgs Dowden, Hutchinson and Ross. 
COGNITION - computing a reality 
COGNITION computing descriptions of a 
reality 
COGNITION - computing descriptions of --, 
COGNITION - computations of-I 
von Foersttr (1973b). Diversity, a 
measure cosplaawnting uncertainty. BCL 
Micro Fiches. 1321 Bond, Psorlat Illinois 
Blueprint Corporation. 
von Fo. rater (Ed) (1974). CYBERNETICS OF 
CYBERNETICS. Urbana! University of 
Illinois, BCL Report 73.38. on BCL Micro 
Fiches. 821 Bund, Neories Illinois 
Blueprint Corporation. 
von Foerster, H. (1976). ObJectss Tokens 
for (Eigen)-Behaviors. Paper presented to 
the Festschrift for Jean Piaget"s 80th 
birthday, Geneva. 
"... In other words, the coordination of 
compositions (i. e., the whole) corresponds 
to the composition of coordinations. This 
is the condition for what may be called 
"the principle of cognitive continuity" 
(e. g., breaking pieces of chalk produces 
pieces of chalk). ... 
Gaines, B. and Shaw, M. 
(1980). "Analysing Analogy. Proc 5th EMCBR. 
Washington DCs Hemisphere Press. 
Glanville, R. 41975). "A Cybernetic 
Developement of Theories of Epistemology 
and Observation, with reference to Space 
and Time, as seen in Architecture", also 
known as "The Object of Objects, the Point 
of Points - or, Something about Things", 
(PhD Thesis). Uxbridge: Brunel University. 
Glanville, R. 11978). "The Nature of 
Fundamentals, applied to the Fundamentals 
of Nature" in klir, U. (Ed) APPLIED GENERAL 
SYSTEMS RESEARCH, Proc Ist ICAGS. New Yorks 
Plenum. 
Glanville, R. 41977/81) "The Same is 
Different" in Zeleny, M. (Ed) AUTOPOIESIS. 
New York & Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Glanville, R. l1979a) beyond the 
Boundaries, in Ericson, R. D. (Ed) Proc of 
the SGSR Silver Anniversary Int. Meeting. 
Springer Verlag. 
... but distinctions need an agent to draw 
them. What then distinguishes the agent 
(the distinquisher)? This is the first 
weakness. but distinctions need a space in 
which to be drawn. What then distinguishes 
the space? This is the second weakness. But 
the distinction is a mark that indicates a 
value. What then distinguishes between mark 
and value, between the distinction and that 
which is contained by (is inside) it? This 
is the third weakness. ... " 4 
Glanville, R. (1979b) "Inside every 
White box there are two Black Boxes trying 
to get out" presented to the 6th Annual 
Conference of the Cybernetics Society, 
London. 
"... Thus, a black Box gives us a concept 
that allows us to handle what is, in 
effect, an unknown worlds it is a statement 
of ignorance, of our ability to overcome 
and cope with ignorance, and thus is a 
primitive of learning and hence of science. 
Glanville, R. (1980) "Occaw"s Adventures 
in the Black box (A Wonder Land)", In 
Lackar, 0. E. (Ed) Procs of the Int. 
Congress on Applied System Research and 
Cyberneticss Pergawon. 
to 
.. the black box appears through Occam's 
Razor as the simplest view. This view 
requires simplification, as a principle - 
that is, it also implies Occam. But this 
simplification destroys the concept of 
objective "simpler", because it cannot 
support the "simplest". Then, what is the 
status of the simplest, of the Black Box? 
Glanville, R. and Varela, F. (1980) 
"Your Inside is Out and your Ouside is In", 
in Lasker, G. E. (Ed), Procs of the Int. 
Congress an Applied System Research and 
Cyberneticus Pergamon. 
. The elementary is that which cannot be 
further reduceds it Is only itself$ it has 
no properties. Thus it can have no inside 
separate from its distinction. Its 
distinction may have no content. The 
universal is that which cannot be further 
expandeds it is everything: nothing may be 
excluded. Thus it may have no outside 
separate from its distinction. Its 
distinction must contain all content. ... " 
von ßlacersfeld, E. (1974a) 'Signs, 
Communication, and Language`. Journal of 
Human Evolution, Vol. 3,465-474. 
von Glasersfeld, E. (1974b) "Piap. t and 
the Radical Constructivist Epicteeology', 
Third South-eastern Conference of the 
Society for Research on Child Development, 
Chapel Hill. 
. Taken seriously, a statement to the 
effect that the child CONSTRUCTS his 
universe and then experiences it AS THOUGH 
it were external to himself, would be 
rather shocking. ... " 
von Olasersfeld, E. (1977) "Notes on the 
Epistemological Revolution" SOSR/AS 
Symposium, Denver, Colorado. 
"... Anything KNOWN is known by an 
experiencer. If "to know" is to make 
distinctions in experience and then to set 
up relations between the parts of 
experience that have been distinguish, it 
follows quite inescapably (1) that we can 
know ourselves only to the extent to which 
we experience dirselves. and (2)+that the 
self we do experience and incorporate into 
our cognitive structures, by that very act 
of construction, ceases to be the self that 
does the experiencing. ... " 
von Ulasersfeld, E. 11979) "Les 
chimpanzee at Is langalte", "in La Recherche 
no. 92, Paris. 
"... Lorsque.. certains chercheurs affirwent 
qu'ils peuvent an effet parlor avoc des 
chimpansas, Als declenchent des reactions 
plus ou mains violentes de la part des 
increduless comment un singe pourrait-il 
etablir avec 1'homme une veritable 
communication? .... on no pout an aucun can 
parler de "langalte". Cette resistance a 
l'egard d'experiences qui, depuis plus de 
dix ans, ant fait lours preuves, s'explique 
sans doute par Is desir de conserver a 
1'homme son caractere d'"unicite"s " 
exclusivite qui pendant des siscleslui a 
permis d'occuper une place privilegiee dan  
12 
le monde animal. ... 
von Olasersfeld, E. (1980) 'Feedback, 
Induction, and Epistemology" in Lasker, G. 
E. (Ed) Procs of the Int. Congress on 
Applied Systems Research and Cyberneticss 
Pergamon. 
.. Hence, a model is a good model 
whenever the results of its functioning 
show no discrepancy relative to the 
functioning of the black box. That 
relation, I content, is the very same as 
the relation between our knowledge and our 
experience -- and because our experience is 
the only contact we have with what 
philosophers call "ontological reality", I 
have suggested that that absolute reality 
has for us the status of a black box. ... " 
Gougen, J. and Varela, F. (1978? ) 
"Systems and Distinctions; Duality and 
Complementarity. Xerox of a paper submitted 
to Int. J. General Systems. 
Gregory', R. L. (1970) THE INTELLIGENT 
EYE. Londons Weidenfeld ic. Nicolson. 
Brice, H. P. (1967) William James 
Lectures (unpublished xerox). (Lecture 11 
"Logic and Conversation" in Davidson iý 
Harman (Eds) THE LOGIC OF GRAMMAR. 
Dickenson Publ. Co. 1975) 
.A man'who, by (in, when) saying (or 
making as if to say) that p has implicated 
that q, may be said to have 
conversationally implicated that q, 
PROVIDED thati (1) he is to be presumed to 
be observing the cunversational waximes, or 
at least the cooperative principle, (2) the 
, supposition that he is aware that, or 
thinks that q, is required in order to snake 
his saying or making as if to say p (or 
doing so in THOSE terms) consistent with 
this presumption, and (3) that the speaker 
thinks (and would expect the hearer to 
think that the the speaker thinks) that it 
is within the competence of the hearer to 
work out, or grasp Intuitively, that the 
supposition mentioned in (2) IS required. 
Guenther, O. (1967) "Time, Timeless 
Logic and Self-referential Systems" in 
ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 
Vol. 138,396-406. 
.. An onthology with two themes requires 
two successive systems of logic because its 
conceptualization has to choose between one 
or the other theme. Either the first or the 
second theme will shift into logical focus 
or, to put it In more formal terms, 
nondesignation will either correspond to 
the theme designated by the single value or 
it will reflect the second theme which 
needs a duality of values for designation. 
... due to the inherent ambiguity of 
the 
term "Thought". It may either refer to the 
image, or the image-producing process. The 
Classic tradition of formal logic neglects 
Us ambiguity. And thus it does not 
understand the Janus-face of subjective 
self-reference. Subjectivity is both the 
still image of the world as well as the 
14 
ºx ""ocees of making an arrays; and what 
wir a, ý! a personal ego conatitutt* ttcelf 
it ih triadic relation between 
env, # wjment, image and image--maktnq. ... 
hlowe, R. H. and von Foerbt. r, H. (1973) 
"]ntroducory Comments to Francisco varela's 
Calculus for Self-Reference" Int. J. 
General Systems, Vol. 2.1-3 
Johnson, B. S. (1975) "See, ihe Old Lady 
Decently". London: Hutchinson. 
'U let me open as though there were a 
beginning, though all there can be is the 
Great Round, uroboros, container of 
opposites, within which we war, laugh and 
are silent. ... " 
Jones, J. C. (1970/1981) DESIGN METHODS, 
Chichesters Wiley. 
Jones, J. C. (1979) "Designing 
Designing" in Design Studies Vol. 1. No. 1. 
31-35. 
Jones, J. C. (1980a) ...... In the 
dimension of Time. (Thoughts about the 
context of designing)" in Design Studies 
Vol. 1 No. 3. 
.. When we say 'the world', and when we 
call it an 'it', we are making a false 
distinction between the things we perceive 
and'the processes of perception and 
recognition by which we learn to see and 
act. ... 
Jones, J. C. (1980b) "Things" in Neuf 
No. 97 
The eye is NOT a 'thing', an entity, 
and neither is the 'hand'. Cut them off 
from the body and they cease to work, to 
operate, they die. This whole Idea of 
"thing" of artefact, is wrong. as is any 
"naming", any treating of parts a+ the 
world as separable entities. ... " 
Jung, R. t)o77) "Systems of Action". 
Univ. of Alberta, Edmontons Center for the 
Advanced Studv in Theoretical Psychology. 
Jung, H. 11979) "Cybernetic 
Phenomenology of Conduct", visiting lecture 
series. Uxbridge$ Brunel Univ. 
Jung. R. (1979) "The Cybernetics of 
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(validity), try to deflate the importance 
of time (criterion of predictability: by 
making the future visible now, we take it 
out of time - make it timeless), and try to 
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apparently then should be more like 
constructors, sources of new actions with a 
surplus to be evaluated - possitively for 
the constructor, and not negatively for 
others. ... " 
de Zeeuw, O. (1979b). "Methodology for 
dealing with side-effects of Policies for 
Science". Proc Symposium on ORDER AND 
DISORDER IN SCIENCE POLICY. Bruxellest 
Fondation Francqui. 
... a. the FORM such knowledge takes is of 
the embedding variety. If one is doing A to 
effectuate X, and an obstruction is 
signalled or the appearance of a 
side-effect, one should find a structure, 
part of which is a description of what one 
is doing, such that there are other parts - 
which either can replace what one is doing 
(thus improving our ability to reach X), or 
can be combined with what one is doing (so 
the combination can replace what one is 
doing) - to reach X with minimal 
side-effects. Such embedding forms in fact 
are 'definers' and 'changers' of 
boundaries the boundary on what one is 
doing (and which originally defines what is 
an effect or side-effect) is changed and 
redefined. ... 
de Zeeuw, ß. (1979c) When to stop. 
improvement" in Ericson, R. (Ed) Proca of 
th SOSR Silver Aniv. Conference. Berlin, 
Heidelberg & New Yorki Springer. 
z in a process of inquiry try to find 
various stopping rules, as an activity on 
the first level itself; these must be such 
that they will help maintain Improvements, 
and thus contribute to improvement on the 
second level! ... " 
de Zeeuw, O. (1980) "Speeding Up 
Improvement" In Lasker, O. E. (Ed) Procs of 
the Int. Congress on Applied General 
Systems and Cyberneticst Pergamon. 
"... the I-indeterminacy model implies that 
there is a difficulty of deciding which of 
various co-existing I-saying systems is 
'the' I, the I that can represent all the 
others. ... So one would like to have a 
method for improvement, that does not 
presuppose any identifiable 'I' on any 
level. ... " 32 
